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INTRODUCTION
With the liberalization of the Japanese beef 
market in April of 1991, the opportunities for expansion of 
beef exports to Japan from the United States improved 
dramatically. This paper will examine the potential for 
economic gain in the Japanese beef market and the ability of 
a Montana beef enterprise to participate in that burgeoning 
market. The productive capacity of Japan itself, the 
competitive position of other beef-exporting countries and 
domestic U.S. companies, and the demands of the Japanese 
consumer will be addressed in an effort to assess the 
comparative advantage of the Montana enterprise in question. 
With the Japanese market framed as such, specific steps 
which the Montana producer may take in order to augment its 
competitive position will be recommended.
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PART I
BEEF CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN —  A FRAMEWORK
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CHAPTER 1 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CATTLE IN JAPAN
The Japanese derive the name of their country from a 
Chinese phrase meaning "the source of the 
sun,"...[which] describes the country's geographical 
position east of China. The word "Japan" came from 
Marco Polo's attempt to render the Chinese 
pronunciation of the phrase in Italian after his return 
from China in the 13th Century. The Japanese 
themselves, however, usually give the characters a 
sound that is rendered in English as "Nihon."
Reported in "Farmline" (Farmline 1990, 12).
Buddhism and Shintoism, the primary religious practices 
in Japan for centuries, shaped much of the social fabric of 
Japanese society. One of the tenets of this fabric was a 
prohibition against the consumption of beef. As a result, 
very little beef was consumed in Japan for 1,200 years. 
Soldiers, however, were considered a special class, and as 
such were not subject to the restrictions of the general 
populace. Japanese military leaders believed that beef gave 
their soldiers strength and would feed beef to their troops 
in preparation for battle. Many soldiers consequently 
developed a taste for beef, which returned with them to 
civilian life. Because the civilian population still 
considered the cooking and eating of beef to be sacrilegious 
and a desecration of the house, these "discharges" would
3
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heat plowshares over hot coals and cook beef outside.
Hence, "sukiyaki," which literally means "plow cooking," was 
born (Lunt 1991, 2b).
Sourced from the Asian mainland via the Korean 
peninsula, cattle were introduced to Japan as draft animals 
for the cultivation of rice sometime around the second 
century. Because of the rugged terrain of the Skikoku 
region, movement of cattle from this import area was 
restricted. As a result, cattle were found in small, 
isolated areas with essentially closed populations (Lunt 
1991, 3b).
In 1635 imports of additional cattle were prohibited by 
mandate of a shogun. Some 200 years later (1854) the 
prohibition was lifted, and with the Meiji Restoration in 
1868 not only was the importation of cattle encouraged, the 
ban against eating beef was removed. A number of breeds, 
including Brown Swiss, Shorthorn, Simmental, Holstein and 
Angus were then introduced for the purpose of crossbreeding. 
Different regions preferred different breeds, which, when 
combined with different crossbreeding practices in the 
different regions, augmented regional differences in types 
of cattle. These regional differences were reinforced in 
1910 when Japan again closed its cow herd to crossbreeding.
A number of distinct breeds are therefore contained within 
the Japanese "Wagyu," which is commonly understood to be the 
Japanese breed of beef cattle ("Wa" means Japanese or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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japanese-style and "gyu” means cattle) (Lunt 1991, 3b).
This would not be unlike Black Angus cattle in the U.S., 
where many Angus breeders maintain that there is more 
variation within the Angus breed than there is between some 
breeds.
As a practical matter, the Japanese Wagyu is separated 
into two breeds. Black Waygu and Red Waygu. The red in the 
Red Wagyu reflects either Simmental or Korean influence, 
depending on the region which is home to the Red Wagyu in 
question. These cattle are generally "beefier" and more 
heavily muscled than the Black Wagyu and are more similar to 
American beef cattle than are the Black Wagyu. The Black 
Wagyu, likely descended from Brown Swiss, Simmental, 
Ayrshire, and possibly shorthorn (interview with Dr. Jerry 
Reeves, animal scientist at Washington State University,
June 18, 1992) and which comprise about 90 percent of all 
Wagyu (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 13), were used primarily for 
draft purposes, for plowing or pulling carts, or as pack 
animals. The draft Wagyu show heavier front quarters than 
do the pack Wagyu, which were selected for overall size and 
back strength. As with the Red Wagyu, these differences are 
delineated by region and are apparent today.
The livestock industry in Japan was basically 
nonexistent prior to the 1950s since cattle were not raised 
primarily for consumption. In fact, most Waygu were 
fattened and slaughtered only after serving a productive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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life as a draft animal, hence the mature age of many Waygu 
cattle which came to market. Though initial efforts at 
expanding livestock production centered on pork and poultry, 
by 1961 government focus shifted to the cattle industry. 
Import quotas, price stabilization schemes, and calf 
production subsidies were implemented (Khan et al. 1990,
10). As a result, the number of beef cattle increased from 
nearly 1.9 million head to almost 2.7 million head in the 
period of 1965 to 1988 (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 14).
This does not include dairy cattle (1.3 million to 2.0 
million for the same period). At most, Japan's cattle 
numbers would approach 5 million head at present. This 
compares to roughly 100 million head in the U.S. and 25 
million head in Australia. The dairy industry did not 
become significant in Japan until after World War II when 
Holsteins were imported in significant numbers. Though 
raised mainly for milk, a major market has been established 
for dairy beef in Japan.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN JAPANESE AGRICULTURE
Though the total area of Japan is not as large as 
Montana, four large islands and numerous smaller islands 
extend in an arc roughly 1,300 miles long, or essentially 
the distance from Maine to Florida. Because 85 percent of 
the land mass is mountainous or hilly, leaving 15 percent 
(or less) which is tillable, the majority of Japan's 124 
million people live in coastal areas (Seim 1990, 123).
Historically, protection of domestic agriculture by the 
Japanese government had a major influence on the development 
of agriculture in Japan. As manufacturing developed in 
Japan, labor productivity in agriculture fell. Per-capita 
farm income was about 80 percent of non-farm income prior to 
1900, but this figure dropped by half —  to less than 40 
percent —  in the 1930s. Thus, to prevent rural poverty 
from fomenting social upheaval during the interwar period, 
the government instituted policies to relieve rural poverty. 
A prominent feature of Japanese agriculture thus became 
social policies constructed for the relief of rural poverty 
(Hayami 1988, 24).
Government intervention for the support of agriculture.
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however, was nothing new to Japanese society. As Japan's 
industrial strength grew during the later 1800s, in part 
based on Japan's successful agricultural development, 
comparative advantage shifted to manufacturing. The 
landlord class then became more concerned about protection 
for agriculture than about increasing agricultural 
production (Hayami 1988, 34). Consequently, political 
lobbying for protective measures became a primary interest 
of the landlord class. Also, as Japan's industrial capacity 
developed during the interwar period, rural subsidies were 
seen as necessary to maintain cheap food for cheap labor. 
Like the landlords, industrialists recognized the need for 
agricultural subsidies to prevent peasants from joining the 
growing labor movement and the socialist ranks (Hayami 1988, 
39).
From 1880 to 1920, through the export of silk and other 
commodities, Japanese agriculture served as a major earner 
of foreign exchange. This was consistent with real growth 
in agricultural productivity for the thirty-five year period 
preceding World War I (Hayami 1988, 29). However, during 
the 1930s the ratio of subsidy to income in agriculture 
surpassed that of the non-agricultural sector (Hayami 1988, 
39). A cheap food policy, for the purpose of cheap 
industrial labor, was at the root of this inversion.
A major overhaul of the Japanese agricultural economy 
occurred after the Second World War with the American
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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occupation of Japan. Wolf Ladejinsky and Robert Fearey, the 
principal architects of the occupation's land reform, shared 
a belief in Jeffersonian agrarianism with General MacArthur. 
Fundamental to Jeffersonian agrarianism was the belief that 
private property was a natural right, and that land 
ownership, independence, liberty, and citizenship were 
connected. General Headquarters therefore undertook land 
reform in an effort to make agrarian communities democratic. 
Free elections were enacted to allow rural representation in 
the Diet, farmer's cooperatives were organized to add to 
their representative power, and absentee landlordism was 
virtually abolished, allowing tenant farmers to become fee- 
holders of the land they farmed (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 
70). This was done in part to prevent agrarian unrest, 
which might well destabilize Japan's newly established 
democracy. As a result, rural conservatism took root with 
small-scale, Jeffersonian owner-operators voicing strong 
support for democratic principles and the conservative party 
(Moore 1990, 88).
Paramount to agricultural reform was an urgent need to 
increase agricultural production, which was done by 
increasing incentives to those cultivating the land rather 
than increasing the economic stature of landlords. From 
1947 to 1950, 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres @ 2.47 
acres per hectare) of farmland were purchased by the 
government from landlords and transferred to tenant farmers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Farmland under tenancy therefore declined from 45 percent in 
1945 to 9 percent in 1955. Not only were the rights of 
tenants on that land which remained under tenancy 
strengthened, but tenant rental rates were reduced, both of 
which further eroded the power of landlords. Land holding 
was also limited to three hectares in order to prevent a 
resurgence of landlordism (Hayami 1988, 45).
The net result was a redistribution of land to a much 
broader class of worker-owners. However, the basic size of 
farm units remained relatively stable at approximately one 
hectare. As a result, the small-scale farming enterprises 
which typify Japanese agriculture, in spite of the successes 
of land reform invoked by the occupation, left Japan at a 
distinct competitive disadvantage in terms of producing 
agricultural products for the international market place.
During the postwar period, though agricultural 
productivity grew quickly relative to that of other 
countries, it did not keep pace with growth in Japan's 
industrial sector. Consequently, in spite of the 
government's interwar efforts to relieve rural poverty, 
income growth in the rural sector failed to match that of 
the industrial, urban sector. Government policy, though 
having concentrated on improving agricultural productivity 
in the postwar rebuilding period, now shifted to closing the 
income gap between farm and urban households. In spite of 
policy directives this gap progressively widened.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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accelerating the migration of farm labor to industrial 
centers. To stem this course, and to strengthen agriculture 
relative to the urban sector, the Agricultural Basic Law was 
enacted as a national charter for agriculture in 1961.
A fundamental tenet of the Agricultural Basic Law was 
to equalize the income potential and standard of living 
between farm and non-farm households. To achieve income 
parity, structural adjustments in agriculture were deemed 
necessary. These included expansion of farm size to take 
advantage of mechanization and economies of scale, a shift 
in production to those commodities which were in greater 
demand (e.g., decreasing consumption of rice and increasing 
consumption of beef), and improvements to farm 
infrastructure and technology (Hayami 1988, 77). Though the 
law ultimately failed to achieve its primary goals, it did 
play a significant role in developing the livestock industry 
in Japan (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 71).
Also important to note is that the emphasis on larger- 
scale farming operations took precedence over concern about 
ownership issues, essentially defining a course for 
agricultural policy which differed from the concerns of the 
postwar reform movement. To help attain a larger-scale 
agriculture, the three hectare upper limit on farm size was 
eliminated in 1970 (Moore 1990, 190). in spite of this, 
Japanese agriculture remains one of the smallest-scale 
agricultural industries in the world (average farm size has
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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remained relatively constant at 1.15 hectares —  about 2.84 
acres —  throughout the twentieth century). Comparatively 
speaking, the average European farm is 15.3 hectares, and 
the average American farm, 175 hectares (Moore 1990, 200). 
Though the size of the Japanese farm has remained basically 
constant throughout the twentieth century, the size of the 
average American farm has nearly tripled since 1960 (Moore 
1990, 205).
Another important government policy was that of food 
self-sufficiency. Although Japan is one of the richest 
countries in the world on a per-capita basis, it is capable 
of producing only 48 percent of its food (Wanatabe 1991,
Dl). The government has consequently instituted measures to 
spur domestic production of food stuffs, and as a corollary, 
has resisted opening its market to food imports in an 
attempt to promote domestic production.
Since the enactment of the Basic Law in 1961, 
agricultural assistance has moved away from price support 
mechanisms because of the financial strain it imposed on the 
national budget and because it encouraged overproduction of 
some commodities.
In Japan land is usually inherited intact, with some 
modification in recent history, by one heir. Though family 
members are seen as transitory, land is recognized as 
permanent property of the household. For centuries land was 
to be preserved by the people for the emperor. Ultimately
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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this gave way to ownership of land by landlords, and, as 
described above, this then evolved into ownership by the 
farmers themselves. Largely the result of the postwar 
occupation, the practice of dividing land among multiple 
heirs became acceptable, which has led to fragmented land 
ownership (Moore 1990, 66). Throughout, land has 
traditionally held a key position in the structure of the 
household.
In many rural areas, and often in response to 
industrial development, land prices have risen in real 
terms, making agricultural land an attractive investment and 
encouraging families who own land to retain its ownership. 
This has become increasingly important with the aging of the 
Japanese population, and the return of older couples to the 
farmstead.
Since the early Meiji period, with the rise of 
manufacturing Japanese farmers have looked to off-farm 
employment to augment farm income. From 1884 to 1939, about 
30 percent of all farms were operated by part-time farmers 
(Moore 1990, 97), known in Japan as "weekend farmers." 
Postwar land reform temporarily reduced this percentage, but 
with the manufacturing opportunities generated by supplying 
the U.S. military during the Korean War the trend toward 
off-farm employment accelerated.
This trend has continued to present-day, and in large 
measure Japan's stellar industrial growth was made possible
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by the availability of stable rural labor. With increased 
mechanization, not only did farmers find themselves less 
dependent upon hired labor, but they were also able to 
pursue off-farm wage labor themselves. Much of Japanese 
manufacturing is based on subcontracting to decentralized 
plants, many of which are located in rural areas because of 
the quality of labor found there. This has resulted in an 
increasing proportion of part-time farms and non-farm income 
for the farm household.
Two problems have surfaced in recent years regarding 
succession of the typical Japanese farm. One is the "heir 
problem." The other is the "bride problem." Finding heirs 
to carry on farm operations, and the duties of the household 
line commensurate with that position, is becoming 
increasingly difficult due to out-migration from farm areas 
by young farmers. In addition, the greatest problem in 1987 
was finding wives for male heirs. Some rural communities 
resorted to recruiting brides from the Philippines and other 
countries to fill this vacuum (Moore 1990, 193).
The net effect is the aging of the rural sector. 
Inheritance and household succession are likely the main 
problems facing rural Japan in the 1990s (Moore 1990, 272).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3 
RURAL POLITICAL STRENGTH IN JAPAN
NOKYO is the common term for the association of 
Japanese agricultural cooperatives. Cooperatives were first 
formed in Japan in 1899 in response to the declining 
economic stature of agriculture vis-a-vis the growing 
Japanese industrial sector. In the 1890s, farm income 
accounted for nearly one-third of the national income.
After World War I, with the formation of a national 
marketing system the number of farm-related cooperatives 
doubled (Moore 1990, 138;. Then, after World War II, the 
occupation forces abolished the old cooperative system and 
formed voluntary, democratic cooperatives free of landlord 
control. NOKYO was also given the right to perform banking 
activities, and with the Agricultural Cooperative Union Law 
of 1947, NOKYO was granted quasi-governmental status and the 
formal right to represent farmers in negotiations with the 
government. Because of this, NOKYO is considered to be one 
of the most powerful interest groups in Japan.
Within NOKYO there are a number of different 
cooperatives engaged in different activities, including 
marketing of various farm products, selling numerous
15
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supplies to co-op members, credit and insurance businesses,
political lobbying, and banking. The Agricultural Central
Bank of Japan, the quasi-governmental financial arm of
NOKYO, was ranked sixth in the world in deposits in 1988
(Moore 1990, 137).
Norinchukin, the co-op's principal bank, has assets of 
$260 billion, more than Citicorp, and is the largest 
supplier of funds to Japan's short-term money markets. 
Yet another Nokyo arm is a huge Japanese insurer, with 
$2.2 trillion of coverage in force —  double that of 
Metropolitan Life (Eisenstodt 1991, 84).
In 1988, NOKYO cooperatives received $5.6 million in
government subsidies (Economist 1988a). In 1991, NOKYO had
assets of $447 billion (Eisenstodt 1991, 84). Much of
NOKYO's financial strength derives from its control of 95
percent of Japan's rice crop (Moore 1990, 154).
Within NOKYO there are more than 4,300 general
cooperatives representing 380,000 employees, 5.5 million
members, and 2.5 million non-farm associate members (Hayami
1988, 46; Moore 1990, 142; Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 101). In
1991 NOKYO had one employee for every three "real" farms,
compared to one employee for every six farms in 1975
(Eisenstodt 1991, 84). In addition to the general
cooperatives there are some 4,700 specialized cooperatives
representing specific interests, such as dairy cooperatives
and citrus cooperatives. Semi-government functions, such as
channeling low-interest loans, have also been assigned to
certain cooperatives (Hayami 1988, 46). About 70 percent of
all agricultural loans either originate from or are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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administered through NOKYO (Moore 1990, 154). The NOKYO 
structure is similar to Japanese industrial groups, known as 
"keiretsu," where the various cooperatives are linked 
through a central bank.
NOKYO has been successful in securing substantial 
agricultural price supports through its political influence. 
Rural Japan has a disproportionate amount of political 
power. While the farm population decreased during Japan's 
industrial growth, commensurate adjustments in rural 
electoral districts were not made. This has essentially 
given a disproportionate political weight to rural areas in 
the number of rural representatives in the National Diet.
In some instances, the disparity has been as high as one to 
three —  that is, one rural vote carries a weight equivalent 
to three urban votes. In the 1986 election, more than twice 
as many votes were needed to elect a representative to the 
House of Councillors^ from a non-farm district as it did 
from an agricultural region (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 66). 
The spread of part-time farming, and the return of retirees 
to the family farm, has contributed to this pattern by
^The Diet, Japan's parliament, is comprised of the House 
of Representatives (the Lower House), and the House of 
Councillors (the Upper House). The Japanese constitution 
provides for an executive branch (the Cabinet, consisting of 
a Prime Minister and about 20 other Ministers of State who are 
appointed by the Prime Minister), a legislative branch (the 
National Diet), and a judicial branch (the court system). 
Agriculture is represented in the Cabinet by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 
63—64).
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slowing the decline in rural population.
The increase in the number of part-time farmers has 
been especially significant. Because of the demands on 
their time from off-farm employment, and the fact that they 
are small-scale producers, part-time farmers are more 
dependent upon the convenience of marketing through and 
buying from agricultural cooperatives than are full-time 
farmers. By-and-large they are high-cost producers and 
loyal, quiet followers of NOKYO. As such, part-time farmers 
have become NOKYO's economic and political power base 
(Hayami 1988, 91).
As political spokesman for rural Japan, NOKYO has 
political power that reaches far beyond its membership 
numbers. With their conservative roots the rural districts 
vote as a conservative block, which has provided a political 
foundation for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
In order to retain that support, the LDP has been receptive 
to NOKYO's demands for protective measures. The 
ideologically conservative LDP has held a majority in the 
House of Representatives since 1955 largely because of its 
rural power base and alliance with NOKYO.
The "World Food Crisis" of 1973-5, which led to sharp 
increases in world food prices, and, in 1973, the U.S. 
soybean embargo and the "oil shock," all reinforced the call 
by NOKYO for greater agricultural protectionism. Japan's 
national security, it was argued, depended upon its ability
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to be self-sufficient in food production, and to be self- 
sufficient domestic production had to be protected from 
foreign competition (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 132). Food 
security through food self-sufficiency became the rallying 
cry.
NOKYO has proven to be an indispensable vote-getter for 
the LDP as well as a source of lucrative employment for 
retired bureaucrats. Because of this, NOKYO; the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF); and the 
ruling LDP became known as the "iron triangle." This 
triumvirate has been known to block any attempts to reduce 
agricultural protection and government subsidy, even when 
proposed reforms stood to benefit the farmers themselves, 
because of the potential for reduction in the economic and 
political power of the "iron triangle."
Aside from its political power, on an operations level 
some would argue that the cooperatives have been 
instrumental in modernizing the beef industry in Japan. 
Because cooperatives provide much of the feed concentrates 
used in cattle raising, and because they provide credit, 
veterinary care, and marketing services, it is questionable 
if the beef industry in Japan would have developed to the 
extent that it has without NOKYO's services. This is 
augmented by the fact that cooperatives operate an 
increasing proportion of slaughter plants and have 
significant involvement in the preparation and distribution
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of beef cuts.
The Waning of Rural Power in Japan
Because it was once so, we Japanese believe that rice 
is the lifeline of Japan. But we do not have to grow 
rice here. Like the lacoccas of the U.S., Japan's rice 
farmers influence politics, distorting the economy and 
crimping the quality of life in our country.
Kenichi Ohmae, McKinsey & Co's managing partner in 
Japan (Ohmae 1992, AID).
To support its bureaucracy, NOKYO must charge high
prices for its commodities —  prices which are as much as 30
percent higher than prices charged by private Japanese
companies, which in turn are higher than prices charged by
U.S. companies (Eisenstodt 1991, 84). As a result, Japanese
farmers pay some of the world's highest prices for an
assortment of agricultural inputs. Because of NOKYO's
ubiquitous presence in rural Japan, and its integral part in
Japan's rural social fabric, most farmers find it less
appealing to shop elsewhere than to bear the higher prices
of NOKYO's products. However, a concern is mounting in
rural Japan that NOKYO is out for itself first and for the
farmer second.
In addition, the LDP is becoming less dependent on the
rural farm vote as it gains support in urban areas. It also
recognizes the necessity of shifting its political power
base to urban areas consistent with changes in demographics
and voting district reform. In fact,
...with as many as three out of five LDP members being
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elected by voters who are litereally dying out, party 
officials know it cannot be much longer before they 
will have to dump the farmers in favour of the wage- 
earning city dwellers (Economist 1991, 32).
The government, and by inference the ruling party, is
also finding it increasingly difficult to fully support
NOKYO and its demands for market protection and subsidies
because of budget constraints and a rising consumer voice
for cheaper food stuffs. As of 1991, 30 percent of a
Japanese family's disposable income was spent on food,
nearly double that of the U.S. (17 percent for the U.S., 20%
for Europe) (Economist 1991, 32). The Japanese consumer is
increasingly aware that the cost of its restrictive trade
policies is borne by them. Prices for many consumer goods
have not reflected the 40 to 50 percent appreciation of the
yen, and the commensurate increase in Japanese purchasing
power, since 1985 (Meltzer 1990, D8). As a result, the
standard of living of the average Japanese family has not
kept pace with Japan's rise in economic power. In 1989,
Japan's Economic Planning Agency reported that
...typical consumer goods were an average of 40 percent 
higher in Tokyo than in New York. The items that were 
far more expensive in Japan were all subject to 
government regulation (Ishihara 1991, 98).
For instance, surcharges on some cuts of imported beef were
as high as 90 to 100 percent (Eaheart 1991, 14).
Haruo Maekawa, a former governor of the Bank of Japan,
made the following observation in 1988:
The main objective of all [government] ministries used 
to be to foster or protect the producer. That is why
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our economic structure became export oriented. It was 
not to improve the quality of the life of the 
people.... The government is now focusing on the 
quality of life. That's why the whole structure of the 
economy is changing (Jameson and Redburn 1988, 17).
Consistent with the waning power of NOKYO is this process of
change to a more consumer-sensitive economy. The attitude
that the consumer need not suffer so that producers may
prosper seems to be increasingly prevalent in modern-day
Japan.
As a result of changes in Japan's political power 
structure, the "iron triangle" is being redefined as well. 
Still composed of three institutions (bureaucracy, the 
ruling party, and special interest groups), the 
representation of those special interest groups and the 
bureaucracy has changed. MAFF is no longer included as a 
component of the "iron triangle's" bureaucracy^, and 
special interest groups have expanded to give more 
representation to economic organizations which are 
independent of rural constituencies (Kihl et al. 1990, 100).
NOKYO has also faced mounting criticism from the 
Japanese business community for obstructing agricultural 
reform, and for impeding Japan's endeavors to reposition 
itself in the global economy consistent with its economic 
stature. Big business has also called for liberalization of
^The bureaucracy of the new "iron triangle" consists of 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), and the Economic Planning Agency (Kihl et 
al. 1990, 100).
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food imports in order to contain cost-of-living expenses for 
their urban employees (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 87).
Internal pressures to relieve the political and 
economic expense of agricultural protection are augmented by 
external pressures from food-exporting countries, most 
notably the United States. Known as "gaiatsu," or foreign 
pressure, Japanese politicians often use pressure from 
foreign governments to institute change which they recognize 
as necessary yet politically unpopular. In this way special 
interests are overridden, the national interest is served, 
and Japan's leadership escapes blame.
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CHAPTER 4 
PROTECTION OF THE JAPANESE MARKET
The Japanese government has authorized 3,600 shops to 
sell imported beef, but many receive so little of it 
that they limit sales to three hours a day. Some offer 
only 3 3 pounds a day.
Phil Seng, President and CEO of the U.S. Meat 
Export Federation (Jameson 1988, 18).
The nominal rates of agricultural protection, defined 
by the percentage by which domestic (Japanese) producer 
prices exceed the border price (the price at which exporting 
countries can place their products at the border of the 
importing country), are compared as follows for 12 
commodities, including beef;
Table 1
Nominal Rates of Agricultural Protection (Percent)
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1986
JPN 18 41 69 74 76 85 102 210
US 2 1 9  11 4 0 6 6
Source: Hayami 1988, 6-7.
As demonstrated by these figures, the Japanese farmer
24
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enjoys a substantially greater degree of market protection 
than does his American counterpart. Resistance to high food 
prices softened as industry became more capital-intensive 
and information-dependent and less reliant upon cheap labor 
during Japan's postwar "economic miracle" (Hayami 1988, 15). 
The agricultural lobby was therefore able to provide its 
markets with a degree of protection among the highest in the 
world. Furthermore, though protection for manufacturing 
declined as this sector left the "infant-industry" stage, 
protection for agriculture was increased in order to arrest 
its economic decline (Hayami 1988, 23).
Commensurate with Japan's industrial growth was a rise 
in affluence among Japan's urban population. The share of 
food as a percentage of the consumer's budget declined from 
60 percent in the early Meiji period to about 30 percent in 
1988 (Hayami 1988, 19), which lowered the resistance of the 
consumer to high food prices. Strong protests by consumers 
to increasing levels of agricultural protection were 
therefore seldom made, let alone orchestrated. Protective 
measures were not without their impact, however. In 1988 
market protection forced the Japanese to pay from three to 
six times the world price for beef, wheat and rice. It was 
estimated that protection added as much as $61 billion, or 4 
percent of personal consumption, to food purchases 
(Economist 1988c, 31).
Protective measures took three forms: (l) border
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protection, i.e., import quotas (quantitative restrictions), 
tariffs, and levies; (2) price supports, which establish 
floor and ceiling prices, usually set higher than market, 
and controlled by the release of food stocks from storage by 
the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIFO), a 
government agency; and (3) subsidies, or direct payments 
from the government to agricultural producers.
Through the price stabilization program, LIFO, which 
also administers import quotas for beef, has been able to 
maintain wholesale prices for domestic beef at levels two to 
four times that of the equivalent import price (Johnson and 
Fisher 1988, 35). In order to reduce input costs to beef 
producers, among a host of government-sponsored activities 
has been the establishment of a feed-price stabilization 
fund, low-interest loans for capital expenditures including 
the purchase of livestock, the development of public lands 
for livestock grazing, and a rice diversion program to shift 
productive land from rice crops to feed crops which 
essentially provides cheaper feed to cattle producers 
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 40-41).
As a percentage of the agricultural budget, subsidies 
command the largest share, rising from 49 percent in 1960 to 
62 percent in 1984 (Hayami 1988, 57). Subsidies to 
agriculture in Japan have risen relative to agricultural 
subsidies in other industrialized countries. The tax-burden 
imposed on farmers in Japan also appears to be considerably
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less than that of Japan's non-farm population. Within farm 
households, in 1983 on-farm income was taxed at half the 
rate of off-farm income (Hayami 1988, 61).
Market protection in Japan has afforded the producer a 
degree of subsidy which is among the highest in the world, 
and in so doing has sheltered much of Japanese agriculture 
from international competition. Coupled with tight beef 
supplies and a continued appreciation in the yen, beef 
prices in Japan have been kept substantially above world 
parity.
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CHAPTER 5
LIBERALIZATION OF THE JAPANESE BEEF MARKET
.. .When asked about cheaper beef coining into his 
market...one of the Japanese hosts [replied]..."What 
would happen in Scotts Bluff, Nebraska, if the 
Australians came in and started selling beef for 30 
cents a pound. Would they get out alive?"
Laura Sands, reporting for Beef Today (Sands 
1988, 17).
As Japan developed its modern industrial economy in the 
1950s and fueled its economic growth largely through 
exports, its domestic markets were not opened to foreign 
products in like amounts. Substantial trade imbalances with 
many of its trading partners developed as a result. This 
situation was seen as increasingly inappropriate with 
Japan's relatively new status as a global economic power.
It was also increasingly expensive for the government to 
continue subsidizing a relatively inefficient agricultural 
economy.
The Nakasone government sponsored the Maekawa
Commission Report, published in 1986, to recommend policy
directives which the government could undertake to rectify
this situation. The report acknowledged that Japan's
economy was structured around exports and that there was an
...urgent need for Japan to implement drastic policies 
of structural adjustment and to seek to transform the
28
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Japanese economic structure into one oriented to 
international coordination (Kihl and Jacobsen 1990,
96).
The report specifically called for structural changes in
Japanese agriculture, emphasizing that
...efforts should be made toward a steady increase in 
imports of products (with the sole notable exception of 
rice) whose domestic prices and the international 
market price differ markedly (Kihl and Jacobsen 1988, 
96).
À second Maekawa Commission Report was published one 
year later (1987) which recommended, among other items 
promoting agricultural reform, the following:
1. Promoting agricultural policy that gives full 
consideration not only to producers but also to 
consumers and the food industry.
2. Reducing the differential between Japanese and 
overseas prices and achieving stable foodstuff 
supplies at popularly acceptable prices by 
improving productivity and promoting imports as 
appropriate.
3. Making Japanese production more rational and 
more efficient and holding border adjustment 
measures to a minimum for nonrice products (Kihl 
and Jacobsen 1988, 97).
During this period the Japanese government was
pressured by the Reagan administration to relax its beef
import quotas. Frustrated by the lack of progress, in 1986
the U.S. requested that the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) rule on a number of Japan's restrictive
measures, including the legality of its import quota for
beef. In 1987 the GATT ruled in favor of the U.S. in ten of
twelve agricultural commodities, with beef as one of the
ten. Subsequently, agreement with the Japanese government
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concerning liberalizing its agricultural imports was reached 
in 1988 with the Beef Market Access Agreement (BMAA). The 
BMAA called for a gradual increase in Japan's import quota 
over a three-year period, after which import quotas would be 
replaced by an ad valorem tax, which would decrease over a 
three-year period.
Specifically, imports would increase by 60,000 metric 
tons in each of 1988, 1989, and 1990. On April 1, 1991, the 
quota would be replaced by a 70 percent ad valorem tax, 
which would fall to 60 percent as of April 1, 1992 and 50 
percent on April 1, 1993. Subsequent reductions in the ad 
valorem tax will be subject to negotiation in the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN). Should beef 
imports exceed 120 percent of the previous year's imports, 
an additional 25 percent tariff would be charged. After 
April 1, 1994, safeguard measures will be determined by the 
GATT. The agreement also called for the Livestock Industry 
Promotion Corporation (LIPC) to cease its involvement in 
Japan's international beef trade effective April 1, 1991 
(Kihl and Jacobsen 1988, 108-109).
Under the quota system, imported beef was subject to a 
25 percent tariff, but when combined with additional 
surcharges a total charge of 75 to 100 percent was common by 
the time the product reached the market place (Cullison 
1991, 3A). As a result of lower prices and greater 
availability, in the initial months of market liberalization
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sales of chilled U.S. beef (volume) nearly doubled. At the 
beginning of liberalization, only 15 percent of U.S. beef 
sales in Japan were of chilled beef. Within the first three 
months that percentage had reached 29 percent, with the 
expectation that 50 percent of U.S. beef sales in Japan 
would be of chilled beef within one year (Pendley 1991, lA).
In total, within the first month of liberalization U.S. 
beef exports to Japan rose 13.7 percent, most of which was 
chilled beef (Davies 1991, 7A). By August of 1991 (the first 
year of liberalization), though exports of chilled U.S. beef 
continued to exceed those of previous years, total imports 
of U.S. beef declined by 27 percent in July and August over 
the same two-month period of 1990. This was due to a 
reduction in exports of frozen beef, attributable to surplus 
frozen beef stocks in Japan (Cattle Fax 1991).
The beef import quota had been the primary means by 
which beef prices were maintained within their designated 
stabilization bands (defined by floor and ceiling prices, 
set by LIPC). Since the beef industry has been less 
developed than the poultry or pork industries in Japan, it 
has been given the highest degree of protection through a 
system of quotas, tariffs and levies since 1964. Import 
quotas were set by MAFF biannually, and were divided between 
a general quota and special quotas, with each containing 
further subdivisions. Nearly 90 percent of the general 
quota was administered by LIPC, with the remaining 10
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percent administered by private entities, primarily traders 
and beef-processors. Special quotas were implemented to 
satisfy some special interests, namely the hotel quota, the 
school lunch quota, the Okinawa quota, and the boiled beef 
quota.
Beef import quotas in metric tons for selected years
were :
Table 2 
































Source: Johnson and Fisher 1988, 98.
The removal of the quota and the cessation of LIPC's 
involvement, which will add flexibility to importing and 
distributing beef in Japan, signaled a major step by the 
Japanese government toward opening its domestic beef market 
to foreign competition The LDP leadership has recognized 
the inconsistency of promoting liberalization of foreign
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markets for manufactured goods while maintaining a highly 
protected domestic market for agricultural commodities. To 
develop a consistent trade policy, and to demonstrate its 
ability to cooperate as a major world economic power, the 
government agreed to open its agricultural markets. The 
government has also acknowledged that its goal of food self- 
sufficiency, given its limited resources, limited factors of 
production, and limited economies-of-scale, is not practical 
(Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 110). Also, "the rapidly 
increasing demand for beef in Japan has forced the 
government to allow imports to increase over time to keep 
prices from increasing significantly above the established 
stabilization range" (Wahl et al. 1991, 119).
However, in spite of a downward trend in wholesale 
prices of meats purchased prior to liberalization and held 
in cold storage in anticipation of higher prices, initially 
retail prices either remained unchanged or increased.
Citing increased labor and rent expense, prior to 
liberalization retailers were reported to be "gouging the 
consumer by increasing profit margins to as much as 40-50% 
from the traditional 30-35%" (Parker and Scandurra 1991).
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CHAPTER 6 
JAPAN'S AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY
Nowhere...is the greying of Japan happening faster than 
down on the farm. In 1960 half of Japan's farming 
population were still under 42 years old. By 1990 the 
median had soared to 60 —  retirement age for the rest 
of Japan. Demographers reckon that, by 2000, as much 
as a third of Japan's farming population will have died 
of old age.
Reported in "The Economist" (Economist 1991, 
32).
It appears that, among the seventeen industrial 
economies, Japan is the only country which has a growth 
rate of labor productivity smaller for agriculture than 
for industry.
Cornelius van der Meer and Saburo Yamada,
Japanese Agriculture. A Comparative
Economic Analysis (Hsiao 1991, 976).
Nearly 250,000 farmers are involved in the beef 
business in Japan (about 0.2 percent of Japan's population; 
about 2 percent of all farm workers; and about 2.7 percent 
of all full-time farmers), most of whom raise Wagyu cattle. 
Seventy percent of Japan's beef production, however, is in 
the dairy industry, which raises and fattens Holstein steers 
and sells cull cows for beef consumption as secondary 
activities to milk production. Beef production is generally 
a sideline to milk production, with most producers owning 
about ten head. Nearly 66 percent of all producers (Wagyu
34
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and dairy) have less than five head. All told, less than 4 
percent of aggregate gross agricultural production in Japan 
is provided by beef cattle (Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 108).
Consistent with Japan's rise to industrial prominence 
in the postwar period, 15 percent of Japan's Gross National 
Product (CNF) was produced by agriculture, which employed 25 
percent of the population shortly after World War II. Both 
figures dropped considerably by 1985, with less than 5 
percent of the population employed by agriculture (and less 
than 1 percent of Japan's population employed on the farm —  
including less-than-half-time and more-than-half-time 
workers) producing 4 percent of Japan's GNP (Hayes et al. 
1990, 208). According to Richard Moore, however, 16 percent 
of Japan's total population was involved in farming in 1985, 
down from 45 percent in 1950 (Moore 1990, 11).
In either case, the trend is noticeably downward in 
terms of population involved in agriculture and contribution 
to Japan's GNP. As previously described, increased farm 
mechanization, coupled with higher-wage opportunities in 
manufacturing, led to an out-migration of labor from the 
farm sector to the industrial sector (Hayes et al. 1990,
208).
Though agriculture's productivity continued to decline 
relative to that of manufacturing in the postwar period, 
per-capita farm income increased faster than non-farm 
income. In 1930, the typical Japanese farm household earned
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32 percent of the non-farm household. By 1980, the figure 
had risen to 115 percent, attributable to agricultural 
subsidies and market protection and to an increase in off- 
farm income in farm households (Hayami 1988, 22). Off-farm 
employment has therefore accomplished a primary objective of 
the Agricultural Basic Law of 1961, that is, income parity 
between farm and non-farm households.
In 1950 there was an unusually large number of farms in 
Japan because of an influx to the farming community from 
urban areas and from overseas territories shortly after 
World War II. However, as employment opportunities grew in 
off-farm occupations, the farm household replacement ratio 
(inheriting males/farm households) fell from 85 percent in 
1950 to 2 percent in 1985 (Hayami 1988, 78-79). The 
implication of this is that the number of farms in Japan 
will fall from 4.3 million in 1985 to roughly 80,000 within 
one generation, barring a return to farming by male core 
workers who are presently leaving for off-farm employment 
(Hayami 1988, 106). Whether this means that smaller farms 
will get larger (through land purchase or lease), and hence 
more "viable," or be sold into non-agricultural uses is 
problematic at this point.
However, though many members of farm households found 
more lucrative employment off the farm, due to the 
decentralized structure of Japanese industry many of these 
workers did not have to leave the farm to secure that
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employment. Rather, they remained on the farm in a part- 
time capacity. Nonetheless, the net effect has been a 
reduction in the number of farms, the number of viable 
(i.e., full-time and self-sustaining) farms, and the number 
of farmers, as shown below. Part-time I refers to those 
farms with farm income larger than off-farm income. Part- 
time II refers to farms with farm income smaller than off- 
farm income.
Table 3
Numbers of Japanese Farms and Farm Workers
rio.ooos) 1960 1970 1980 1985 1985/1960
farms.( # ). .
Total 6057 5342 4661 4376 .72
viable 521 353 242 232 .45
Workers (#)
> 1/2 time 1454 1025 697 636 .44
< 1/2 time 312 522 557 527 1.69
Total 1766 1547 1254 1163 .66
Farms ( # '1
Full-time 208 83 62 63 .30
Part-time I 204 180 100 78 .38
Part-time II 194 271 304 297 1.53
Total 606 534 466 438 .72
Source : Hayami 1988, 81-82.
As the above information indicates, though the number 
of workers whose primary vocation was farming decreased by 
more than half from 1960 to 1985, the number of workers 
partially involved in farming increased by over 50 percent 
in the same time period. There has, however, been a net
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decrease in the number of farms and the number of farmers of 
roughly one-third, and part-time farms have replaced viable 
farms as the dominant force in rural Japan. By 1991, the 
number of full-time farmers for whom agriculture is their 
sole source of income was reported as being no higher than 
470,000, or less than half-of-one-percent of Japan's 
population (Economist 1991, 31). Farmers who are classified 
as full-time comprise about 5 percent of all Japanese 
farmers (Reid 1990, H4). From 1975 to 1990, the number of 
households for whom farming is their major source of income 
declined by 40 percent to about one million. "Full-time 
farming families earn $24,000 a year from agriculture; 
adjusting for inflation, that's less than what they earned 
ten years ago" (Eisenstodt 1991, 84).




Year On-Farm Income (A) Total Income (B) A/B (%)
I960 $980 $1,950 50.2%
1970 $2,210 $6,920 31.8%
1980 $4,140 $24,320 17.0%
1985 $4,635 $30,065 15.4%
Source: Moore 1990, 15.
Note: Average pre-1986 exchange rate (1978-1985) of 230
yen per dollar was used.
The salient point is that, by 1985, only 15 percent of
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a farm household's income came from farming. Off-farm 
income has become an increasingly dominant factor in the 
Japanese family's ability to retain and work its farm.
The typical Japanese farm family of the 1990s consists 
of a head-of-household who commutes to an off-farm job and 
who farms only on weekends, and a wife and old parents who 
farm full-time. The introduction of small, ten-or-less 
horsepower "hand tractors" has allowed women and the elderly 
to perform many farm functions without the help of able- 
bodied men. Demographically the age structure in Japan is 
rising, most noticeably in life expectancy. In the 1930s 
the average life expectancy of the Japanese was about 50 
years. In 1985 this increased to 75 years for men and 80 
years for women. With this labor source available for 
farming, and the off-farm employment opportunities available 
for heads-of-household, many farm families have been able to 
retain ownership of their farms. This has, however, had the 
unintended effect of impeding growth in the viable-farm 
sector of the farm economy.
Additional motive for retaining farm ownership has been 
the security inherent in owning land as well as the 
investment value of the property itself. The value of 
tillable farm land has increased dramatically in recent 
years for several reasons. One is Japan's relatively high 
population density and mountainous terrain, which limit the 
supply of raw farm land. Another is the tendency to keep
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the ownership of farm land in the family, which limits the 
amount of farm land available for sale. Yet another 
involves agricultural subsidies, which tend to be 
capitalized into the value of farm land. The high cost of 
arm land has contributed to the lack of expansion, via land 
purchase, in the number of viable farms.
The farm expansion that has occurred has done so 
primarily through land leasing rather than land purchase. 
Economy-of-scale has been an objective of Japanese 
agricultural policy since the Basic Law and has become 
increasingly important as wage rates have escalated. 
Basically, where leasing does occur, large farms have become 
larger and small farms smaller as small farmers lease land 
to large farmers. Even so, most landownership patterns are 
sporadic. That is, even at their relatively small size, 
most Japanese farms are comprised of non-contiguous parcels. 
Therefore, as larger farms expand through lease 
arrangements, those leased parcels are often isolated 
tracts. The scattered ownership of larger farms effectively 
limits any economy-of-scale through the use of large 
machinery.
With an elderly labor force entrenched on family farms, 
expansion of viable farming units by younger, 
entrepreneurial farmers is greatly restricted. Therefore, 
the ability of agriculture to attract, retain and reward 
some of Japan's more promising managerial talent is
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unlikely. Unless the comparative advantage of full-time 
farmers is increased relative to that of part-time farmers, 
the ability of Japanese agriculture to be internationally 
competitive is doubtful (Hayami 1988, 110).
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CHAPTER 7 
BEEF PRODUCTION IN JAPAN
Japanese Wagyu beef production is as much an art form 
as it is agriculture.
Toshikazu Tanaka, marketing director for the 
U.S. Meat Export Federation in Tokyo (Yates 
1989).
If surplus rice paddies were converted to feed-crops or 
to beef-cattle forage, it is estimated that domestic beef 
production in Japan could double by the year 2025 (Khan et 
al. 1990, 14). Even if it did, domestic production would not 
accommodate anticipated demand. Because of Japan's low 
self-sufficiency in beef production, imports are a necessary 
variable in the equation of consumer demand and beef supply. 
Japan expanded its imports after 1954, beginning with frozen 
grass-fed beef brisket from Australia and New Zealand. In 
1986, the first shipment of chilled grain-fed beef (eighty- 
eight carcasses) was imported by Japan (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 37). By 1987 beef imports had expanded to nearly
50,000 tons valued at about $900 million, which made Japan 
one of the world's five largest importers of beef (Khan et 
al. 1990, 14). Commensurate with the development of beef 
imports was the expansion of Japan's domestic production
42
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capabilities.
As mentioned previously, Waygu and dairy cattle are the 
two primary sources of domestic beef production in Japan. 
Known for its ability to produce high-quality beef 
(simplistically, the greater the marbling the higher the 
quality since flavor is largely derived from marbling),
Wagyu is raised under very careful, deliberate methods in 
order for the carcass to marble to its full potential. The 
typical Japanese producer, who is raising Wagyu for Japan's 
premium market would follow the following procedures: 
restricted movement, either confined to small pens or 
tethered in barns; long feeding periods at slow rates of 
gain (relative to U.S. standards), often feeding the animals 
for 18 to 20 months (as opposed to 5 months in the U.S. 
commercial feedlot industry) with slaughter at 27 to 29 
months of age (as opposed to a 17- to 19-month average in 
the U.S.); feeding hand-mixed, carefully measured feeds to 
each animal twice daily to ensure complete consumption; 
massaging and grooming; and, in some instances, feeding the 
animals beer as an appetite enhancer. As a result, beef 
with twice as much marbling as steaks grading U.S. Prime is 
brought to market. Marbling is caused primarily by four 
factors: genetics (Wagyu is best), length of feeding period
(longer is better), maturity (older is better), and sex 
(female is better) (Reeves et al. 1991, 10b).
Wagyu calves are often fed concentrated rations as a
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supplement to milk beginning at two to three months of age. 
They are weaned at eight to ten months and sold as feeder 
calves (if not retained to be fed by the breeder) or as 
replacements to other breeders. The majority of the calves 
are marketed individually at special calf auctions which 
occur every couple of months and last from two to three 
weeks.
The more intensive feeding period for Wagyu calves 
begins at ten to fifteen months of age. In the early 1960s 
the calves were fed for about twelve months. In the 1980s, 
this period was more than doubled in an attempt by producers 
to increase the degree of marbling. The motive was to push 
their cattle to qualify for the highest meat grades, which 
sell at substantial premiums. This length of feeding period 
is expected to continue but is not expected to increase due 
to the biological limits of Wagyu, which, given current 
technology, appear to have been met (Wahl 1989, 9).
The "ideal" feeding method involved feeding Wagyu 
heifers till almost thirty-six months of age. These cattle, 
representing less than 5 percent of all Wagyu, are fed by 
growers who specialize in producing top-grade Wagyu beef. 
Each grower usually fattens one or two head at a time, 
preferring heifers to steers (but not restricting the 
operation to heifers only). Special rations, involving a 
gradual increase in the energy level of the feed during the 
feeding period, is fed until the animal is finished (Johnson
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and Fisher 1988, 22). In extreme cases, the animal is fed 
for up to six years (Hayes 1990, 5).
Because of the difference in age and length of feeding 
period from the typical U.S. feeder, the live weight of 
Wagyu at slaughter will average about 1400 pounds compared 
to 1050 pounds for the U.S. feeder. This translates to 
about an 800 pound Wagyu carcass, up from a carcass weight 
of about 460 pounds in 1960. When compared to U.S. 
production costs, Japanese Wagyu is two to 2.8 times more 
expensive to raise (Khan et al. 1990, 18). Wagyu carcass 
weights have dropped slightly since 1981 as a result of 
government efforts to decrease production costs (Wahl 1989, 
11).
Despite the financial reward for raising this type of 
beef and the effort expended, very few carcasses reach the 
top Japanese beef grades. From 1980 to 1990, only 5 to 7 
percent of all Wagyu steers graded in the two top categories 
(Supreme and Superior) (Khan et al. 1990, 18). Only 1 to 2 
percent graded in the top category (Wahl 1989, 11).
The second sector of Japan's beef industry is less 
radically different from the U.S. beef industry. Dairy 
cattle are fed for 12 to 13 months (still more than double 
the U.S. feeding period) and are slaughtered from about 1450 
to 1475 pounds. After being fed to feeder-calf weights on 
farms which specialize in raising calves, the calves are 
sold to feedlots where they are finished (i.e., fed high-
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concentrate rations for up to 13 months), at which time 
their carcasses are similar to U.S. Choice. Though dairy 
cattle are slaughtered at heavier weights than Wagyu they do 
not grade as well. Under the old Japanese beef grading 
system, only one-half-of-one percent to 1 percent of dairy 
carcasses reached the Excellent grade (the number three 
grade, with Superior number two and Supreme number one)
(Khan et al. 1990, 18; Wahl 1989, 12).
Though dairy beef is not as profitable per unit as 
Wagyu, it is cheaper to raise and is better suited to 
econoraies-of-scale. As Japan's beef market has diversified, 
dairy beef caters to an increasing market for less exclusive 
and less expensive cuts. As a result, at least until 
recently there has been a general downward trend in the 
production of Wagyu in Japan. Wagyu accounted for 60 
percent of total domestic beef production in 1965. By 1987 
Wagyu's share of domestic production had slipped by half, to 
under 32 percent (approximately 177,000 tons). Conversely, 
dairy beef increased from 900 tons in 1965 to about 375,000 
tons in 1987 (Khan et al. 1990, 18-19).
Despite efforts by the Japanese government to encourage 
beef production, the Wagyu herd decreased from 2.3 million 
head in 1962 to a low of less than 1.4 million head in 1972. 
By 1986, the Wagyu herd had recovered to over 1.6 million 
head, well below its 1962 level. Much of the reason for the 
decline in herd numbers was attributable to high feed costs.
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which led to a sharp drop in the profitability of raising 
Wagyu (Wahl 1989, 9).
Whereas the Wagyu herd has decreased, the dairy herd 
has increased —  from less than 1 million head in 1962 to 
about 3 million head in 1986. The dairy industry has also 
cut unit costs of production —  something which the Wagyu 
sector has not been able to accomplish (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 36). Because milk production is profitable, calves 
are considered a byproduct and contribute less than 10 
percent to dairy revenue.
Table 5
Wagyu and Dairy Cattle Numbers in Japan
Wagyu (1, OOOs) Dairy (1, OOOs)
Cow Feeder Cow Feeder
Year Total Herd Cattle Total Herd Cattle TOTAL
1962 2337 1309 1027 1145 729 416 3482
1965 1568 733 835 1318 885 434 2886
1970 1573 714 859 2042 1245 797 3615
1975 1427 645 782 2296 1275 1021 3723
1980 1478 633 845 2907 1457 1450 4385
1985 1662 632 1030 3080 1460 1620 4742
1986 1657 618 1009 3068 1418 1650 4725
Source: Wahl 1989, 12, 14, 16.
Of particular importance is the reduction in the 
breeding base of the Wagyu herd, those cattle which produce 
premium beef in Japan, by more than half, and a 
corresponding increase, by a factor of two, in the breeding 
base of the dairy herd.
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While the number of beef cattle (a combination of Wagyu 
and dairy cattle) has increased from about 1.9 million head 
in 1965 to over 2.6 million head in 1988, the number of 
farms which raise beef cattle has decreased from 1.4 million 
to about 260,000 in the same time period (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 14). This has meant that the number of cattle per 
farm has increased by a factor of ten, from less than two 
head per farm to over ten head per farm (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 14). About 85 percent of Japan's beef herd is on 
farms of less than ten head (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 15).
While the number of dairy cattle has increased from 
about 1.3 million head in 1965 to over 2 million by 1988, 
the corresponding number of dairy farms has decreased from
381,600 to about 71,000. Likewise, the number of dairy 
cattle per farm has increased from just over 3 head in 1965 
to nearly 29 head by 1988. Approximately 58 percent of 
dairy farms have between 10 and 50 head (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 16).
Some researchers consider Japanese dairy beef to be 
similar to imported beef. Others insist that they are 
markedly different, and that Wagyu is distinctly different 
from either. Under this perception beef is not a commodity 
in Japan. Each beef product has its own characteristics and 
its own market, and is priced accordingly. As reported 
below, the farm price for cattle has shown a steady increase 
for the survey period. Wholesale price of Wagyu is about
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twice that of dairy beef, and at the retail level Wagyu has 
commanded about a 70 percent premium since 1980. The 
relative prices (in yen per kilogram) appear as follows:
Table 6
Wholesale and Retail Beef Prices in Japan
Wholesale Retail
Year Wagyu Dairv Waavu Dairv
1965 510 410 1079 867
1970 843 589 1783 1246
1975 1640 1166 3470 2467
1980 2161 1272 4572 2691
1985 2158 1249 4565 2642
1986 2180 1292 4612 2733
Source; Wahl 1989, 15
As a point of reference, the retail prices convert to 
the following dollars per pound:





Source: Calculated from preceding table using average per-
year exchange rates.
The average farm size in Japan has basically remained 
constant since 1908, ranging between 1.0 and 1.2 hectares 
(about 2.5 to 3 acres). Within this average, as a
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percentage of total (i.e., the number of farms less than
one-half hectare, the number of farms from one to two
hectares, the number of farms larger than five hectares,
etc.) the number of farms within different size classes has
not changed appreciably within the same time period. The
largest category has been farms less than half a hectare
(with few exceptions, consistently near 40 percent of all
farms have been smaller tha" half a hectare), and the
smallest category has been farms greater than five hectares
(with few exceptions, consistently between 1 and 2 percent)
(Hayami 1988, 27). Essentially, then,
...a large number of inefficient mini-sized farms 
incompatible with the introduction of modern labor- 
saving technologies has been preserved, especially in 
the rice and beef sectors to which the strongest 
protection has been given (Hayami 1988, 73).
This becomes apparent when compared to the output per
farm worker in the U.S., where economies-of-scale are
pervasive. Though the output per farm worker in Japan is
about one-tenth that of the U.S., conversely, output per
unit of land in the U.S. is about one-tenth that of Japan,
reflecting a Japanese agriculture which is more intensive
than that of the U.S.:
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Table 7 
Farm Output, U.S. and Japan
Output per Male Worker^ Output per Hectare
U.S. 285 1.2
Japan 28 12.2
Source: Hayami 1988, 75.
If the government's sheltering of agriculture is to be 
removed, then for the full-time farmer to generate an on- 
farm income equivalent to that of off-farm workers, labor- 
saving technology must be implemented. The problem for 
Japanese agriculture then becomes the structural impediments 
to increasing scale economies. Given the lack of progress 
in this regard throughout this century in spite of 
government policies designed to remove those impediments, it 
appears as though little progress in real terms in 
agricultural production in Japan is imminent.
The implications of this for the beef industry in Japan 
are poignant. Part-time and elderly workers, which make up 
the bulk of Japan's agricultural labor force, usually focus 
on rice farming "because it is a very stable crop offering a 
high return on only intermittent labor without much 
managerial effort" (Hayami 1988, 90). It would not be 
unreasonable to conclude that, in terms of units produced.
^Output is in terms of wheat units, equivalent to one ton 
of wheat into which other agricultural products are converted 
according to the ratios of their prices relative to the price 
of wheat (Hayami 1988, 75).
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the Japanese beef industry may support only moderate growth 
in the foreseeable future. In terms of profit, however, in 
light of a growing demand for beef the industry itself may 
benefit even as imports command an increasing share of the 
market.
Although the production of beef in Japan has shown a 
steady increase, from 2.9 million head and 14 2,000 carcass 
tons in 1965 to 4.7 million head and 559,000 carcass tons in 
1986, Japan's domestic beef industry remains a relatively 
insignificant component of Japan's economy (Johnson and 
Fisher 1988, 9). In 1986, "the value of beef production 
accounted for only about 4 percent of the gross value of 
agricultural output" in Japan (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 10). 
In other words, beef production accounted for about one- 
tenth of 1 percent of Japan's GNP in 1986.
By 1987, domestic beef production accounted for less 
than 70 percent of beef supplies, down from 96 percent in 
1960 (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 11, 17). The following table 
compares domestic production with import volume:
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Table 8
Volume of Japanese Beef Production and Beef Imports
f1000s tons) 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Japan Production 555.3 558.6 564.9 569.8 547.8
Import Volume 220.4 262.0 319.0 379.7 495.9
Total Supply 775.6 820.6 883.8 949.5 1043.6
Import/Total (%) 28.4 31.9 36.1 39.9 47.5
Percent Change n/a +5.8 +7.7 +7.4 +9.9
Source: AGSMS 1991 , 3.
Though modest increases in domestic production were 
seen in 1986 through 1988, it is significant that domestic 
production registered a decrease in 1989 from 1988 in spite 
of a nearly 10 percent increase in total beef supply. This 
is illustrative of the growing role which beef imports play 
in total beef supply. Specifically, domestic production 
declined about 1.3 percent from 1985 to 1989, while beef 
imports increased 125 percent and total supply increased 
about 35 percent —  all of which occurred while Japan's 
population increased about 1.8 percent (from 121.049 million 
in 1985 to 123.255 million in 1989) (Statistical Handbook 
1991, 15). Beef imports, then, are commanding an increasing 
share of an increasing market in relative as well as 
absolute terms. That is, not only are there more people, 
but more of those people are eating beef (or, those people 
who are eating beef are eating more of it) and more of the 
beef being eaten is imported.
The relative decline of the traditional Japanese beef
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breed and the emergence of dairy-steer-fattening as a 
growing element of beef production is likely the most 
significant development in the Japanese beef industry in 
recent years (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 17). As of 1987, 
dairy beef accounted for roughly 70 percent of Japan's total 
domestic beef and veal production. In the 1960s, slaughter 
of Wagyu and dairy beef were about equal in terms of numbers 
of cattle. Twenty years later, about twice as many dairy as 
Wagyu cattle were raised for slaughter (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 17).
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CHAPTER 8 
DISTRIBUTION OF BEEF IN JAPAN
It is true that even Agatha Christie's Hercule Poirot 
would be baffled by how goods in Japan get from the 
factory or farm to the consumer.
Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say NO 
(Ishihara 1991, 97).
Price increases that result when Jeep Cherokees are 
shipped across the Pacific are an even bigger mystery 
than the Bermuda Triangle.
Lee lacocca (paraphrased), The Wall Street 
Journal (Chandler 1992).
Today, there's a labor shortage in Japan, yet at least
300,000 people working in the distribution system are 
said to be completely redundant.
Matasaburo Kazeno, Journal of Commerce and 
Commercial (Kazeno 1990).
For the domestic beef producer in Japan, there were 
generally three distribution channels available. These 
channels were: (1) the traditional channel, controlled
largely by the "butcher's guild," which distributed about 10 
percent of domestic supply; (2) auction or central markets, 
which slaughter and auction carcasses, and which provide 
producers direct access to wholesale markets, distributed 25 
to 30 percent of the beef supply; and (3) meat processors, 
which slaughter, cut, and package beef, and which allowed 
producers to bypass wholesale markets, distributed 60 to 65
55
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percent of supply (Hayes 1990, 231).
Imported beef was distributed according to the quota 
system, and was further complicated by specific procedures 
pertaining to its purchase and sale. The quota system not 
only made the importing of beef to Japan quite complicated 
for exporters, it was also cumbersome for user-groups in 
Japan who were often required to source their beef from 
different quota allocations. Under the quota system only 
thirty-six trading companies and twenty-nine user 
associations were allowed direct participation in the import 
market, which essentially allowed that market to be 
monopolized (Khan et al. 1990, 60). With the dissolution of 
the quota structure and the disengagement of LIPC, this 
monopoly will disintegrate, and over time, imported beef 
will become more available to a broader range of wholesalers 
and retailers at more reasonable prices.
Retailers of foodstuffs and drinks account for over 40 
percent of all retailers in Japan, by far the largest 
category of retail store (JETRO 1990, 70). Though purchases 
of beef by a retail outlet directly from the foreign 
supplier is now possible, the use of wholesalers is expected 
to continue because of their attendant services, such as 
custom cuts and frequent delivery. Wholesalers may also 
offer the retailer a significant degree of comfort with 
their control over quality of product. This may be 
especially true for the restaurant market.
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Meat processors in Japan have a wide distribution 
system, which may position them to become a major force in 
the distribution of chilled beef. Increased sales are 
expected to follow increased distribution since one reason 
Japanese consumers do not buy beef is simply its lack of 
availability, especially in smaller meat shops. Since 76 
percent of meat shop supplies are provided by cooperative 
associations, it may be advisable for exporters to work 
through these cooperatives in order to penetrate this 
market.
However, for larger retail outlets like hotels, 
restaurants and supermarkets, direct sales bypass markups 
imposed by a myriad of middlemen within the Japanese 
distribution system. With fewer markups, retail prices 
should decline, and with a price-quantity elasticity greater 
than one, the amount of beef imported should increase (i.e., 
as price declines, quantity purchased should increase by a 
greater amount). With the quota and tariff restrictions of 
the pre-April 1, 1991 Japanese beef market, prices of 
imported beef in Japan were almost four times U.S. export 
costs by the time the beef was purchased by the consumer 
(Khan et al. 1990, 67).
Top-grade domestic beef sold for as much as (the 
equivalent of) $54 per pound in Japan in 1988. At its 
cheapest, popular beef (for which most imported beef would 
qualify) could be found for $9 per pound (Khan et al. 1990,
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67). By inference, the cost to the importer of that same 
product (popular beef) would be about $2.25 per pound. 
Historically the Japanese government had maintained that 
without high prices the domestic beef producer would fall 
victim to foreign competitors, and Japan's food security 
would suffer as a result. In terms of direct monetary gain, 
however, the primary beneficiaries of Japanese pricing 
schematics were wholesalers and retailers within the 
Japanese distribution system (Khan et al. 1990, 67). With 
price being an important consideration in the market for 
table beef (i.e., home consumption), to the extent that the 
gap between import cost and retail price can be narrowed by 
the gradual removal of protective measures and a less 
cumbersome distribution system, product demand should 
increase.
Historically, trading companies have played an integral 
role in the development of Japan's import and export 
markets. Japan emerged from a two-hundred-year-period of 
global isolation during the Meiji era. In the 1870s Japan's 
business community agreed to concentrate trade functions 
within a relatively small group of specialized companies. 
This was felt to be necessary in order to overcome language 
barriers and to work through Japan's unfamiliarity with 
international trade practices (JETRO 1990, 93). Given 
Japan's reputation as being a nation of shrewd traders, 
speculation would allow that this was a wise step.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
The trading companies were able to tap into and 
maintain international trading networks which identified 
export opportunities for Japanese manufacturers and allowed 
those businesses to purchase raw materials at favorable 
rates. Since then trading companies have, in the view of 
the Japanese, promoted the smooth flow of trade. The 
benefit that trading companies have is partially found in 
their volumes of trade, which lead to lower unit costs and 
more efficiency in product distribution than would otherwise 
be the case (JETRO 1990, 93).
There are approximately 8,500 classified trading 
companies in Japan (JETRO 1990, 93). Though the size of 
these companies varies dramatically, smaller, specialized 
trading companies handle smaller volume products (like 
premium beef) which may require sophisticated marketing. 
By-and-large, in addition to developing trade flows, which 
is vital since trade is their source of revenue, trading 
companies act as intermediaries between exporters and 
importers. Among other activities, trading companies handle 
much of the necessary paperwork, obtain favorable trade 
financing, supervise transportation, arrange insurance and 
storage, and provide useful information (JETRO 1990, 94).
With market liberalization and the end of the quota 
system, beef exporters were given the opportunity to trade 
directly with retailers. However, bypassing intermediaries 
in the distribution system has not proved easy to beef
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exporters. Unless the exporter can form its own outlets in 
Japan, the traditional structure might well prove to be the 
best avenue for product distribution. High labor and land 
costs, a shortage of truck drivers and other workers 
integral to product distribution, and entrenched, 
traditional distribution channels, all form barriers to new 
outlets. As a result, established trading companies may 
well remain a critical link in the distribution of imported 
goods in Japan (Cody 1991b, lA).
A critical factor in the distribution of goods in Japan 
is that of personal relationships. These often take years 
to develop, and until they are entry to the Japanese market 
may well be blocked. Establishing trust, and a commitment 
to the long term, are essential for an exporter to gain 
access to the Japanese distribution system, which is 
imperative if one is to gain access to the Japanese market.
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CHAPTER 9
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE JAPANESE MARKET
[Feeding for the Japanese market is] a much greater 
expense, 20 percent to 25 percent higher, but our 
restaurant-grade beef will bring $45 to $65 a pound in 
Japan. Here, it's probably $9.
Donald Butler, President of Shasta Foods 
International, operator of Monterey County 
Cattle Feeders Inc. (La Granga 1990).
At current levels, Japan is importing from all sources 
the equivalent in beef of all the feeder cattle in 
Iowa, about 1 million to 1.3 million head. If 
predictions come true, within 10 years, they will be 
taking the equivalent of all the meat cattle...[that] 
Nebraska and Iowa could supply.
Marcia Krings, reporting for Agri-News 
(Krings 1991).
Japan is one of the richest countries in the world.
Per capita GNP in Japan in 1988 was $23,365, second only to 
Switzerland and Iceland (JETRO 1990, 15). Personal income 
has grown with GNP, resulting in an increase in personal 
income in real terms which has fueled an increase in 
personal consumption. The value of Japanese assets have 
increased since 1982, which has also encouraged increasing 
amounts of personal consumption (JETRO 1990, 15).
The upswing of the personal consumption curve is also 
attributable to the increasing numbers of women entering the
61
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work force. From 1975 to 1988, the number of female 
employees increased 43 percent to 16.6 million workers, or 
37 percent of the total work force. This has led to an 
increase in the number of double-income households, which 
means that wives, who control most personal expenditures in 
Japan, have more money to spend than they've had in recent 
history. This trend is expected to continue because of the 
tight supply of labor in Japan (JETRO 1990, 16).
In spite of Japan's efforts toward self-sufficiency in 
agriculture, Japan is the largest net buyer of farm 
commodities in the world. It is also the largest market for 
exports of U.S. agricultural products, accounting for almost 
20 percent of total sales of U.S. exports in the past few 
years. Thirty-four percent of Japanese farm imports were 
sourced from the U.S. in 1987, and 75 percent of all U.S. 
beef exports are imported by Japan. Second to Canada, Japan 
is the largest trade partner with the United States (Kihl 
and Jacobsen 1990, 107).
Also of significance is the Plaza Accord of 1985, 
whereby the G-7 finance ministers realigned the value of the 
yen and the U.S. dollar by allowing the yen a significant 
increase in value vis-a-vis the dollar. Within three years 
the value of the dollar was reduced by half with respect to 
the yen. The effect of the Accord on exchange rates can be 
seen in the following chart:




















Source: Statistical Handbook 1991, 158.
The intention of this agreement was to lower the costs 
of imports to Japan and raise its costs of exports, 
primarily with the United States, in order to correct the 
trade imbalance of those two countries. The appreciation of 
the yen has been a major factor in increasing Japan's 
imports, and it has increased the purchasing power of the 
Japanese consumer. Because prices of imported goods 
declined, more money was available for the consumer to buy 
more of everything, not just imports. Domestic spending has 
consequently become the driving force behind growth in the 
Japanese economy (Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 94).
The appreciation of the yen has also made it more 
difficult for Japanese producers to cut production costs
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relative to other countries (JETRO 1990, 9). Coupled with a
tight labor market concomitant with the aging of Japan's
population, segments of Japan's market are likely to become 
vulnerable to production in those countries where labor and 
input costs are relatively cheaper. For this to achieve any
significant dimension, however, Japan must allow its
international competitors to enter its market place in a 
more liberalized manner. As Japan's trade imbalance with 
the United States has persisted in spite of the yen's 
appreciation, steps toward liberalizing the Japanese market 
have been taken (see Chapter 5). The rise in the value of 
the yen, combined with an over-supply of global food 
supplies, has widened the disparity between Japanese and 
international food prices, which has led to rising demands 
from consumers for liberalized food imports.
The removal of beef import quotas effective April 1, 
1991, was expected to release a pent-up demand for beef by 
an affluent market which is half the size of that in the 
United States. With 124 million people, in terms of total 
domestic consumption the Japanese market is the second 
largest in the world. Japan is also one of the two largest 
net food importers in the world (the former Soviet Union has 
been the other). Even preceding market liberalization, from 
1960 to 1985 the real value of Japan's food imports 
increased at an average rate of 13 percent per year, which 
is more than three times that of the world total (Hayami
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1988, 2). Consistent with this is Japan's self-sufficiency 
in beef production, which declined from 96 percent in i960 
to 69 percent in 1986 (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 11).
Monthly disposable income per household in Japan has 
increased from 344,000 yen (about $1,450) per month in 1983 
to 406,000 yen (about $3,170) per month in 1988 while food 
purchases, though still the largest single budget 
expenditure, declined from 21 percent of household 
disposable income to 18.4 percent for the same period (JETRO 
1990, 34-35). Similarly, expenditures by Japanese consumers 
for eating and drinking in 1988 was 157 billion yen (about 
$1-23 billion). At 27 percent of all expenditures in 
leisure-related markets, this was the highest single 
category in terms of disposable income spent of any leisure 
market (JETRO 1990, 54).
In spite of rising beef prices, beef consumption in 
Japan has shown a per-capita increase to roughly 10 pounds 
in 1986 (compared to nearly 70 pounds per-capita consumption 
in the U.S.) from just under 2.5 pounds in 1960. This level 
is expected to increase to 15 pounds per capita by 1995
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 45), or to as much as one-half of
the per-capita U.S. consumption (interview with Hiroshi 
Aoyama, General Manager, Meat Products Department, Nichiro 
Corporation, June 17, 1992). This would eventually place 
per-capita Japanese beef consumption at 30 to 35 pounds.
Given the high price elasticity of beef in Japan, if
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
prices decline as expected with market liberalization, an 
increase in consumption should outpace increases in price. 
Beef consumption in Japan has increased with the increase in 
disposable income. When quantity consumed is charted 
against disposable income, however, elasticity is estimated 
to be 1.5, so that with an increase of one unit of 
disposable income, consumption will increase by 1.5 units. 
Beef consumption, then, is expected to increase at a faster 
rate than the increase in disposable income (Khan et al. 
1990, 13).
Econometric studies conducted by Thomas Wahl, Dermot
Hayes, and Gary Williams suggest as much:
The estimated expenditure elasticities indicate that 
both Wagyu and import-quality beef are luxury goods in 
Japan. The expenditure elasticity of demand for 
import-quality beef is also greater than is that for 
Wagyu beef. This result is somewhat surprising because 
Wagyu beef is more expensive in Japan than is import- 
quality beef (Wahl et al. 1991, 122-123).
Wahl et al go on to report that, under the Beef Market
Access Agreement (BMAA), beef imports are projected to reach
1.2 million metric tons by 1997, up from an anticipated
394,000 metric tons for 1990. In view of this, Wahl et al
see an opportunity for U.S. and other beef exporters "to
significantly increase exports to Japan" (Wahl et al. 1991,
125). While the authors expect the "disappearance" of Wagyu
to change little, they also expect per-capita
"disappearance" of import-quality beef to more than double
by 1997. Likewise, consistent with the increasing market
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for beef imports in Japan, U.S. producers expect their 
exports to more than double by the year 2000 (Parker and 
Scandurra 1991). Dermot Hayes expects the value of U.S. 
exports to Japan to also double, but he expects it to do so 
by 1993. With U.S. beef exports valued at $1.1 billion in 
1989, anticipated sales should therefore exceed $2.2 billion 
in real terms by 2000.
While climbing from 278,000 tons in 1970 to 565,282 
tons in 1987, domestic beef production has not kept pace 
with consumer demand. Even with the increase in consumer 
demand, meat consumption in Japan lags that of other 
countries of similar economic stature. Though pork is the 
meat most often purchased by the Japanese consumer, beef is 
nonetheless most frequently named as the meat of choice 
among most age groups. Increases in purchases of U.S. beef 
are expected to range from 20 percent to 100 percent 
depending upon the cut (Khan et al. 1991, 60). When and how 
much largely depends upon a drop in prices, which is 
expected to occur as the ad valorem tax declines.
With the projected increase in Japan's population, the 
limited productive capability of Japan's domestic beef 
industry, and increasing consumer demand, much of the 
growing market for beef in Japan will be satisfied by 
imports. As such, if exports of U.S. beef to Japan double 
from $1 billion to $2 billion by 1993 as Dr. Hayes expects, 
this market would be equivalent to 10 percent of the U.S.
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beef industry at present value ($20 billion) (Hayes 1990,
6), or an increase of 12 million people in the U.S. 
population (Hayes et al. 1990, 161). In fact, beef imports 
are expected to capture an increasing share of an increasing 
market as the affects of market liberalization take hold.
As of 1991, 70 percent of U.S. beef exports, valued at 
$1 billion, were shipped to Japan. In 1989, the U.S. 
shipped 850 million pounds of beef and veal to Japan. This 
is equivalent to 1.6 million cattle, or 30,000 head per 
week, which is about 4 percent of U.S. production. As 
reported by the U.S. Meat Export Federation, these exports 
increased the value of an average U.S. steer by $79 in 1989 
(Dorgan 1990, lA) as a factor of increased demand.
Compared to imported U.S. beef, domestic Japanese beef 
was roughly three times as expensive in 1990. Tokyo meat 
specialists expect that gap to close, however, as U.S. 
suppliers develop their product to meet the requirements of 
the Japanese consumer. As a luxury good, top-quality beef 
often escapes the typical consumer search for bargains 
(Cullison 1991, lOA).
As reported by the U.S. Meat Export Federation,
Japanese consumption of beef is expected to double or triple 
by 2000. John Harris, a major west-coast beef processor and 
exporter of beef to Japan, "sees a fivefold increase in U.S. 
beef sales to Japan if the U.S. cattle industry can capture 
just half the expansion in purchases by Japanese consumers"
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(Dorgan 1990, lA). While imported beef accounts for about
40 percent of Japan's annual beef consumption at present, by
the turn of the century that share is expected to fill more
than half of total Japanese demand. As of 1991, U.S.
imports accounted for about 43 percent of that 40 percent
(Cullison 1991, lOA).
In the Tokyo Wholesale Market on February 1, 1990, 
prices of air-freighted chilled carcasses from longer- 
fed US cattle graded B3 varied between 1,200 yen and 
1,400 yen per kilogram (Lin and Mori 1991, 104).
With the exchange rate at 144.93 yen-per-dollar on
February 1, 1990, this converts to a range of $3.76 to $4.38
per pound. In comparison, prices for U.S. prime carcasses
in the U.S. wholesale market for that same date were
approximately $1.20 to $1.25 on a per pound basis*
(telephone interview with Cattle Fax 1992). This
differential suggests a profit margin in the range of $2.50
to $3.10 per pound in the Japanese market over the U.S.
market. At the top end of the scale, in the same year Kobe
beef, or Wagyu raised in the Kobe region of Japan and known
for its superior marbling even by Wagyu standards, sold for
as much as $180 per pound in Japan. To the extent that
carcass quality can be improved, the upside in terms of
‘This price range is based on adding from $5.00 to $6.00 
per hundred-weight to the wholesale carcass price of "Choice 
cut-out value," which is a "rule-of-thumb" for determining the 
price range of Prime carcasses. The Choice cut-out value on 
February 1, 1990 was $117.53 per hundred-weight for carcasses 
weighing 550 to 700 pounds (telephone interview with Cattle 
Fax, June 3, 1992).
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price-per-pound is substantial.
Restaurants offer significant potential as markets for 
U.S. chilled beef. Thirty-four percent of Japanese beef 
consumption occurs in restaurants (Eaheart 1991, 15). There 
is an estimated one restaurant for every 125 people in 
Japan, as opposed to one for every 400 people in the U.S. 
(Martin 1991, 158). More than 41 percent of all sales in 
all retail franchise chains occurs in foodservice franchise 
outlets (Martin 1991, 158). Home consumption, however, 
remains the largest sector for beef disappearance at 51 
percent, yet, at 25 percent, is also the smallest sector for 
consumption of beef imports (Eaheart 1991, 15).
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CHAPTER 10 
DEFINITION OF PRODUCT
Generally, Japanese consumers claim to judge beef 
quality by marbling and tenderness. However, according 
to retailer [sic], price seems to be the most important 
factor in judging quality.
A Washington State University Team that 
visited Japan in 1989, reported in BEEF 
(Vansickle 1991a, 39).
Traditional Japanese dishes require very tender beef. 
Tenderness and flavor is largely a function of marbling —  
the more intramuscular fat there is (marbling) the more 
tender and flavorful the meat. The Japanese style of 
premium beef production, i.e., extended feeding periods for 
Wagyu cattle, evolved from this product requirement. For 
instance, sukiyaki is made with paper-thin slices of beef, 
cooked in a skillet with vegetables and a special soy sauce. 
Shabu-shabu also requires paper-thin slices of beef, which 
are dipped into boiling water with seasoned ingredients. 
Without a very high degree of marbling, beef cooked in this 
manner may produce an offensive odor (especially true with 
grass-fed beef) and often becomes tough when boiled or 
cooked in high moisture. The advantage of highly-marbled 
beef is with its fat, which tends to seal the natural juices
71
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and promote tenderness by melting around the meat. The 
preference for highly-marbled beef may also be a factor of 
conditioning in that Japanese consumers are raised to 
believe that the best tasting beef is that of the heavily- 
marbled Wagyu (Hayes et al. 1990, 169).
In addition to marbling, other important, defining 
characteristics of meat quality include freshness (chilled 
being much preferred to frozen), color and texture of the 
meat, fat color, moisture content ("absence of drip"), and 
ultimately, what beef-type the meat is (i.e., Japanese Wagyu 
vs. domestic dairy vs. imported). The degree to which the 
product is organic, in the sense of being raised free of 
pesticides, additives, and chemical treatment (growth 
implants or vaccinations), and processed without the use of 
preservatives, are also important considerations for the 
Japanese consumer.
Separate from the beef itself, but nonetheless an 
important characteristic of the product, is packaging. 
Labeling of package ingredients is important in order to 
identify (or the lack thereof) any inorganic inputs. Also, 
the size, appearance, and quality of package defines which 
type of beef it is. Small packages are the norm, reflecting 
not only the smaller servings which are typical of the 
Japanese market but also the relative lack of storage space 
(most meat is consumed on the day of purchase because of 
limited refrigeration space in the typical Japanese home).
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Nearly half of all meat purchases are between one-half and 
one pound, and beef is purchased on an average of once or 
twice per week. Several layers of wrapping, higher quality 
materials, and attractive, eye-catching packages are 
important to the Japanese consumer. In fact, it is not 
uncommon for the cost of packaging to exceed the cost of 
contents in Japan (Khan et al. 1990, 49-50), as it often 
does in the United States.
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CHAPTER 11 
BEEF GRADING IN JAPAN
Because the quality grade is determined by the lowest 
score of the four quality characteristics, carcasses of 
the same quality grade often display dissimilar quality 
characteristics....Because buyers may place different 
values on different yield and quality characteristics, 
it is not surprising to see that carcasses of the same 
yield and quality grades are priced over a wide range.
Biing-Hwan Lin and Hiroshi Mori (Lin and Mori
1991, 104).
In April of 1988 Japan changed its beef grading system 
in an attempt to place less emphasis on marbling in order to 
reduce production costs. As a result, more emphasis has 
been given to carcass yield, but as a practical matter 
marbling has remained a primary consideration in judging the 
quality of a particular carcass. The old system consisted 
of six categories. In descending order these were:
Supreme, Superior, Excellent, Medium, Common, and Utility. 
Marbling scores, ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 5, 
were also used to refine each grade. Japanese graders 
considered U.S. Prime to be equivalent to Japan's Excellent 
grade, U.S. medium and high Choice were rated equivalent to 
Japan's Medium, and U.S. low Choice and high Good were 
considered equivalent to Japanese Common (Khan et al. 1990,
74
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17) .
At the time of the above comparison, the U.S. meat 
grades were, in descending order of quality: Prime, Choice,
Good, Standard, Cutter, and Canner. Prime, Choice, Good, 
and Standard were further delineated as high (+), medium 
(absence of + of -), or low (-). Subsequently, "Good" was 
renamed "Select."
Comparison of U.S. grades with Japanese grades would 
then appear as follows:
Table 10
Former Japanese Beef Grades and U.S. Equivalents




Medium High or Medium Choice
Common Low Choice or High Good
Utility (no poor beef exported)
Source: Khan et al. 1990, 17.
An important difference between the Japanese system and 
the U.S. system is the carcass used to determine grade.
While these Japanese grades were determined by cutting the 
carcass between the 5th and 6th rib, in the U.S. the 
standard has been to cut between the 12th and 13th rib. The 
significance of this is that the meat is generally more 
highly marbled at the former cut (5th and 6th ribs), which 
has caused U.S. beef to be downgraded in the Japanese market
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(Hayes 1990, 2).
The new Japanese grading system involves three yield 
grades, A, B and C, which use a regression equation to 
classify yield percentages. According to Mr. Aoyama 
(General Manager, Meat Products Department, Nichiro 
Corporation), yield grade refers to the amount of meat 
retrieved from a carcass, with 70 percent yield qualifying 
as A, 60 percent yield as B, and less than 60 percent as C 
(interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, 1992). Yield is determined 
so that the normal distribution is around the B grade.
Four other classifications, consisting of; (1) beef 
marbling; (2) meat color and brightness; (3) meat firmness 
and texture; and (4) color, luster, and quality of fat; are 
each important measures of quality and are each rated on a 
scale of 1 to 5 with 5 being high. Carcasses in Japan are 
now cut between the sixth and seventh rib for the purposes 
of grading throughout Japan.
A multiple regression equation, which includes four 
carcass measurements, estimates the cutability percentage of 
the carcass and assigns a yield score. Most measurements 
are taken between the sixth and seventh rib. For Wagyu 
carcasses, a factor of 2 percent is added to the base 
numerical score in the equation, giving Wagyu a slight but 
automatic advantage (interview with Dr. Jerry Reeves, June 
18, 1992).
There are 12 classifications for marbling (l is low, 12
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is high), with l having no intramuscular fat (similar to 
wild meat), and 12 appearing to be peppered with fat, all 
intramuscular, comprising as much as 80 percent of the cut. 
There are seven colors of meat, ranging from a bright pink 
(best) to a deep, ruddy red (worst). There are also seven 
colors of fat, ranging from a bright, pure white (best) to a 
yellowish white (worst). Color assessment for both meat and 
fat is by visual appraisal, as are firmness and texture.
Once each of the four classifications are assigned a 
number (from one to five), the lowest of those four numbers 
is placed with the yield score. The result is a grade 
ranging from Cl (lowest) to A5 (highest). Out of a possible 
fifteen scores, the final meat quality score is the minimum 
score which that carcass can be assigned.
When the new grading system was implemented (1988), 
quantity of steer carcasses grading in each category in 
Japan appeared as follows:
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Table 11
Carcass Grades of Beef Steers in Japan (1988)
Yield Quality Meat Quality
1 2 3 4 5
A A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
0% 3% 8% 11% 6%
B B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
1% 23% 22% 4% 1%
C Cl C2 C3 C4 C5
2% 12% 8% 0% 0%
Source : Johnson and Fisher, 1988, 30.
It is notable that only 33 percent of all domestic 
steer carcasses graded in Japan in 1988 were in the B4 to A5 
range, which is loosely defined as being of premium 
restaurant quality.
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CHAPTER 12
THE JAPANESE BEEF MARKET
Japan is not one general market. There are many 
different segments.
Philip M. Seng, President and CEO, U.S. Meat 
Export Federation (Cullison 1991, IDA).
Top quality beef is considered a luxury in Japan and is 
generally reserved for special occasions. This niche 
represents about 6 percent of the Japanese beef market, and 
is by-and-large unaffected by rising and falling incomes. 
Primary users of this type of beef are luxury hotels and 
exclusive restaurants, and to some extent, supermarkets 
(Khan et al. 1990, 19).
A much larger segment of the market, in the range of 65 
to 70 percent, is made up of end-users of popular beef and 
can be split into two subgroups: high quality (HQ) beef and 
popular beef. HQ beef is made up of Wagyu which did not 
make the top grades and dairy beef which grades as high as 
the lesser quality Wagyu. U.S. grain-fed Prime beef is 
generally within this market. Imported beef (primarily from 
the U.S. and Australia) accounts for about 40 to 50 percent 
of this market (Khan et al. 1990, 19).
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The second subgroup, "popular beef," is made up of the 
less-desirable cuts of HQ beef, imported grass-fed beef 
(Australia), imported U.S. Choice beef, and the lesser 
grades of domestic dairy beef.
The remaining 30 percent of the beef market goes to 
beef used in processing, such as beef for sausage and 
meatloaf. Lower beef grades and the less desirable cuts 
from higher grades fill this demand (Khan et al. 1990, 20).
It is important to note that the large middle market 
has been growing much faster than either the top or bottom 
segments in recent years. An end-user who is cost conscious 
and concerned about quality typifies this market segment. 
From 1985 to 1989, the cumulative growth in this market was 
10 percent (Winkler 1991, 21b).
The Japanese are very cosmopolitan and enjoy a 
relatively high percentage of overseas travel, due largely 
to the appreciation of the yen and the relative wealth of 
the Japanese economy, and a high per-capita savings rate.
As a result, and with the pervasive western influence on 
Japanese culture, dietary habits in Japan are changing. For 
instance, as a percent of diet, fat has increased from 8.8 
percent in 1955 to 27.4 percent in 1985 (compared to 45 
percent fat in the average American diet in 1982).
Likewise, while protein consumption has remained relatively 
constant (11.3 percent in 1955 to 13 percent in 1985), 
carbohydrates have declined from nearly 80 percent to under
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60 percent by 1985 (Moore 1990, 3).
Another reflection of dietary change is witnessed by a 
broadening of cooking styles, including barbecuing or 
grilling, stews and curries. As a result, the need for 
highly-marbled beef from the standpoint of odor and flavor 
retention is becoming less predominant.
"The total Japanese meat market of 4.7 million tons is 
composed of three major submarkets: beef (19 percent), pork
(42 percent), and chicken (35 percent)" (Khan et al. 1990, 
63). Imports account for 37 percent of the beef market, 20 
percent of the pork market, and 12.5 percent of the chicken 
market (Khan et al. 1990, 63).
Despite its lesser stature in terms of volume, the meat 
of choice for out-of-home consumption by the Japanese 
consumer is beef (Khan et al. 1990, 39, 41). Beef is 
perceived by the Japanese consumer to be healthy and 
flavorful. It is also perceived as a food of choice among 
"smart" people (interview with Hidetaka Iwasaki, President, 
Nichiro Pacific, Ltd., June 17, 1992). However, a relative 
unfamiliarity with methods of preparation and a relatively 
high price hamper more frequent consumer purchases of beef. 
When beef is purchased, domestic Wagyu and dairy tend to be 
purchased most frequently, followed by imported chilled 
beef. Imported frozen beef occupies the bottom slot.
Price awareness appears to be based on two concerns.
One is that beef is relatively expensive, and given its
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elasticity of demand, when price drops quantity expands. 
Another is anchored in Japanese shopping habits. The 
typical Japanese housewife shops frequently, often daily, 
and is therefore immediately aware of any price movement.
The reason most often given for purchase of meat imports is 
its low price.
Although beef has been expensive in Japan, as the price 
of fish increases due to declining supplies, beef is 
becoming more price competitive. According to Mr. Iwasaki, 
not only can the Japanese housewife get more variety with 
beef than she can with fish for the same price, but she can 
also make the table more attractive with beef at a lower 
cost (interview with Hidetaka Iwasaki, 1992).
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CHAPTER 13
THE JAPANESE CONSUMER
Therefore, in 10 to 20 years, I believe, the 
gastronomic culture of Japan will be exactly the same 
as in the United States.
Hiroshi Tanaka, President of Kyotaru Co., 
which operates more than 600 restaurants in 
Japan (Nation's Restaurant News 1988).
Still, total rice consumption has been dropping 
steadily for decades as the Japanese diet grows more 
Western. In the past 30 years, rice consumption has 
gone from 253 pounds per capita to 156 pounds. Since 
1987, in a historic turnabout, meat and dairy 
consumption has exceeded rice.
Reported in "The Washington Post" (Reid 1990, 
H4).
Japanese beef consumption has grown nearly 50 percent 
in the past decade, about half of which has been fueled 
by imports.
USDA's Economic Research Service, reported in 
BEEF (Vansickle 1991a, 37).
In addition to being one of the wealthiest countries in 
the world, with a 1990 population of nearly 124 million 
Japan is also one of the most populous (seventh in the 
world). Its population is expected to increase moderately 
to a peak of about 136 million in 2013, and the percentage 
of people over age 65 is expected to increase from about 10 
percent in 1985 to over 22 percent by 2015 (Statistical 
Handbook 1991, 15). Elderly people tend to eat less food in 
general and less fat specifically. They do, however, prefer
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high quality protein foods (JETRO 1990, 17), but all-in-all 
will probably consume less beef than younger people.
About 43 percent of the population lives within a 
fifty-kilometer radius of three metropolitan areas: Tokyo,
Osaka, and Nagoya. The average size of the Japanese 
household decreased from around five (1920 to 1955) to 3.1 
in 1989 (Statistical Handbook 1991, 22).
Due largely to the appreciation of the yen and falling 
oil prices, domestic prices in Japan have maintained a 
stable trend in recent years. With 1985 as the base year 
(100), by 1990 the Consumer Price Index in Japan was 108.9, 
compared to 124.3 for the United States (Statistical 
Handbook 1991, 150). At the retail level, the CPI for food 
in Japan increased at a somewhat slower rate, to 102.2 in 
1989 and 106.9 in 1990. The relatively sharp rise in food 
prices between 1989 and 1990 was attributed to poor weather 
conditions for the pertinent growing season (Statistical 
Handbook 1991, 117-118).
From 1975 to 1989, as a percentage of consumption 
expenditures food decreased from 30 percent to 24.3 percent. 
Consumption expenditure rose 0.5 percent in real terms 
(i.e., after adjustment for the rise in CPI) from 1988 to 
1989. Since 1978, with the exception of 1980 and 1981, 
family income has increased in real terms each year, 
although to varying degrees (from a low of 0.7 percent in 
1989 to high of about 4.2 percent in 1982) (Statistical
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Handbook 1991, 112).
Selective consumption in Japan has increased steadily 
since 1982 whereas household purchases of basic necessities 
have remained relatively flat. A trend towards purchases of 
goods and services which are different from the norm also 
appears to be well established. Part of this discriminating 
market has targeted goods which imply high-status, such as 
expensive restaurants and high-quality goods. This is 
reflected in a willingness by the Japanese consumer to pay 
high prices for quality food products, such as §35 per pound 
for domestic Wagyu beef (JETRO 1990, 20).
Relative to the 1950s, the Japanese are eating less 
rice and more meat. More frequent dining-out has become 
common as has increasei frequency of purchase of favorite 
foods (JETRO 1990, 21). In 1988, sales in specialized 
restaurants were about 15.5 trillion yen (about §128 
billion) (JETRO 1990, 22). The number of restaurants in 
Japan is expected to increase, and with it the demand for 
high-quality, international cuisine (JETRO 1990, 23), 
derived in part from an increase in foreign travel among the 
Japanese. Relative to total food expenditure, expenses for 
dining out rose to 14.5 percent in 1989 from 9.1 percent in 
1975 (Statistical Handbook 1991, 114).
With their high standard of living, a relatively large 
percentage of Japanese consumers can afford to be 
discriminating buyers, and therefore tend to choose high-
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quality, brand-name products. In spite of their apparent 
homogeneity, the Japanese consumer often selects products 
for purchase for the individuality which it may express. 
Variety becomes important in these purchase decisions (JETRO 
1990, 29), but the product's cost must still be judged to be 
reasonable. As growth in disposable income has slowed in 
Japan in recent years, though the middle market has 
softened, high-priced high-quality goods as well as cheaper 
goods continue to attract consumers. In fact, the middle 
market is losing market share to high-quality products.
Sales of high-quality imported and domestic foods has been 
consistent with this trend (JETRO 1990, 36, 38).
Average monthly disposable income for worker households 
in Japan was 215,500 yen (about $940) in 1975, of which food 
expenditures accounted for 49,800 yen (about $220), or 23 
percent. In 1989 these figures changed to 421,400 yen 
(about $3,055) monthly disposable income, of which 76,800 
yen (about $557) went to the purchase of food, or 18.2 
percent (Statistical Handbook 1991, 117). In spite of what 
appear to be more discriminating, and therefore more 
expensive, tastes in food, as a percentage of disposable 
income and as a percentage of expenditures, food costs have 
declined. This would indicate latitude in the average 
Japanese household budget for the capacity to increase its 
purchases of beef once the decision is made to do so.
About half of Japanese women fifteen years old and
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older are employed (Statistical Handbook 1991, 103).
Families with working women tend to save and consume more 
because of higher household income, and their families tend 
to eat out more frequently. Housewives control 80 percent 
of the income in Japan and give their husbands allowances 
which they often spend on business entertainment, which 
frequently includes dining out (JETRO 1990, 52).
The abrupt rise in wages of industrial workers, 
doubling from 1955 to 1970, and doubling again from 1970 to 
1985 (deflated by the CPI) translated into a change in 
dietary habits. Per-capita annual consumption of rice 
declined from a peak of 118 kilograms (260 pounds) in 1962 
to 80 kilograms (176 pounds) in 1980. As a percentage of 
consumption expenditure in urban, worker households, rice 
declined from 10 percent in 1960 to 2 percent in 1980, 
reflecting its status as an inferior good consistent with 
increases in per-capita income (Hayami 1988, 50, 69).
Changes in food consumption in Japan are indicated in 
the following chart;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 8
Table 12







1960 1965 1970 1975 I960 1985 1985/1960
Calorie 2290 2459 2529 2516 2554 2581 13
Protein (g) 
Animal
70 75 78 80 83 84 20




Grains 150 145 128 122 113 109 -27
Rice 115 112 95 88 79 75 -35
Vegetables 100 108 114 110 110 108 8
Fruits 22 29 38 43 39 37 68
Meat 5 9 13 18 23 25 400
Beef 1.1 1.5 2.1 2.5 3.5 4.4 300
Egg 6 11 15 14 14 15 150
Dairy prod. 22 38 50 53 62 67 205
Fresh milk 13 20 26 29 34 35 169
Source: Hayami 1988, 117.
Most notable is the increase in meat consumption by a 
factor of five in a twenty-five-year-period, and an increase 
in beef in the same time frame by a factor of four. These 
were the largest items of increase in per-capita consumption 
of all items surveyed by a substantial margin.
In spite of a relatively flat growth rate in total
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caloric intake and a slowing in Japan's population growth, 
no significant growth in aggregate demand for food in terms 
of calories has occurred. However, due to rising affluence 
in Japan, changes within that overall demand have been 
substantial, as reflected by an increase in consumption of 
meat and a decrease in the consumption of rice.
Increasingly, Japanese diets are changing to reflect the 
influence of western styles and habits, one effect of which 
has been a decrease in the use of traditional seasonings. A 
growing share of imported foods within that demand structure 
has been significant (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 42).
It is generally accepted that high prices have limited 
the consumption of livestock products. Though real prices 
for some livestock products have fallen, real prices for 
beef and fish have risen. Consequently, pork, chicken, and 
some dairy products have experienced faster growth rates in 
consumption than have beef and fish. Much of this is 
attributable to protectionist policies which have 
artificially inflated beef prices. Retail prices for beef 
and pork were roughly equal in 1960. During the 1980s, 
however, beef prices exceeded pork prices by about three 
times. Protectionist trade policies have been responsible 
for this misalignment (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 43).
While beef consumption grew from 1.1 kilograms per 
person per year (2.4 pounds) in 1960 to 4.6 kilograms (10.1 
pounds) in 1986, pork consumption grew from 1.1 kilograms
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
(2.4 pounds) to 10.7 (23.6 pounds), and chicken from 0.8
(1.8 pounds) to 9.8 (21.6) in the same time period (Johnson
and Fisher 1988, 45). The lower rate of increase in beef
consumption is blamed on restrictions on its availability,
and consequently its high price relative to other meats.
Furthermore, in spite of the apparent increase in per 
person beef consumption, Japan's current level remains 
less than half that of most industrialized countries 
and only about a tenth the quantity consumed in 
Australia and the United States (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 44).
As judged by international standards of the optimal 
diet in terms of protein, fat, and carbohydrates consumed, 
the Japanese diet has essentially achieved the optimum. 
Changes in dietary habits will therefore occur in response 
to changes in taste, cooking practices, and food preference 
rather than as an attempt to improve the diet as a whole 
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 44).
A seasonal pattern in the type of beef consumed is 
evident. Premium grade Wagyu, purchased in paper-thin 
slices, is most popular in mid-winter and in April and May, 
when sukiyaki and shabu-shabu are cooked for festive 
occasions. In the summer, when barbecuing and grilling are 
popular, lower grade domestic beef and the bulk of imported 
beef are purchased (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 45). With a 
broadening in cooking practices these distinctions may blur, 
however. For example, cooking steaks at home that are as 
well prepared as those in restaurants appeals to Japanese 
housewives. To do so, those housewives have indicated that
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they would like to learn new cooking methods ((Khan et al. 
1990, 39).
To the Japanese consumer, domestic beef and imported 
beef are two separate commodities, as different as, say, 
pork and lamb (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 46). The beef 
market in Japan is highly segmented, with each segment 
displaying different price and income elasticities.
Imported beef is often further segmented according to 
source. Imported beef may therefore not serve as a close 
substitute for domestic beef (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 46). 
However, this assessment did not take into account chilled, 
grain-fed beef imported from the U.S. To the Japanese 
consumer, freshness is tantamount to quality. In addition, 
even when it was imported as frozen, U.S. grain-fed beef 
qualified for the top end of the middle market, otherwise 
defined as "high quality beef," a market which was judged to 
be relatively insensitive to price because of the lack of 
substitutes (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 47).
In 1987 the Australian Meat and Live-Stock Corporation 
identified five market segments; "(1) high-class hotels and 
restaurants, and retail and supermarket outlets; (2) 
middle- class hotels and restaurants, and retail and 
supermarket outlets; (3) lower-class restaurants and fast 
food outlets; and (4) manufacturing, ham and sausage small 
good industries" (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 48).
Some up-scale western markets were included in the
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"high class" category, in spite of the fact that domestic
Wagyu was this segment's primary meat source. Western-style
restaurants also made up part of the "middle class" market,
serviced in part by imported grain-fed and chilled beef.
It is assumed that demand for imported beef will
increase as prices fall. Greater availability of beef
should also lead to its greater utilization outside the
home. Finally, consumption of beef is expected to increase
at a faster rate than that of pork and chicken, and should
eventually exceed pork and chicken in total consumption
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 138).
Specifically, total consumption of beef in Japan is
estimated by the Australian Meat and Live-Stock Corporation
to increase by 8 percent per year from 1990 to 1994, and
imported beef consumption is expected to increase 10 percent
per year in the same period (Winkler 1991, 25b). By another
estimate, consumption is expected to reach 1.675 million
metric tons by Japanese fiscal year 1995 (April 1995 through
March 1996), of which 1.115 million metric tons, or 67
percent, will be imported (Platt and Youmans 1991, 44b).
This would be an increase of 25 percent over estimated
JY1991 levels.
What type of beef will supply this demand? It will be 
perceived by the Japanese consumer as a fresh, high 
quality product that is attractively packaged, 
healthful, and free of residues. It will display well 
in the show case. It will be convenient to prepare 
(perhaps microwave ready) and will appeal to a growing 
number of affluent, sophisticated, working women. 
Processed meats, gift items, and ethnic and gourmet
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items also have opportunity. Most importantly, beef 
that tantalizes the Japanese consumer will have the 
culinary attributes that appeal to the Japanese palate 
(Platt and Youmans 1991, 44b).
From 1962 to 1986 the Japanese consumer has enjoyed 
real growth —  at an annual rate of 3.5 percent per year —  
in per-capita expenditure for beef. For the same period, 
annual real growth of 3.1 percent in monthly per-capita 
income and 3.3 percent growth in fish expenditures were 
recorded (Hayes et al. 1990, 206). In real terms, then, the 
growth in meat expenditures exceeded growth in income. Not 
only did the per-capita amount of beef consumed increase, 
but it did so even as it became more expensive relative to 
fish. One might conclude that a pent-up demand for beef 
therefore exists, and with the drop in prices expected from 
a liberalized Japanese market, significant increases in per- 
capita consumption will occur.
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CHAPTER 14 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Although the Japanese prefer the flavor of U.S. corn- 
fed beef to the grass-fed beef of Australia, the latter 
is perceived to be of higher guality because its shelf 
life of more than 60 days is double that of most U.S. 
beef.
Patrick E. Brecht, American President Lines 
Ltd., director of special commodities 
technical services (Dunlap 1991, IB).
...in the U.S. you can ship things by the half a pound. 
Here you get gram sales, individually sliced beef for 
shabu-shabu. This all adds onto the cost in a way 
foreign trade houses aren't used to dealing with.
A general manager for one of Japan's largest 
packers, reported in the "Journal of 
Commerce" (Cody 1991, 2A).
Perhaps more important than any other consideration to 
the Japanese consumer is that of guality. To develop beef 
with the quality that is demanded by the Japanese consumer 
is likely the largest challenge faced by a foreign producer. 
Not only is imported beef generally perceived as lesser in 
guality than domestic beef, but the Japanese consumer is 
often not aware of the inherent differences between grass- 
fed and grain-fed imported beef.
Further delineation can be made in defining the scale 
of production in marketing the product. Generally speaking,
94
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the Japanese prefer family-scale businesses that are small 
enough to be flexible yet large enough to deliver adequate 
quantities of a consistent, high-quality product.
Flexibility may vary from changing cutting practices and 
packaging methods to accommodate the needs of the end-user 
to supplying the quantity needed when it's needed.
Long-term relationships are extremely important to the 
Japanese, and must therefore be equally important to the 
supplier of the Japanese market. Critical to a long-term 
relationship is a supplier's commitment to not sell his 
product to a buyer's direct competitor. The supplier must 
also be committed to meeting the buyer's delivery schedules 
and special needs, including the development of a 
differentiated product (Hayes et al. 1990, 171), if a long­
term relationship is to flourish. By all means, 
confrontation must be avoided. Trust is essential. If the 
supplier is willing to commit himself to this type of 
business relationship, then long-term profits can be 
expected and the supplier will find his interests protected 
in the Japanese market (Khan et al. 1990, 75).
Developing a brand name and a product guarantee of 
safety, taste and freshness may be central to successful 
promotion of one's product in Japan (Khan et al. 1990, 68- 
69). Attributes of brand-name products which appeal to the 
Japanese consumer include quality, fashion, status, and 
"delicate deviation," i.e., "the expression of a modicum of
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individuality within a framework of overall conformity” 
(JETRO 1990, 39, 46). It is important for the exporter to 
cater to psychological as well as material needs in 
promoting his product (JETRO 1990, 69).
Once the product is developed, in order to maintain 
quality, care must be taken during transportation. For 
instance, a container of chilled beef must not be allowed to 
sit in the sun while waiting to be loaded, nor should it be 
stored on the port-side of a ship's cargo bin in summer 
where it can also be heated by the sun (interview with John 
Morse, President of Zenchiku Land and Livestock Co.,
February 21, 1992). A consistent temperature of 30 degrees 
fahrenheit must be maintained throughout the product's 
transport if good condition at arrival is to be assured. 
Temperature monitors may be used throughout the process to 
determine this. Special packaging may also be required to 
seal in moisture and to protect the product from bruising 
from handling or vessel movement (Seim 1990, 124-125).
Packaging at the processing plant should consider the 
demands of the end-user so that repackaging for the retail 
outlet is not needed. Likewise, the exterior packaging 
should be marked in Japanese to save remarking when it 
reaches Japan.
These steps, and a myriad of others like them, are 
required if the supplier is to assure delivery of a quality 
product. It is this type of effort which is vital to
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establishing and maintaining a long-term relationship with a 
Japanese buyer.
A critical step in product development, and one which 
is imperative to assure product quality during 
transportation, is shelf life. Shelf life refers to the 
limited life of chilled beef due to the présence of bacteria 
and natural decomposition. A minimum shelf life of 60 days 
is necessary if the product is to remain fresh from 
slaughter to port-of-departure to port-of-entry to retail 
meat case and the consumer's table, or to restaurant 
refrigerator and the customer's plate. Twenty-seven to 28 
days are generally required from the time the carcass is 
chilled till the beef reaches the retail outlet. With a 60- 
day product life, 32 to 33 days remain for the retailer to 
sell the product (Seim 1990, 129). This is important to the 
Japanese retailer because it allows them the flexibility to 
withhold beef from the market if they expect a favorable 
price movement (Platt and Youmans 1991, 43b).
A shelf life of 45 days has been adequate for beef 
produced in the U.S. and sold domestically because of the 
relative proximity of slaughter plant to supermarket. To 
achieve an extended shelf life, modifications to meat 
processing methods and packaging are required. Sanitation 
at slaughter and during processing, temperature control, 
handling and transportation all affect shelf life. Not all 
slaughter plants will be willing to make these adjustments.
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The producer who is interested in exporting chilled beef to
Japan, however, will need to find a packing plant which will
accommodate itself to its customer's specifications. This
might include doing all final cuts at the supplier's packing
plant to avoid butchering in Japan. As labor becomes more
scarce in Japan, this may become an important consideration.
The need for extended shelf-life can be cut
considerably if air transport is used. The problem,
however, is that air transportation costs about four times
as much as ocean freight. If the volume shipped by a given
exporter is significant, air freight becomes prohibitive.
Temperature control and handling requirements are also more
difficult with air freight (Dunlap 1991, 8B).
In addition to improving shelf life, marbling must also
be improved. To produce the highly-marbled beef required by
the premium Japanese market, at a minimum longer feeding
periods by U.S. feeders will be required.
Because marbling is the deposition of excess energy 
consumed by the animal, a longer period of consumption 
by the beef animal of excess energy is required to get 
increased marbling. However, marbling is not the only 
site where fat is deposited. Excess energy (in the 
form of fat) is also deposited as seam fat between 
muscles (intermuscular fat) and external fat under the 
hide (subcutaneous fat). Both seam fat and external 
fat are generally not consumed and are removed or 
trimmed during cutting, which lowers the saleable yield 
of the carcass and reduces profits. Ideally for the 
Japanese market, longer feeding times would increase 
marbling with no increase in seam or external fat 
(Knipe et al. 1990, 154).
The trick is to do just that. Selection of cattle 
which have a genetic predisposition to marbling, and the use
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of ultrasonics to determine how well a given animal is 
marbling while on feed, may be two of many tools which will 
need to be explored by the U.S. producer in an attempt to 
develop beef for this particular market.
Promotion may be viewed as an essential element of 
product development. The U.S. Meat Export Federation 
allocated $12 million to promote U.S. beef in Japan in 1991. 
Supermarkets in Japan were also beginning to place imported 
beef in the center of display cases rather than at the 
sides, which had a positive affect on sales (Pendley 1991, 
lOA).
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CHAPTER 15 
COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
There are primarily three competitors for the Japanese 
beef market; domestic producers within Japan, Australian 
cattle raisers and feedlot operators, and beef producers 
within the United States. Argentina and Brazil, though 
major exporters of beef, are focused primarily on European 
markets. Though the Canadian beef industry is as efficient 
as the U.S. and Australia, Canadian meat packaging and 
transportation is not as well developed for export as are 
those facilities in the U.S. New Zealand does export beef 
to Southeast Asia but does not have the volume of the U.S. 
or Australia.®
As of 1987, the U.S. had the largest share of the 
imported beef market, in terms of tonnage and value, if beef 
offal is included with chilled and frozen beef. Combined 
beef imports inside and outside of the stipulated quotas 
were as follows:
®In 1989 there were 7.8 million cattle in New Zealand, 
12.2 million in Canada, 22.4 million in Australia, 50.8 
million in Argentina, 99.2 million in the United States, and 
136.8 million in Brazil (Japan Statistical Yearbook 1991, 
768) .
100
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0 1
Table 13










1976 119,510 88,421 74.0 20,544 17.2 91.2
1978 157,072 94,451 60.1 46,432 29.6 89.7
1980 177,609 106,271 59.8 59,173 33.3 93.1
1982 182,838 96,953 53.0 75,746 41.4 94.4
1984 214,991 101,340 47.1 96,780 45.0 92.1
1986 273,231 117,033 42.8 137,774 50.4 93.2
1987 317,935 134,757 42.4 162,997 51.3 93.7
Source; Johnson and Fisher 1988, 149.
From 1976 to 1987, beef imported from Australia and the 
United States grew by 166 percent. Within that market, in 
terms of tonnage shipped, Australia's market grew by 52 
percent while that for the U.S. grew by 693 percent. 
Coincident with this, Australia's market share slipped from 
74 percent to just over 42 percent, due to the erosion of 
its market by competitors from the United States, whose 
market share grew from just over 17 percent to more than 
half.
This can be attributed to two things above others. One 
is political pressure from the U.S. for Japan to open its 
beef market to U.S. exports. The other is grain-fed beef 
which the U.S. has historically produced, and which is more 
suitable to the Japanese palate than is grass-fed beef which
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has been Australia's mainstay.
However, if frozen and chilled beef only are taken into 
account, the U.S. share of the market takes a noticeable 
drop:
Table 14
Australian and U.S. Share of Japanese Beef Market: 
Frozen and Chilled Beef
($1 ,000,000)
Volume (tons) Value
1987 1988 1988 1987 1988 1989

























































Source ; AGSMS 1991, 2.
The U.S. share of the chilled beef imports in 1989 was 
19 percent in terms of volume and 26 percent in terms of 
value. If chilled and frozen beef imports are combined, the 
U.S. share becomes 43 percent in terms of volume and 53 
percent in terms of value for 1989. In either case, the 
growth of U.S. beef imports to Japan has exceeded the growth 
of Australian imports. Incidental to the Japanese market is
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"In fiscal 1991, the U.S. imported $1.23 billion in 
Australian ag products, against exports of only $236 
million" (Doane's 1992b). In any event, the total market is 
expected to increase which should increase sales in terms of 
volume and value for all beef exporters to Japan.
Australia
Australia has smart, export-oriented beef producers who 
will fight tooth-and-nail for the Southeast Asian 
market —  which, after all, is on the Aussies' front 
lawn.
Jonathan Knutson, "Agweek Magazine" (Knutson 
1990, F2).
Australia's largest export market for beef is the 
United States, which imported 365,000 tons of Australian 
beef in 1990, followed by Japan, which imported 200,000 tons 
(Winkler 1991, 21b). Japan began to import substantial 
tonnages of beef around 1955, the bulk of which was sourced 
from Australia as frozen, grass-fed beef. The primary use 
for this meat was for institutions and meat processors. As 
a result, Australia's beef became known as a low-quality 
product.
Thinking that chilled beef would be better than frozen, 
Japan opened its market to imports of chilled beef from 
Australia in the 1970s. Even when imported chilled, by 
Japanese standards Australian beef was cheap, particularly 
when compared to U.S. grain-fed beef. In addition, because
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it was relatively cheap, Australian beef gave importers 
greater opportunity for price markup, and hence a wider 
profit margin, than U.S. beef. Importers therefore promoted 
Australian beef more than U.S. grain-fed beef, giving it 
wider consumer exposure and higher volume sales. U.S. 
imports were then directed to specialty markets within the 
table meat trade. This remained the case until 1978, when 
Japan made quantitative and qualitative adjustments to its 
quota system in favor of the U.S. product in response to 
political pressure from the United States. When combined 
with a growing preference by the Japanese consumer for 
grain-fed beef, which more closely resembles Japanese 
domestic beef, Australia has lost market share to the U.S. 
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 89-91).
In 1972 and 1973, demand for beef increased in Japan at 
a time when domestic production leveled-off. As a result, 
prices for Australian beef soared and the export market to 
Japan appeared to take-off. To capitalize on this emerging 
market, Australian producers began to develop a feedlot 
industry, often in partnership with Japanese investors, 
tailored to supplying the Japanese beef market. Due to a 
combination of factors, including the oil crisis of 1973, 
accelerating inflation and rising feed costs in Japan (which 
led to herd liquidations), beef prices in Japan fell 
dramatically. To protect its domestic industry, the 
Japanese government first curtailed imports in 1973 and then
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closed its market to imports in 1974 for one year.
The budding feedlot industry in Australia was caught at 
a vulnerable moment. A domestic market within Australia had 
not been developed for grain-fed beef, and other export 
markets were not readily available. When the Japanese 
market was curtailed, and then was closed, many backers of 
the Australian feedlot industry lost a lot of money.
Because of this, once the Japanese market reopened 
Australian producers resisted reinvesting in the feedlot 
industry. As a result, Australia's history is one of 
efficient production of grass-fat beef rather than as a 
supplier of grain-fed beef. Consequently, Australian beef 
does not command the price of U.S. grain-fed beef in the 
Japanese market (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 143; Winkler 1991, 
26b).
Unlike the U.S. market, a strong domestic market within 
Australia for grain-fed beef has not yet developed. This 
remains a detriment to Australia's grain-fed, export beef 
industry since the opportunities to sell product which does 
not qualify for export are limited. The risk, therefore, is 
higher than it is for the U.S. producer.
Nonetheless, Japanese investment has flowed to 
Australia in order to develop a supply for the Japanese 
market. Japanese capital has been crucial in upgrading and 
expanding slaughter facilities and in establishing feedlots. 
With Japanese investment has come direct access to Japan's
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distribution system. Foreign investment in Australia's beef 
and meat processing industries, the bulk of which is 
Japanese, has been extensive. In fact, 3 3 percent of total 
Australian slaughter is through packing plants with some 
foreign ownership. Among others, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, and 
Nippon Ham have purchased feedlots in Australia to grow beef 
to the specifications of their customers (Wanatabe 1991,
D2). As of 1989, Japanese investment in Australian beef 
operations reached $132 million, more than twice their 
investment in the U.S. (Time 1989). With Japanese 
investment, Australian feedlot capacity, estimated to be 
600,000 head in 1991, is expected to double by 1992 
(Vansickle 1991, 19). Because of the extent of foreign 
ownership, some alarm has sounded within Australia 
concerning the loss of Australian control over its own beef 
industry (Winkler 1991, 23b).
Australia recently introduced a new grading system 
which very closely matches the Japanese system. Called the 
Chiller Assessment Scheme, the grading standard was 
instituted to allow buyers, and specifically Japanese 
buyers, to specify the product they want. Like the Japanese 
system, scores are assigned for marbling, meat color, fat 
color, and yield. The marbling score is identical to that 
of the Japanese system, which allows Japanese buyers and 
Australian suppliers to use the same criteria when defining 
the product (Winkler 1991, 24b).
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Australia is currently orienting its beef trade with 
Japan toward increasing its profit margins within its 
existing market share of Japan's middle market, and 
specifically, the home and institutional segments of that 
market. This would require raising prices of Australian 
beef to price levels of U.S. imports and domestic dairy 
beef.
With the financial backing of Japanese corporations, 
extensive new growth in Australia's feedlot industry is 
planned. An expanded use of genetics, including the use of 
Wagyu semen, is also being pursued in order to add quality 
to Australia's cattle.
All of this is being done to compete for market share 
at a higher market price in the Japanese market. The 
advantage that Australia has in doing so lies largely in the 
evolution of Australian beef production as an export 
industry. Established primarily to service markets within 
the United Kingdom, secondarily (in the 1950s) the U.S. 
market, and eventually the Japanese market, Australia 
developed a shelf life of 60 to 90 days for its export beef 
(as opposed to 40 to 45 days for U.S. beef) as a matter of 
market orientation. Australia has had to develop a longer 
shelf life to service its markets while the U.S. has not 
(Hayes et al. 1990, 168).
Not only does Australia have a great deal of experience 
in servicing export markets, it has a national focus to do
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so. For example, Australia has developed the world's first 
electronic health certificate (Pierce 1991, 75). It has 
also established the Australian Meat and Livestock Research 
and Development Corporation, a quasi-government agency, to 
conduct export research for the Australian meat industry. 
This agency recently published a strategy which outlines 
specific steps, including upgrading quality and price, which 
Australia can take to directly compete with the U.S. for the 
high-quality, grain-fed segment of the Japanese "middle 
market." This market is targeted because it represents two- 
thirds of total domestic demand and offers the best 
potential for continued growth (Platt and Youmans 1991,
43b).
With processing facilities located in nothern port 
cities, Australian meat exporters have direct acess to ocean 
transportation. Shipping time between Melbourne and 
Japanese ports has been cut to 12 or 13 days, from as long 
as 27 days, due to the development of a faster shipping 
link. Average transport time from Australian ports is said 
to be from 15 to 17 days (Pierce 1991, 75).
Australia currently dominates chilled beef sales to 
Japan with sales of 8,000 to 12,000 tons per month compared 
to chilled beef sales of 2,000 to 4,000 tons per month by 
the U.S. (1991 figures) (Cody 1991). Half of Australian 
beef shipped to Japan is chilled, and 91 percent of chilled 
beef exported by Australia is shipped to Japan. As of 1991,
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Australia had captured about 80 percent of chilled beef 
sales in Japan. Consistent with consumer demand, however, 
Australia's market share is expected to yield to higher- 
quality, grain-fed beef sourced from the U.S. (Pendley 1991, 
6A).
Japan
I started this farm twenty-five years ago with one cow 
and one-and-a-half acres of land....Over the years.
I've built up my business until today I have fifty-five 
head of cattle.
Tsutomu Sameshima, a farmer near Sueyoshi, 
Japan (Oka 1988b).
But as you might expect, Japanese beef is best for 
Japanese.
Yaeko Shishikura, a homemaker in Chiba,
Japan (Wanatabe 1991, D2).
Though masked by its relatively high degree of 
protection, Japanese agriculture has experienced a sharp 
decline in comparative advantage in the postwar period 
(Hayami 1988, 11). In spite of this, and in spite of the 
inherent limitations to an expanded beef industry in Japan 
(farm size, cost of production, lack of feed grains and 
pasture, etc.), the outlook for beef production in Japan is 
not entirely bleak. According to Hayami, beef production is 
expected to become a major industry in Japanese agriculture, 
especially in rougher, more remote terrain. Beef production 
in Japan for a commercial meat market is a relatively new 
industry. With an elastic demand, as prices respond to
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market liberalization, demand will rise for more product. 
This should benefit the domestic producer as well as foreign 
exporters. When combined with deficiency payments, 
international cooperation will be achieved and a domestic 
industry will grow (Hayami 1988, 119).
Japan has also maintained steady investment in its 
agricultural infrastructure, such as land improvements, 
upgrading of irrigation and drainage facilities, and 
construction of rural roads (Moore 1990, 9).
Perhaps the strongest advantages the Japanese producer 
has are twofold: (1) it is a domestic industry, and as such
enjoys all the attendant benefits including governmental and 
popular support, direct ties to Japan's complex and 
difficult distribution system, a complete lack of obstacles 
inherent in the import-export trade (language, 
transportation, cultural differences, etc.), and a close 
geographical link to the consumer; and (2), access to a full 
array of Wagyu genetics.
Because of this last point alone, the domestic Japanese 
producer has a virtual lock on the very top-end of the 
Japanese beef market. Only four Wagyu bulls have been 
exported from Japan, so all genetics in foreign countries 
descended from those four bulls. It is also commonly 
assumed that those bulls were far from the best that Japan 
had to offer. Therefore, in terms of genetics for marbling, 
Japan has no peer.
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The majority of Japan's cattle production is done by 
older, semi-retired family members on farms of less than ten 
head. As previously discussed, this poses problems for the 
entry of entrepreneurial talent in Japan's beef industry.
As a result, innovative practices on a significant scale in 
the near future are unlikely.
Some rationalization is occurring in Japan's dairy 
sector, with some benefits being realized from economies-of- 
scale and lower costs of production (Johnson and Fisher 
1988, 136). In the Wagyu sector, however, with market 
liberalization there are fewer incentives for increased 
Wagyu production due to the high costs of doing so. That 
is, as imports become cheaper, Wagyu beef will become 
relatively more expensive. It is expected that in the 
longer run the Wagyu share of the Japanese beef market will 
decrease from its current level of about 20 percent (Johnson 
and Fisher 1988, 137).
The consensus within the Japanese beef industry is 
that, at the conclusion of the three-year liberalization 
phase, a deficiency payments scheme will be implemented to 
replace the protection that had been granted by quotas and 
price stabilization, to be administered by a restructured 
Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIFO) (Johnson and 
Fisher 1988, 137). Should this be the case, the volume of 
imports would be somewhat hampered since, in essence, a 
certain amount of market share would be "set aside" for
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domestic producers. However, even if this is the case, "it 
is inconceivable that the government will succeed in 
supporting previous levels of self-sufficiency" (Johnson and 
Fisher 1988, 138).
To overcome the limitations of its domestic production 
capacity, Japanese beef importers are looking to vertically 
integrate by purchasing production capacity in foreign 
countries. In Australia the Japanese have purchased 
ownership positions in feedlots and meat processing 
facilities. In the Pacific and Intermountain West, the 
Japanese purchased Washington Beef Company, a meat 
processing plant in Yakima, Washington, in 1988. Also in 
1988 the Zenchiku Corporation purchased the Selkirk Ranch 
near Dillon, Montana. Other examples in other parts of the 
U.S. are readily found, such as the purchase of shares in 
Iowa Beef Processors Inc. (IBP), a major U.S. meat packer in 
Nebraska, and the purchase by Japanese investors of Monterey 
County Cattle Feeders Inc., which feeds an estimated 20,000 
cattle for shipment to Japan, and which plans to increase 
that capacity to 50,000 head (La Ganga 1990, ).
Even with its increasing presence, however, according 
to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, as of 1990 Japanese 
ownership comprised "less than 1 percent of total investment 
in U.S. farmland and agribusiness" (Farmline 1990, 10).
This percentage would be substantially higher, however, if 
only cattle operations which focused on exporting carcass
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beef to Japan were considered. For instance, 15 to 20 
percent of U.S. beef exports to Japan are sourced from 
Japanese-owned and Japanese-U.S. joint venture companies 
(Farmline 1990, 12).
In this way the Japanese retain ownership, or at least 
a significant portion of ownership, of the product from 
production source to the Japanese distribution system. It 
can also
...raise, process, and package beef to the 
specifications of the Japanese market in the amount 
needed and distribute the beef through existing ties in 
the distribution system (Khan et al. 1990, 57).
By so doing the Japanese essentially become exporters
as well as importers, and are positioned to take advantage
of the liberalized conditions of the Japanese beef market.
Japanese firms which are involved in this process, often
through joint ventures with "source" companies in foreign
countries, are also competing for import market share.
Because of their ties to the distribution system in Japan,
and the advantages they enjoy by selling in their own
country, they should prove to be formidable competitors
(Khan et al. 1990, 57).
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The United States
Even with tariffs at 70 percent..-US beef, when freed 
of import restrictions in three years time, will cost 
about 25 percent less than Japanese beef....
Reported in "The Christian Science Monitor" 
(Oka 1983a).
At first glance, what the Japanese call a "formed 
steak" looks delicious....The Japanese create this so- 
called steak from bits of offal —  what Americans 
politely call "variety meats." For effect, a touch of 
fat is added at the edge....This artistry makes it 
possible for the United States to sell about 60,000 
tons of offal to Japan every year, but...it has given 
American beef a bad name here.
Reported in the "Los Angeles Times" (Jameson 
1988a, 1).
The United States has a proven track record for being a 
very large, efficient producer of grain-fattened beef. Its 
beef industry is roughly four times the size of Australia's 
(roughly lOO million head in the U.S. versus 25 million head 
in Australia). It has a tremendous capacity to produce feed 
grains, as well as the ability to convert those feed grains 
into efficient gain ratios on very large numbers of cattle. 
Though not competitive with ful1-blood Wagyu in terms of 
flavor, the quality of these cattle is very good. In terms 
of production capability to service the Japanese market, the 
U.S. is very well positioned.
The genetic quality of U.S. cattle, with the exception 
of the narrow base of available Wagyu genetics (faced by all 
countries other than Japan), is significantly ahead of 
Australia's cow herd. A note of caution must be sounded 
here, however. Australia's cattle herd was started in large
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measure by a type of Indian water buffalo, which is not 
known for the marbling of its meat (interview with Dr.
Thomas Wahl, agricultural economist at Washington State 
University, February 7, 1992). The Australians have, 
however, been taking advantage of the superior genetic^s 
offered in the U.S. by purchasing semen for artificial 
insemination. It is expected that the "genetic deficit" 
(relative to U.S. cattle) currently present in Australia's 
cow herd will narrow as Australia pursues a genetic 
improvement program.
Nonetheless, the U.S. is still ahead of Australia in 
terms of decades-old genetic development of succulent, 
grain-fed cattle. Some would also argue that the sheer size 
of the U.S. feeding and packing industry may also lend 
itself to supplying custom cuts to fill Japanese orders. 
Other advantages which the U.S. enjoys include its colder 
climate (at least in northern-tier states), which the 
Japanese believe causes better marbling, as well as "the 
Japanese perception that U.S. processing facilities are very 
clean and modern and that U.S. inspection systems are the 
best in the world" (Michaelsen 1990, 22f). Also, 
consistently, U.S. beef is high-quality and (at least as of
1991) has name recognition.
To service the chilled-beef market in Japan, U.S. 
exporters must develop an extended shelf-life in order to 
avoid the high cost of air freight. In 1990 air freight to
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Japan from the U.S. ranged from 70 cents to 90 cents per 
pound. Ocean freight ranged from 17 to 20 cents per pound 
(Kendall 1990). When weights are measured by the ton, costs 
savings in transportation can be substantial if not the 
largest single area of cost discrepancy.
Transport time for ocean freight from Seattle to Tokyo 
is reputed to range from 7 to 10 days (compared to 12 to 17 
days from Australia) (interview with Hidetaka Iwasaki,
1992). Transport time from California ports is close to 15 
days (interview with Mr. John Morse, 1992). In this regard 
then, the U.S. appears to have an advantage over Australia.
Though the U.S. cannot compete with Australia on price, 
Australia cannot compete with the U.S. on quality. In both 
categories, however, as mentioned previously Australia 
expects its product to become more like the U.S. product. 
While Australia has geared its market toward exports, the 
U.S. market has been geared toward domestic sales. As a 
result, the U.S. has not developed the capacity to ship 
chilled beef to the extent that Australia has. A revamping 
of export facilities and practices is necessary if the U.S. 
is to remain competitive with Australia.
In spite of this, though Australia surpasses the U.S. 
in terms of tonnage of chilled beef exported to Japan, the 
rate of growth of U.S. exports of chilled beef is much 
higher than Australia's. From 1987 to 1988, Australian 
shipments of chilled beef to Japan increased by 22 percent.
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followed by a 46 percent increase in 1989. The 
corresponding numbers for the United States are 106 percent 
and 71 percent. By 1991, U.S. beef occupied 75 to 85 
percent of beef counterspace in Japan (Morgan 1991).
Part of the competitive advantage enjoyed by the United 
States comes from its stature as the dominant political 
power in the post-war period. Japan liberalized its beef 
market largely in response to political pressure from the 
United States. It is questionable if any other country 
could have done the same. Because of the persistent trade 
surplus which Japan has with the United States, it is likely 
that the Japanese government will insure that a substantial 
percentage of its beef market will be serviced by U.S. beef.
Peter Drucker essentially likens the U.S.-Japan trade 
relationship to the adage: if one's debt is small, one is
owned by the bank. But if one's debt is very high, one owns 
the bank:
We are so hypnotized by the trade surplus that we do 
not understand how dependent upon the United States 
Japan has become. In economic history, the point at 
which a nation's dependence on one market becomes 
economically and politically dangerous is somewhere 
around 25 percent. Japan has surpassed that point with 
the United States, which buys more than 40 percent of 
Japanese exports (Drucker 1990).
In addition to improving product shelf-life, export 
facilities and transportation, other areas for attention 
include changing the fat deposition character of U.S. cattle 
(increase marbling and decrease the amount of exterior fat 
which must be trimmed), and reducing package size and
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increasing package durability (Khan et al. 1990, 20). Also, 
according to a 1988 survey, the Japanese consumer often 
confuses U.S. beef with Australian beef. That is, "the 
Japanese consumer's image of American beef is mostly formed 
from taste experiences with Australian beef" (Khan et al. 
1990, 50).
Promotional activity in Japan by U.S. beef interests 
should overcome this misperception, and that promotion is 
occurring. In 1991, the U.S. Meat Export Federation planned 
to sponsor five-thousand events to promote U.S. beef in 
Japan through 1992. Promotional activities would include 
U.S. beef cook-offs, recipe books and cooking schools. Also 
planned was a "hookup with Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. to promote Japanese microwave ovens and American beef 
dishes" (Wanatabe 1991, D2). Apparently some positive 
results occurred. According to the U.S. Meat Federation, in 
1991 U.S. beef did have name recognition (Vansickle 1991b, 
19).
One of the most significant advantages U.S. producers 
have over their counterparts in Japan has to do with costs 
of production. Though the following figures were published 
in 1988, the relative difference is likely quite similar;
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Table 15











































avg on 1,440-lb 
dairy steer)
$395.86
Source: Sands 1988, 17.
Note: Exchange rate ê 125 yen/$l.
Note: Feeding period for a U.S. steer is about 5 months.
Feeding period for a Japanese dairy steer is about 
16 months.
As U.S. cattle are fed to Japanese standards the costs 
of production will increase, but will still fall far short 
of the costs of production within Japan. Selling price will 
also increase, but is expected to increase relatively more, 
by a significant margin, than the costs of production.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 16 
MARKET RISK
What all must do, however, is adapt products and 
marketing to Japanese tastes in what is a faddish, 
fast-changing market.
As reported in "The Economist" (Economist 
1988b, 19).
I don't know where the other $2,100 went but somebody 
got it and it wasn't me. Similarly, neither should you 
assume that the $6 difference between sirloin you 
deliver for $4 per pound and the $10 per pound retail 
price is your profit.
Steve Browning, Montana Livestock Exporters, 
on shipping 1,450-pound live steers to Japan 
@ $1,875, which sold in Japan for $4,000 
(Fitzgerald 1988).
The Japanese history of beef is so marginal. What 
they've had is Kobe, which is extremely fat. I think 
our industry will make a mistake if we feel that's 
where the taste is going to be.
Billy Powell, Executive Vice President of the 
Alabama Cattlemen's Association (Johnson 
1989, 36).
Whereas the export market will in all probability 
remain Australia's primary focus in product development, the 
U.S. is more likely to view the Japanese market as a 
specialty market. The primary reasons for this have to do 
with the size of the U.S. domestic market and the cattle 
feeding and processing industries which have evolved around 
that market. The trend in U.S. beef production has been
120
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toward leaner, less marbled carcasses. Genetic selection and 
feeding programs have changed accordingly (Knipe et al.
1990, 154). In a sense, then, beef production in the U.S. 
has headed away from the type of beef demanded by the high 
quality beef in Japan. Given the changes necessary to cater 
to the Japanese market, including different genetic 
selection, feeding programs, processing, packaging and 
transportation practices, it is unlikely that a major 
movement in the U.S. to service this market will emerge. It 
is equally likely that those who are flexible enough to do 
so will find it difficult to develop U.S. beef to 
consistently grade well enough to qualify as premium beef in 
Japan (B3 or better).
It is not unlikely that the demand for we11-marbled 
beef in Japan will in fact shrink. As the Japanese consume 
more beef, their concern about consumption of saturated fats 
may override those factors which motivate the consumer 
(taste, status, tradition, etc.) to purchase highly-marbled 
beef. This may then become a declining market in absolute 
as well as relative terms. The risk in this is that by the 
time the U.S. producer develops the genetic tools and feed 
programs to service the premium market, that market may be 
well on its way down. The practices which the exporter 
would develop in doing so, however, would in all likelihood 
carry over into producing beef more appropriate to the 
changing tastes of the Japanese consumer. Of significant
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importance would be the contacts developed within the
Japanese distribution system.
Factors that may retard the current growth in 
consumption of beef by the Japanese consumer include 
declining economic growth, declining population growth, 
slowing changes in dietary habits, and growing consumer 
health consciousness. Recent trends show both 
population and economic growth rates to be slowing 
though continuing to grow. Little increase in demand 
is expected to occur from dietary changes because 
influencing factors such as urbanization have 
essentially made their contribution. The optimal diet 
in terms of protein, fat, carbohydrate, and caloric 
consumption has also been reached, having a potential 
moderating effect on increasing demand for beef. In 
addition, increasing health awareness may retard the 
growth rate of per capita beef consumption, especially 
of beef that is highly marbled with fat (Khan et al. 
1990, 13).
Be this as it may. At present, the Japanese are 
demanding highly-marbled beef, it has been a traditional 
part of their diet for a long time, and opportunity exists 
to service that market.
The financial risk involved in developing a product 
which will qualify for the Japanese premium market is 
considerable. The cattle are older when they go on feed and 
are fed for much longer periods, which translates into a 
longer period of financial commitment than is customary in 
the U.S. cattle business. That is, the dollars spent to 
develop and finish the product are much higher than 
customary, and the time those dollars are invested in 
developing and finishing the product is much longer than 
customary. As a result, the finished product represents a 
substantial commitment of time and financial resources
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 3
before any return is realized.
Should that finished product not be acceptable for the 
targeted export market, and as a result need to be sold 
domestically, if marketed through traditional channels the 
animal would be discounted by the U.S. market because that 
type of beef does not fit consumer preference. Substantial 
monetary losses would then be incurred. This market 
position may be avoided if specialty markets within the U.S. 
can be developed. Should this not be feasible, contracting 
between all the involved parties may be necessary to 
distribute the potential for loss fairly. More importantly 
would be the development of ultrasonics to determine a 
carcass's condition of marbling at selected points in time 
to coincide with different marketing alternatives.
All other considerations aside, shortages of 
refrigerated warehouse space, and inadequate dock and 
airport freight-staging areas, may constrain any rapid 
increase in imports of chilled product, at least initially. 
High land costs to expand these facilities may prove 
prohibitive. To what extent the Japanese palate will change 
to accommodate more consumption of beef, and particularly 
U.S. chilled beef, is open to debate. In a study conducted 
by a Washington State University sociologist, Japanese- 
Americans who had lived in Hawaii for three generations only 
consumed eighteen pounds of beef per capita, as opposed to 
about seventy pounds for most Americans (interview with Dr.
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Jerry Reeves, February 6, 1992). Though this is nearly 
twice the consumption by the average Japanese today, it 
falls short of what some U.S. beef exporters may hope for 
and expect.
Japanese consumers by-and-large favor Japanese beef. 
Just how much the lower price of imported chilled beef will 
affect this predilection has yet to be fully determined. In 
1991, however, Japan imported 147,116 metric tons of U.S. 
beef for the first ten months of the year, down from 163,958 
metric tons for the same period in 1990, for a decline of 
over 10 percent. The corresponding value of these exports 
was about $800 million in 1990 and $745 million in 1991 
(about a 7 percent drop) (Cattle Fax 1992). Even though a 
decline was expected due to the stockpiling of imported beef 
prior to the lifting of import quotas on April 1, 1991, the 
negative movement in export volume should not be ignored.
The call for self-sufficiency in food production also
lingers (45 percent self-sufficient in beef production in
1988 vs. 90 percent in the 1960s) (Wahl et al. 1991, 119),
which may hamper consumer enthusiasm for foreign products
despite its lower cost and favorable taste comparison.
Matthew Cohn, Pacific Rim Trade Officer for the
Department of Commerce, State of Montana, offered the
following observations (interview, July 1, 1992);
A major problem is the distribution system within 
Japan. The real profits will be made in Japan as the 
product works its way through the distribution system, 
with numerous markups imposed as the product winds its
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way toward the consumer.
The Japanese tend to squeeze their suppliers to the 
"half-penny” in attempting to secure the lowest 
possible prices. If the Japanese are to pay a premium 
price in the U.S., they must sell the product for a 
premium in Japan. For the producer to receive a 
premium, then, the producer's carcasses must grade 
better than B3.
The producer will not be able to exert any degree of 
control over the product once it reaches Japan. For 
instance, imported U.S. beef, should it grade well, may 
be sold as domestic Wagyu rather than as U.S. beef. 
Also, beef that is sold under trademark does not insure 
that producers of that beef have the trademark's 
exclusive use. For example, beef sold as "Nebraska" 
beef in Japan may not be Nebraska beef at all. It 
could be anything that might pass for "Nebraska" beef. 
In fact, a Japanese meat marketer may sell domestic 
Japanese beef as imported beef if he thinks it may sell 
better if labeled as such.
The Japanese are notorious for "changing the rules in 
the middle of the game." Not that such a practice is 
inherently wrong, but it is something to which most 
U.S. businesses are unaccustomed. In essence, the 
Japanese operate under a different set of business 
ethics than do American businesses.
Although a Japanese client may say it wants one-hundred 
carcasses per month, there is no guarantee that it will 
take that many, and it is highly unlikely that a U.S. 
supplier will be able to secure guarantees to that 
effect.
Other customers should be pursued. Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Guam and Hawaii are all are big markets for 
Japanese tourists. Another customer in Japan might be 
beneficial, but in all likelihood Nichiro would resist 
such a move. Typically, Japanese customers want "an 
exclusive" when dealing with suppliers. Japanese 
restaurants within the U.S. would also be a logical 
market.
The Japanese have been known to reject a whole 
container of chilled carcasses because one bit of mold 
was found on one carcass. Also, a container may spoil 
because someone forgot to plug it in while it sits on 
the dock.
U.S. companies which have been successful in Japan have
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done two things. One is to team-up with a Japanese 
partner. The other is to form their own distribution 
system. Once Mr. Marchi "figures out" the product and 
the attendant services (processing, transportation, 
shelf life, etc.) he should do well, but the investment 
to learn is significant.
Mr. Aoyama reported that, since liberalization,
Japanese dairy farmers have found it increasingly difficult 
to compete with imports for the "intermediate" beef market. 
Many dairy farmers are consequently transplanting Wagyu 
embryos into their dairy cows in order to raise beef for the 
premium market while continuing commercial milk production. 
While this may bode well for most imports, it provides 
additional competition for Nichiro's targeted market.
Mr. Marchi is dealing with an uncertain demand. Mr. 
Aoyama said that initially Nichiro will want fifty carcasses 
per month once a grade of B3 is consistently attained, and 
eventually it will want one-hundred carcasses per month.
Mr. Yamamura placed Nichiro's demand at three-hundred per 
month. Mr. Aoyama acknowledged that demand was uncertain 
since Nichiro was dealing with an uncertain market. That 
is, Nichiro has not had the product so they do not know what 
the demand will be (interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, 1992).
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CHAPTER 17 
MARKET ENTRY
In terms of carcass quality as seen by the Japanese, on 
a scale of l to 10 we have gone from -1 to 1, and the 
Japanese want us at 5.
Jon Marchi, a rancher in Poison, Montana, who 
custom feeds cattle for Nichiro Corporation, 
Tokyo (interview, January 8, 1992).
When dealing with the Japanese, one personal visit to 
Japan is worth one-thousand phone calls and ten- 
thousand letters.
Y. Yamamura, President and CEO of Arrowhead, 
Inc., a Tokyo trading house (Marchi 
interview, 1992).
From September 1987 through January 1988, Jon Marchi, 
owner of Marchi Angus Ranches of Poison, Montana, purchased, 
processed and quarantined 742 live steer calves for shipment 
to Japan. Mr. Marchi had contracted with Montana Livestock 
Exporters, Inc., to provide those cattle and associated 
services. The cattle were quarantined in feedlots owned by 
Marchi Angus Ranches and were shipped to Japan air freight 
from Seattle in three separate shipments. The first 
shipment was consigned to Naigai/Mitsui, a 50- percent owner 
of Montana Livestock Exporters, Inc. The next two shipments 
were consigned to UNI-COOP.
In June of 1988, Mr. Marchi travelled to Japan to 
inspect those cattle, then on feed in a Japanese feedlot.
128
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Mr. Y. Yamamura, then a Senior Managing Director of Naigai 
Foods Co., Ltd., in Tokyo, assisted in making the necessary 
arrangements for Mr. Marchi. While in Tokyo Mr. Marchi met 
with Mr. Yamamura, among others, to discuss the potential 
for additional shipments of Montana cattle to Japan.
While in Tokyo, Mr. Marchi noted that Wagyu beef was 
selling in the display case for upwards of $70 per pound, 
while U.S. Choice sold for about $24 per pound. Similarly, 
Wagyu hamburger sold for $12.50 per pound compared to $8.90 
per pound for U.S. hamburger. In his conversations with Mr. 
Yamamura, Mr. Marchi was told that the typical Japanese ate 
high-quality beef once per month, but ate less expensive 
beef once per week or even once per day. He was also told 
that the younger generation was increasingly fond of beef 
and that good potential existed for beef imports that 
catered to Japanese taste.
In these discussions, the expansion of the Marchi 
feedlot to accommodate and feed more cattle for export to 
Japan, and the acquisition of or joint venture with a 
Montana packing plant to process those cattle for export to 
Japan as chilled carcass beef, was also discussed.
By the end of 1988, shipping live cattle to Japan was 
dropped in favor of carcass beef. By shipping carcass beef, 
excessive freight costs could be avoided. Locating and 
securing a consistent supply of quality cattle could also be 
avoided. Health problems —  which commonly occur when
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calves, usually at various stages of weaning and from a 
number of different ranches, are put together at about the 
same time —  would be circumvented. Carcass beef dodged the 
problem of securing quarantine space in Japan, which was 
extremely limited (and as such served as a non-tariff 
barrier) and which often had to be reserved years in 
advance. The end of the quota system was anticipated, and 
those companies which were importing carcass beef would be 
well positioned to capitalize on the new market conditions.
In December of 1988, Mr. Yamamura informed Mr. Marchi 
that he had resigned from Naigai Foods and had formed a 
trading company. Arrowhead Inc., in Tokyo. Mr. Yamamura had 
encouraged Naigai Foods to develop a specialty meat in the 
United States in order to position itself for the 
liberalization of the Japanese beef market. Naigai was more 
interested in cheaper Australian beef, and the possibility 
of importing beef from Mexico, than it was in high-quality, 
specialty beef. Mr. Yamamura left Naigai Foods in 
September of 1988, and subsequently presented the idea to 
Nichiro Fishery Co., Ltd.
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NICHIRO CORPORATION
Nichiro Corporation, known as Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha 
Ltd. until 1990, was established in 1914 for the purpose of 
salmon fishing in northern waters. The company lost 
virtually all of its assets in World War II, after which it 
began a long process of rebuilding. In 1962 a joint venture 
was formed with H.J. Heinz Co., known as Nichiro Heinz,
Ltd., which developed fishing grounds off the Sahara coast 
of Africa. In 1979 Nichiro purchased Peter Pan Seafoods, 
Inc., a U.S. fish processor. In 1985, Nichiro established 
SeaBlends Food Company in Seattle, whose charge was to 
produce specialty seafoods for the U.S. and foreign markets.
By 1987 Nichiro's capital had risen to 8.2 billion yen 
(about $56.9 million), employed about 2,000 people, and had 
consolidated annual sales of over $1.8 billion. Of those 
sales, roughly $380 million, or 21 percent, were in frozen 
and chilled foods (not including fish, which accounted for 
46 percent of sales). Nichiro was one of thirty-six 
companies designated by LIPC to import beef into Japan under 
the quota system.
Nichiro's principal activities were: salmon and crab
fishing; fish farming; trawl fishing; food processing; feed
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manufacturing; foreign trade in fish and other products, and 
the distribution of those products; cold storage; and 
shipping. In 1987, Nichiro had 27 subsidiaries and 26 
affiliates (Nichiro 1987; Japanese Companies 1987, 15).
According to Nichiro's 1987 annual report, it is a 
"globally oriented food company...[which] seeks to 
contribute to society through the supply of high-quality 
food products ...." Nichiro, according to Mr. Iwasaki, is 
the third largest fishing company in Japan and is a "mid­
level" beef company. It's 1991 gross sales were roughly $2 
billion, about half of which were fish. Beef sales were 
about $180 million, almost all of which were sales of 
domestic (Japanese) beef.
Nichiro operates a 2,000 head feedlot through its 
affiliate, Shinmei Chikusan, in Okydo, Japan. It feeds 
Holstein steers which it buys from Japanese dairy farmers, 
but wants to introduce Wagyu to its feedlot operation via 
embryo transplant. It slaughters one-hundred head per month 
for the Japanese meat market. According to Mr. Iwasaki, 
Nichiro also imports sixty ton of processed meat (hamburger, 
which is 50 percent pork) per year from Australia, which it 
buys through a Japanese trading house.
Nichiro built a new fish processing plant in Seattle in 
1990, operated by its subsidiary, Nichiro Pacific, Ltd.
When it did so it overbuilt, so that it now has unused 
capacity, including refrigeration space, cyrovac equipment.
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and a labor force. It also has ships available for ocean 
transport. With its refrigeration space, Nichiro sees the 
opportunity to provide U.S. beef steak, via air freight, to 
Tokyo restaurants which operate under just-in-time 
inventory.
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CHAPTER 19
THE MARCHI-NICHIRO FEED TRIALS
If Jon Marchi can export carcasses that will grade A3 
and A4, I  will be president of the company!
Hiroshi Aoyama, General Manager, Meat 
Products Department, Nichiro Corporation, 
Tokyo (interview June 17, 1992).
With its extensive distribution network for chilled 
foods, Nichiro recognized the potential for capitalizing on 
an emerging (from the standpoints of market liberalization 
as well as increasing consumer demand) market in Japan, 
provided the right product could be developed. To position 
itself in that emerging market, speed was of the essence. 
Other Japanese companies were doing the same. For instance, 
Mr. Yamamura reported that Meiji Milk Co. was attempting to 
develop premium Japanese-quality beef in Australia and 
Oklahoma in order to supply the same market Nichiro had 
targeted.
In addition to Nichiro's current distribution chain, 
two other markets showed promise. One was Japanese 
restaurants in the United States. The other was a 
restaurant chain in Japan, to be called Steake Restaurant, 
which Mr. Yamamura hoped to develop in conjunction with 
Nichiro and Imperial Hotel. Its purpose would be to sell
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Marchi Beef throughout Japan. Before either could be 
pursued, however, an acceptable product had to be developed.
To develop the product two things were required.
First, feed trials were necessary to determine the required 
feed rations, gain ratios, feeding periods and carcass 
weights. Secondly, crucial to the process was a U.S. 
producer who: (1) had access to high-quality Black Angus
cattle, (2) had the capability to conduct the feed trials,
(3) could arrange for slaughter according to Japanese 
specifications, and (4) most importantly, was eager to 
cooperate with Nichiro in developing the product according 
to Nichiro's standards. Mr. Marchi, presented through Mr. 
Yamamura and Arrowhead, Inc., offered this opportunity.
Mr. Hiroshi Aoyama, a representative of Nichiro 
Corporation, visited Mr. Marchi in Poison in May of 1989 
(followed by Mr. Yamamura in July). On May 26, Nichiro 
bought fifty yearling steers from Marchi Angus Ranches at an 
average live weight of 929 pounds. Selected by Mr. Aoyama 
and Mr. Marchi as the best of two-hundred Black Angus which 
Mr. Marchi had in his feedlot in Poison, these cattle were 
then custom fed by Mr. Marchi for 193 days, till early 
December, when they were slaughtered at White's Wholesale 
Meats in Ronan, Montana, at an average live weight of 1298 
pounds. Average daily gain (ADG) for the 193-day feeding 
period was less than 2 pounds. The target had been 2.2 to 
2.6 pounds per day.
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Compared to U.S. industry standards, slaughter weight 
was high (most fat cattle in the U.S. are slaughtered at 
1050 to 1100 pounds), the feeding period was longer (150 
days is the norm in U.S. feedlots), and the ADGs were lower 
(three to four pounds per day is average in a typical U.S. 
feedlot). By feeding the Nichiro cattle for longer periods 
of time at slower rates of gain and to heavier weights, the 
hope was to develop highly marbled beef which would grade B3 
or better, and, in Mr. Yamamura's opinion, to ultimately 
produce beef which would rival or at least compete with 
Japan's Kobe beef (premium Wagyu, grown in the Kobe region 
of Japan) or Matsuzaka beef (Wagyu raised in the Matsuzaka 
region, generally of somehwat higher quality than Kobe 
beef). The hope was to have the product developed by the 
time import quotas were removed (April 1, 1991), at which 
time Nichiro would import one-hundred carcasses per month, 
or 530 tons per year (carcass weight of 880 pounds). Under 
its LIPC quota, as one of the thirty-six Japanese firms 
allowed to import beef, Nichiro's chilled, grain-fed beef 
imports were limited to twenty tons per year.
In order to fill its twenty-ton quota for 1989, Nichiro 
purchased an additional 6.5 carcasses from Mr. Marchi. The 
carcasses (56.5, for a total carcass weight of 21.3 tons) 
were quartered, cooled and wrapped to Nichiro's 
specifications. They were then trucked to Seattle and 
shipped to Tokyo via air freight as chilled carcass beef.
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The arrangements were made by Nichiro Pacific, Ltd. (NFL), a 
U.S. subsidiary of Nichiro Corporation based in Seattle.
Typical problems which surfaced in chilling and packing 
carcass beef in the U.S. for shipment to Japan included 
improper refrigeration and inadequate wrapping materials. 
Some carcass damage often incurred as a result.
Modifications to the packing process at White's, per 
detailed instructions sent by Nichiro, avoided these 
problems. Mr. Yamamura had emphasized the necessity of full 
cooperation from White's so that the integrity of the 
product not be compromised.
Mr. Genjiro Honda, a Nichiro meat specialist, was 
present when the cattle were slaughtered at White's. In 
addition to instructing his American counterparts in the 
Japanese style of carcass preparation, Mr. Honda graded the 
carcasses. The results were disappointing.
Of thirty-three carcasses graded on December 4, 1989, 
none reached B3.* One graded B1 (lower than B2). All the 
others graded B2 (lower than B3). Carcass quality was 
essentially that of Japanese Holstein and Australian beef. 
The goal of matching Wagyu, let alone Kobe beef, seemed out- 
of-reach. Mr. Marchi reported that:
®0f a multitude of criteria involved in the Japanese beef 
grading system, three are of primary importance: color of the
fat (stark white is best, yellow is worst), color of the meat 
(bright pink is best, dark red is worst), and amount of 
marbling (the more the better —  from 50 percent to 80 
percent).
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The first carcasses were low-Choice to mid-Prime. Bob 
[Bob White, owner-operator of White's Wholesale Meats], 
Doug [Dr. Douglas Gray, a meat scientist at Montana 
State University], and I all thought they were great. 
Bob said some were the best he'd ever seen. But they 
weren't what the Japanese wanted.
Both sides were naive. We thought it would work. We 
all did. The Japanese thought the Americans could do 
it easily and we did too. But we couldn't, and the 
Japanese didn't give up.
All in all, the fat color of the carcasses had been 
quite good, as was the color of meat. The Japanese grader 
was very pleased with both. Marbling, however, was 
mediocre. Of the twelve grades of marbling, these carcasses 
were consistently in the middle. The feeling was that 
carcasses which would grade B3 or better (i.e., B3, B4, B5, 
Al, A2, A3, A4, A5) could be produced. The challenge was 
but to do so consistently, economically, and with most, if 
not all, of the steers selected for a given feed trial.
These conditions had to be satisfied before Nichiro would 
commit itself to importing one-hundred carcasses per month 
from Marchi Angus Ranches, which it had hoped to do 
beginning in April of 1991.
In the feed trial of 1988, Dr. Gray outlined some of 
the difficulty of product development, and recommended 
measures that should be attempted. Problems, or 
complications, which Dr. Gray mentioned include the 
following:
(1) maintaining gains would get increasingly 
difficult as the cattle matured;
(2) though barley was the recommended feed, the
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potential for bloat, inconsistent feed consumption, and 
acidosis were considerable;
(3) though corn was a safer feed, it tended to 
produce fat which was soft and tinged with yellow;
(4) though age worked for producing better marbling
(since marbling is the last fat deposited, the animal must 
have reached structural and muscular maturity before 
depositing intramuscular fat), it worked against meat color 
(the older the animal, the darker the meat) and tenderness
(the older the animal, the less tender the meat);
(5) meat color was adversely affected by stress —  
stress which could be induced simply by trucking the cattle 
from the feedlot to the slaughter plant;
(6) some cattle will deposit yellow fat regardless of 
what they are fed because their genetic make-up does not 
allow them to process carotene well;
(7) maturity is generally reached at about 19 months 
of age, and marbling occurs between 13 and 36 months, and 30 
months was probably getting too old;
(8) marbling is the biggest contributor to flavor yet 
the most difficult to achieve —  not only is it the last of 
the four fats to be deposited (external, or back-fat; 
internal, or body-cavity fat; intermuscular, or seam fat; 
and marbling, or intramuscular fat), it is also the first to 
be lost under any sort of stress;
(9) if the carcass was trimmed too much, it would
lose 2 percent of its weight through moisture evaporation 
while in refrigeration; and
(10) no standard efficiency factor's existed for what 
Mr. Marchi was attempting to do since, to Dr. Gray's 
knowledge, this had not been attempted before.
Steps which Dr. Gray recommended for the initial
feeding trial, in an attempt to avoid some of these
potential problems, included the following:
(1) to achieve a carcass weight of 880 pounds, which 
Nichiro wanted, the cattle should be fed to a live weight of 
1430 pounds, requiring 2.6 to 2-7 pounds-per-day gain given 
the time allowed; as a target, feed cattle to a live weight 
of 1400 to 1650 pounds;
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(2) the cattle should be fed twice daily to maximize 
consumption;
(3) the ration should eventually become 80 percent 
barley in order to increase the rate of gain, increase 
marbling, and to produce fat which is firm and very white;
(4) once slaughtered, electrical stimulation of the 
carcass might improve meat color, and it would force the 
marbling to set-up better, which could improve marbling up 
to 10 percent;
(5) slaughter the cattle as soon as possible after 
transporting from the feedlot;
(6) barley and wheat are equally good in terms of 
producing white fat, but barley is better for making more 
fat ;
(7) feed the cattle as much as they will eat, and keep 
an 80:20 ratio of grain to roughage; at a minimum, 10 
percent of the feed ration should be alfalfa hay;
(8) feed uniform sets of cattle, and push them to get 
maximum feed consumption.
Though many of these recommendations were followed, the 
cattle weights at slaughter, carcass weights, gains per day, 
and marbling were not satisfactory in terms of specialty 
beef for Japan. Because the meat did not fit Nichiro's 
targeted market, Nichiro sold the carcasses at about 900 yen 
per kilogram (approximately $2.84 per pound, using the 1990 
average exchange rate). Nichiro's cost was about 1,250 yen 
per kilogram ($3.95 per pound), for a loss of roughly $1.11 
per pound. Nichiro's total loss was about $47,000.
Nichiro Corporation thought the weight gains, and the 
carcass yield (58 percent actual, 61 to 63 percent 
expected), should have been better. Actual average carcass 
weight was 755 pounds. Expected carcass weight was 880
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pounds. Likewise, whereas the expected ADG was 2.2 to 2.6 
pounds per day, actual was 1.97. The Japanese were 
disappointed, even discouraged. The trust which Mr. Marchi 
had established with Arrowhead and Nichiro Corporation 
seemed to be in jeopardy. In their view, the cattle did not 
perform as expected. For the project to continue, these 
issues had to be resolved immediately. Trust had to be 
reaffirmed. It was January of 1990.
Within ten days of receiving Mr. Yamamura's letter 
outlining the above concerns, Mr. Marchi responded in 
detail. Among other items addressed, Mr. Marchi explained 
that the Japanese frame of reference was the Wagyu, which 
was not fed for marbling until it was structurally mature. 
The Nichiro cattle in the Marchi feedlot, however, were 
being fed for structural growth as well as meat development. 
A lower grain-to-hay ratio had been used in order to foster 
structural growth, deemed essential in order to achieve 
marbling. A grain-to-hay ratio of 80:20 would have been 
more efficient in terms of weight gain, but it would not 
have been the desired weight type (i.e., backfat and seam 
fat instead of marbling). A feed ratio of 48:52 grain-to- 
hay was therefore used. Though hay is the most expensive 
and least efficient means of feeding cattle in terms of 
weight gain, it was seen as necessary given the goals of the 
feed trial.
To rectify this situation in the interest of developing
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a product the Japanese wanted at a cost which they felt 
reasonable, and in a spirit of cooperation and shared risk, 
Mr. Marchi proposed a cap on cost-of-gain. The 1989 cattle 
had a cost-of-gain of $1.04 per pound. Mr. Marchi proposed 
limiting the cost-of-gain on the next feed trial to $.83 per 
pound.’ Should cost-of-gain exceed $.83, he would pay the 
difference up to a live weight of 1500 pounds, with the 
following conditions: Black-white-face steers would be fed
with Black Angus, and the feeding period would be two to 
three months longer (from 193 days in the 1989 trial to as 
much as 250 days in 1990).
This was a significant risk for Mr. Marchi since he did 
not know what the price of feed would be in 1990, although 
he did expect to feed more grain than hay (thereby lowering 
the cost-of-gain). Mr. Marchi had already guaranteed death 
loss not to exceed 2 percent. Plus, in anticipation of 
providing one-hundred carcasses per month beginning in April 
of 1991, Mr. Marchi had done the following: purchased an
additional hay and grain ranch and contracted to buy yet 
another; constructed one mile of new road; drilled a four- 
hundred foot well in order to supply high-quality water to 
the feedlot; commenced construction of another feedlot; 
contracted to buy an additional 110 Black Angus steer calves
’Based on its experience of feeding cattle in Japan, 
Nichiro expected the Marchi steers to perform about 20 percent 
better than they did. Mr. Marchi proposed a cap of $.83 per 
pound to reflect a 20 percent reduction in the actual cost-of- 
gain.
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on October 15, 1990; added an additional ranch employee; 
and contracted with Dr. Gray for advice concerning cattle 
nutrition.
Mr. Marchi reiterated that 1989 was a trial from which 
they learned much, that feeding cattle to these weights was 
virtually unheard of in the U.S., and that a grain ration 
which excluded corn and relied strictly on barley and wheat 
was largely untested. He stressed that he had made a 
substantial investment in this project in terms of time and 
capital and that he was committed to a long-term 
relationship with Nichiro in order to develop the product 
Nichiro wanted.
Nichiro accepted Mr. Marchi's explanation and proposal, 
and began to deal with Mr. Marchi directly through Mr. 
Yamamura of Arrowhead, Inc. (the Tokyo trading company), 
bypassing Nichiro Pacific, Ltd. After a number of different 
scenarios were discussed, a second feed trial involving five 
head began July 10, 1990. Some notable differences 
characterized this trial: only five head were involved;
Nichiro would accept only those carcasses which graded a 
minimum of B3; a feeding program would be provided by 
Nichiro; the feeding period would be for nine months; and 
the goal of the trial was to achieve a grade of B4. From 
Nichiro's perspective, the price differential between B3 and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
144
B4® was large enough to absorb some adverse movement in the 
exchange rate as well as import duty costs and still remain 
profitable. To effectively compete as a specialty meat, 
though B3 was acceptable, B4 was desired.
In addition to the cost-of-gain cap, Mr. Marchi stood 
the risk of not having the carcasses grade B3. Should this 
be the case, in all probability the carcasses would be 
heavily discounted in the U.S. market due to their excessive 
fat (by U.S. standards). The incentive for Mr. Marchi to do 
so was the prospect of a one-hundred-per-month carcass 
business. In terms of assumption of risk, it seemed as 
though he were being asked to go a good deal more than half 
way. In the interests of developing trust, and in carrying 
the project forward, he accepted the challenge.
The five steers were slaughtered at White's Wholesale 
Meats on April 4, 1991. Since a representative of Nichiro 
was unable to attend, and since the carcasses could 
therefore not be graded until they were received in Japan, 
Nichiro accepted all carcasses regardless of their grade. 
Live weight at slaughter was 1550 pounds and carcass weight 
averaged 876 pounds, weights which essentially met the 
Japanese criteria. Average daily gain for the 266-day 
feeding period (July 10, 1990 through April 3, 1991) was 2.0
'Wholesale prices in Tokyo in June, 1992, on a per-pound 
basis were: B2 § $2.50; B3 § $3.15; A3 @ $5.60; A4 @ $7; A5
@ $9. Price quotes for B4, B5, Al, and A2 were not available 
(interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, June 17, 1992).
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pounds, somewhat less than the target of 2.2 to 2.6 pounds 
per day. Cost-of-gain was about $.97 per pound up to 1500 
pounds, which exceeded the ceiling price of $.83 by $.14 per 
pound. Consequently, Mr. Marchi credited Nichiro for the 
difference per their agreement.®
The carcasses were evaluated and graded in Japan on 
April 11, 1991. Of the five carcasses, three graded B2 and 
two graded A2. The carcasses were clean and in good 
condition, and the color of the meat and fat were judged to 
be very good. Marbling, however, was still somewhat 
disappointing, and a moisture problem, defined as "watery" 
or "drip," was detected.
Carcass sales price was about 9 percent (on average) 
less than the expected sales price. Because they could not 
be sold as B3 (equivalent to Wagyu half-blood cross or 
Japanese Holstein steer), they had to be sold as "regular 
imported meat," such as that from Australia.
Other than the increase in carcass weight, attributable 
to the extended feeding period and upward adjustment in the 
grain-to-hay ratio (to 75:25 from 48:52), there was slight 
difference from the first trial in terms of meat 
improvement. Nichiro recommended increasing the amount of 
carbohydrates in the feed ration, increasing the quantity of
®$.9659 - $.83 = $.1359 per pound credit; 1500 pounds - 
1018.4 pounds = 481.6 pounds of gain per head applicable for 
feed credit; 481.6 pounds x $.1359 per pound x 5 head = 
$327.25 total credit.
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feed, and extending the feeding period.
All in all, however, Mr. Marchi was informed that 
future carcasses would be accepted as B3 provided the 
moisture problem could be solved. The solution could be as 
simple as withholding feed and water from the cattle for 
twenty-four to forty-eight hours prior to slaughter, as was 
customary in Japan.
A third feed trial began on October 1, 1991, with ten 
Black Angus steers. At an average age of about eighteen 
months, and an average weight of 1123 pounds, these steers 
began the feed trial (they had been on summer pasture 
through September) at approximately the same weight and age 
of most fat cattle at the time of slaughter in the U.S. The 
ten were selected as the best of 255 yearling steers 
(averaging 915 pounds) and were to be fed until the 
following October. Confident that the feed trials were 
making sufficient progress, Nichiro purchased the steers at 
$.80 per pound, effective October 1, 1991. As with the 
previous feed trial, the steers were to be fed according to 
a program provided by Nichiro.
In February of 1992, Mr. Marchi was notified that, 
should the ten head grade a minimum of B3 and the moisture 
problem be solved, then Nichiro's demand will expand to 
three-hundred carcasses per month, considerably higher than 
the one-hundred per month previously expected. Should this 
be the case, substantial expansion of Mr. Marchi's feedlot
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capacity and White's Meats refrigeration space would be 
needed. The possibility of a joint venture between Nichiro, 
Marchi Angus Ranches, and White's Wholesale Meats had been 
discussed in earlier negotiations. The prospect of a joint 
venture involving all three, or any two of the three 
parties, remained a possibility. In addition, should the 
project prove successful, Mr. Marchi was assured that he 
would be the exclusive exporter of chilled beef from the 
United States for Nichiro Corporation.
Speaking for Nichiro, Mr. Yamamura informed Mr. Marchi 
that Nichiro was interested in importing "U.S. Standard 
meat" as well as chilled "B3 or better." Mr. Yamamura 
explained that, though Australian and New Zealand beef was 
relatively cheap in Japan, it was not acceptable as table 
meat because it was grass fed. He also reported that, 
though Australia was developing grain-fed beef, the 
Australian product was priced the same as the U.S. product. 
At the same price, the Japanese prefered U.S. beef.
Mr. Yamamura also reported that, after 1993 when the 
import ad valorem tax would be renegotiated (70 percent in 
1991, 60 percent in 1992, 50 percent in 1993), the expected 
level was 30 percent to 40 percent. Mr. Aoyama expects this 
level to drop further, to as low as 25 percent, though it 
may do so incrementally. At this level, Mr. Yamamura claims 
that Marchi beef would compete with higher quality Japanese 
beef (Kobe and Matsuzaka categories) because of its
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significantly lower price. Mr. Yamamura reported that 
Nichiro hoped Mr. Marchi would be able to fill its demand 
for higher-quality as well as lower-quality (U.S. Standard) 
beef. Mr. Yamamura reiterated Nichiro^s interest in making 
a financial investment in the Marchi and White operations 
should Mr. Marchi and Mr. White so desire.
Mr. Aoyama and Mr. Iwasaki visited the Marchi Ranch in 
June of 1992. After observing the steers Mr. Aoyama thought 
they would be ready for slaughter in October, and he thought 
60 to 70 percent of them (six or seven head) would grade B3. 
He expected the remainder (three or four head) to grade B2 
and some to grade A3. He stated that, if the steers were 
Wagyu, he would expect them to grade A3 to A4.
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CHAPTER 20
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY AND THE JAPANESE BEEF MARKET
In an attempt to increase the likelihood of success, 
additional research in product development was essential. 
State-of-the-art research on developing this type of beef 
for the Japanese market was being conducted at Washington 
State University (WSU) in Pullman, Washington. To learn 
what the researchers at WSU had learned, with the intention 
of gaining insight into product development as well as 
guidance on how to proceed, Mr. Marchi and Mr. Hibbard (the 
author of this paper) visited WSU in February, 1992.
The team of researchers who received Messrs. Marchi and 
Hibbard at WSU included: Dr. Kristen A. Johnson, animal
nutritionist; Dr. Charles T. Gaskins, geneticist; Dr. Jerry 
J. Reeves, reproductive endrocrinologist; Dr. Raymond W. 
Wright, Jr., embryologist; Dan Coonrad, beef herdsmanager; 
and Drs. Thomas I. Wahl, Raymond J. Folwell, and James C. 
Barron, agricultural economists. Research at WSU on this 
subject had been conducted since 1989, including visits to 
Texas A&M (which has pioneered research in this area) and 
Japan by team members. Two feed trials have been conducted 
and a third is underway. Much of WSU's effort in product
149
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development involved experimentation with different feed 
rations, different length of feeding periods, and different 
breeds of cattle.
WSU Feed Trials
In the first trial. Black Angus and Wagyu crossbreds 
were put on feed at 500 to 600 pounds and fed to gain no 
more than 2.2 pounds per day. A ration of 50:50 or 60:40 
concentrate-to-roughage (grain-to-hay) was fed until the 
cattle reached 1,000 pounds. From 1,000 to 1,500 pounds the 
ration was increased to 80:20 grain-to-hay. The cattle were 
slaughtered once they reached 1,500 pounds.
At the beginning of the first trial, the Angus were a 
full year younger than the Wagyu (six months versus eighteen 
months). At slaughter all Wagyu graded Prime plus. One 
Angus graded Choice, all other Angus graded Prime.
The results of the first trial were instrumental in 
designing the second trial. The second trial, completed in 
1991, consisted of 4 Black Angus steers, 4 Longhorn steers, 
and 3 Wagyu crossbred steers (two 3/4 bloods and one 7/8 
blood Wagyu). Four Wagyu crossbreds began the feed trial 
but one died of unrelated causes.
The researchers found the Angus to be more efficient 
than Wagyu in terms of pounds gained per pounds of ration 
fed. Whereas a Wagyu can only be fed about 1.7 percent of 
their body weight in feed concentrates per day, Angus can be
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pushed to at least 3 percent (Pitts 1990, 8). Wagyu, which 
tend to be fine-boned and gentle, even docile, were less 
aggressive than the Angus and Longhorn and were "out 
competed" at the feed bunk. They tended to be "finicky," 
sometimes "going off feed" for no predictable reason, all of 
which translated into less feed efficiency relative to 
Longhorn and Angus, which translates to higher costs-of- 
gain.
At the time of slaughter, the researchers thought the 
cattle were not yet ready in spite of being fed for 365 
days. Nonetheless, slaughter proceeded in order to supply 
the carcasses at the time required by WSU's outlet in Japan. 
The cattle were slaughtered at Washington Beef in Yakima, 
Washington, a Japanese-owed packing plant. The Angus did 
not marble as well as the researchers had hoped:
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Table 16
Cattle Performance, 1991 WSU Feed Trial
Angus Longhorn Wagyu
Initial Wt (avg lbs) 728 569 765
Final Live Wt 1590 1266 1585
Birthdate (avg) Jan '88 Mar '88 Mar '88
Avg Daily Gain (lbs) 1.72 1.41 1.65
Feed Efficiency 15.8 16.3 15.7








Source: Johnson et al. 1991, 8b-9b.
Note: U.S. beef grades: Ch = USDA Choice; P = USDA
Prime. For marbling grade: - = minimum; 0 = 
average; + = maximum.
Note: Re: Japanese beef grades, grading was done by WSU
staff, not by certified Japanese beef 
graders.
Though the initial and final weights of the Black Angus 
were quite close to those of the Wagyu, the Angus were about 
nine months younger. This placed the Angus at a 
disadvantage in terms of structural maturity. The Longhorn 
performed quite well relative to the Angus in terms of feed 
efficiency and Japanese grade.
Marbling and Carcass Development in Waayu and Angus
A primary difference in marbling between Wagyu and 
Angus lies in the type of intramuscular fat each deposits.
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Wagyu tend to deposit small flecks of fat, often described 
as "fine,” "feathery,” or "lacy.” Angus tend to deposit 
intramuscular fat in chunks. In other words, whereas a 
premium Wagyu steak would be peppered with bits of fat, so 
that it would resemble salami in terms of fat interlaced 
with meat, relative to Wagyu a premium Angus steak tends to 
have more fat on the external edge with pieces of fat, 
smaller in number but larger in size, broadly scattered 
throughout the steak. The premium Japanese market demands 
the former.
Dr. Charles Gaskins, A WSU geneticist, believes that 
Angus are genetically incapable of producing marbling 
equivalent to that of Wagyu. According to Dr. Gaskins, 
genetics are the single most important factor in developing 
marbling. That is, over 50 percent of marbling is 
determined by an animal's genetic make-up. Relatively 
little data has been collected regarding the genetic 
marbling ability of Angus sires since that has not been a 
primary consideration of Angus breeders. In order to 
collect this data, carcass identity would need to be 
maintained through the cutting and grading process.
Slaughter operations in the U.S. are not currently set up to 
do this. To select Angus sires for their ability to foster 
marbling in their progeny, then, is difficult at best.
Dr. Gaskins thought that marbling might be determined 
by a single gene in Wagyu, which geneticists may be able to
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isolate. In the case of Angus, however, marbling may well 
not be limited to a single gene, which makes it more 
difficult to isolate, and therefore more difficult to trace. 
Because marbling is considered to be 50 to 70 percent 
heritable, its identification could have significant 
implications for speeding the development of marbling in the 
Angus breed.
According to the WSU researchers, the primary factors 
which contribute to marbling are:
(1) genetics ;
(2) length of feeding period (the longer the better);
(3) maturity (to an extent, the older the better); and
(4) feed ration (70 to 80 percent Total Digestible
Nutrients, or TON).
The WSU researchers also reported that, of the beef 
breeds in the U.S., the old-style Angus comes closest to 
matching the marbling ability of the Japanese W a g y u . T h e  
old-style Angus (popular in the 1950s) was very short and 
compact, and very fat, perhaps best described as "dumpy," 
and is found only in isolated pockets. These pockets 
include one in Pennsylvania (old-style Angus owned by the 
Amish), one in North Carolina, and one in Ellensburg,
^“"Certain breeds have different muscle structures which 
help determine those which deposit marbling and those that do 
not. The predominantly white muscle fibers of breeds such as 
Charolais, Maine Anjou, Limousin and Gelbvieh use mainly 
glucose or sugar as a source of energy for the muscle to 
contract or relax....On the other hand, such breeds as Angus, 
Shorthorn, Jersey and Longhorn deposit high levels of 
marbling. Their predominantly red muscle fibers use fatty 
acids, stored nearby as marbling, as a source of energy" 
(Rester 1988, 11).
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Washington (owned by Agri-Beef).
Dr. Reeves reported that genetics also account for some 
of the yellow tinge found in the fat of some feedlot beef. 
Genetics may in fact have more of an influence on the degree 
of yellowing than does feed. Nonetheless, it was 
recommended that beta-carotene, found in corn and to some 
extent in alfalfa, be kept out of the diet. Dr. Reeves also 
said that eighteen degrees fahrenheit was a critical 
temperature. When the temperature fell below this level, 
increased energy was required in the steer's feed ration if 
weight loss was to be prevented.
The WSU research team also had trouble with moisture, 
or watery meat, and thought a longer dry-lot time might be 
the answer. The research staff were not in universal 
agreement on this issue, however. One thought an extended 
dry-lot time, as was customary in Japan, would not have a 
significant affect on reducing moisture, and would in fact 
induce stress and would therefore have an adverse affect on 
marbling. Another thought that feed ration and animal 
maturity both affected water content in meat (rice straw and 
older maturity causing drier meat), but that a dry stand of 
twenty-four hours prior to slaughter may be the single most 
effective thing one could do to prevent weepiness. On the 
other hand, Japanese producers think watery or moist meat is 
primarily a factor of age (to avoid a moisture problem, 
Japanese producers will not slaughter dairy cattle before
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eighteen months of age or Wagyu before twenty-four months of 
age) (Lin and Mori 1991, 112).
There were also two schools of thought among the WSU 
researchers interviewed regarding in-weights and length of 
feeding period. One school maintained that if the steers 
which enter the feed trial are "backgrounded"^^ for twelve 
to eighteen months, then a feed-period of less than one year 
should be adequate to achieve an acceptable degree of 
marbling. The other school thought that in-weights ought to 
be in the 650 to 700 pound range, and that a feeding period 
of four-hundred days would be necessary. That is, one 
called for starting cattle at older ages and heavier weights 
and feeding for a shorter period of time, the other for 
younger cattle fed for a longer period of time. Additional 
feed trials would be necessary to determine which approach 
provided the best results.
Dr. Wright recommended the following as an ideal 
approach to achieving high-quality marbling: slaughter the
fat cattle at thirty months of age after a feeding period of 
four-hundred days with a steer that is at least a half-blood 
Wagyu (a 7/8 to 3/4-blood Wagyu is preferable). The cross 
which Dr. Wright recommended was Holstein and Angus, which
^"Backgrounding" typically refers to feeding a weaned 
calf on pasture when adequate pasture is available, and hay 
with modest grain supplements when pasture is not available, 
for a period of time, usually several months. In this case, 
backgrounding for 12 to 18 months would put the steer at 1-1/2 
to 2 years of age at the start of the feed trial.
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was then crossed to Wagyu, giving a crossbred steer which 
was 1/4 Holstein, 1/4 Angus, and 1/2 Wagyu —  recommended in 
part because of a Japanese preference for the Holstein-Wagyu 
cross.
According to Dr. Wright, unless straight Angus are from 
a high-marbling genetic line, and inadequate information 
exists to determine this, they will grade B2. A 3/4 to 7/8- 
blood Wagyu (15/16 is considered a purebred, of which there 
are about two-hundred in the U.S.) is needed if consistent 
grading of B4 to A4 is to be realized. Another researcher, 
however, thought that U.S. Wagyu would never break into the
Japanese A market simply because it is U.S. beef. Even if
it did, U.S. Wagyu would in all likelihood never grade A5 
(the highest grade attainable) because part of the grade is 
determined by local reputation. That is, some locales in 
Japan are known for producing superior beef, and beef from 
those locales are automatically graded higher for that 
reason.
In addition to its superior marbling ability, Wagyu 
also has the advantage of the peculiar chemical composition 
of its fat. Due to the presence of a particular enzyme in
W a g y u , o n l y  one-third of Wagyu fat is saturated
^According to the 1991 McGregory Field Day report, Wagyu 
fat was found to be lower in palmitic acid than is most U.S. 
beef, and it was found to have "an unusually high 
concentration of oleic acid...Clinical trials have 
demonstrated that palmitic acid increases serum cholesterol 
when ingested by humans, while oleic acid does not increase 
(or may actually decrease) serum cholesterol" (Ford 1991 19).
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(saturated fat has been linked to heart disease) compared to 
half for typical U.S. cattle (Dorgan 1990, 6À). When 
grilled, more fat is cooked out of Wagyu than from Angus.
Fat on the chilled Angus carcass is hard, but fat on the 
chilled Wagyu carcass is soft. Therefore, though Wagyu has 
more untrimmable fat than does Angus, Wagyu fat is perceived 
as being less of a potential health hazard than is Angus 
fat. Because of this, in Dr. Wahl's opinion, in the long 
run the type of fat rather than the amount of marbling may 
be the key issue.
The common perception that Wagyu is more flavorful than 
other beef was borne out by controlled and uncontrolled 
taste tests. A controlled taste test utilizing a trained 
taste panel in Canada, and an uncontrolled taste test 
conducted at WSU drew the same conclusions: of the beef
fed, Japanese Wagyu was judged the most flavorful, followed 
by American Wagyu, Angus, and Longhorn, in that order.
The importance of developing well-marbled carcasses has 
to do with the translation of tenderness and flavor into 
higher wholesale prices. This explains why there is a 
significant price increase from carcasses which grade B3 to 
carcasses which grade B4. As explained by Dr. Cross, an 
animal scientist at Texas A&M, "a 5 percent change in 
marbling will increase the value of the animal by $200”
(Ford 1991, 17).
In order to achieve a carcass which would grade B3 or
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better with some degree of consistency, several criteria 
seemed to emerge. First, an animal with some degree of 
Wagyu genetics, and in all likelihood, at least a half- 
blood, was required. Second, a feeding period of four- 
hundred days, beginning with an animal which was about 
eighteen months old, and fed with a ration of 80:20 grain- 
to-hay with a TON of 70 to 80 percent for an average daily 
gain of about two pounds, was also required. Third, in 
order to avoid a moisture problem, dry-lotting the cattle 
for up to forty-eight hours prior to slaughter may be 
necessary. All reasonable steps should also be taken in 
order to avoid animal stress at all times.
An unknown is how well a Wagyu-Angus cross would 
perform on an extended feeding trial. A current WSU feed 
trial, to be completed in April of 1993, will provide 
information about the performance of this cross when the 
trial is complete. In an ideal scenario, this cross would 
combine the superior marbling ability, flavor, texture, and 
unsaturated fat of the Wagyu with the feed efficiency and 
milking ability of the Angus.
Market Considerations
Dr. Thomas Wahl expected the tariff to decrease to 
around 30 percent, but to no lower than 25 percent, and will 
probably occur in increments of 2 percent per year beginning 
in 1994. Dr. Wahl expected the feeding of dairy cattle in
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Japan for beef consumption to decrease substantially in the 
long run, but he also expected the Wagyu sector to remain 
indefinitely.
Dr. Wahl categorized the market as having three 
segments: a high-end segment which demanded premium Wagyu,
served for business lunches and in high class restaurants; 
a middle market which constituted the majority of the 
Japanese restaurant trade and home sales, and which demanded 
beef in the quality range of B4; and a lower market which 
used frozen cuts for barbecue and other casual consumption.
Dr. Wahl expects the bulk of growth to be in the middle 
market. He expects some growth to occur in the upper market 
assuming stability in Japanese tax laws regarding the 
deductibility of business expenses. Dr. Reeves, however, 
expects the bulk of growth in beef consumption in Japan to 
be on the lower end, in outlets such as McDonalds, where the 
U.S. producer cannot compete with producers in Australia. 
What is not clear is how closely growth in volume consumed 
equates with the growth in value of a particular market 
segment. That is, in terms of value, smaller volume growth 
in the upper-end market should outpace a much larger growth 
in volume in the lower market due to the difference in value 
of the meats consumed.
Drs. Wahl and Wright thought that a better market for 
premium beef raised in the U.S. to Japanese standards would 
be the domestic U.S. rather than the Japanese market. At
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present, WSU beef which does not qualify for the Japanese 
market is sold domestically at three-times the U.S. 
wholesale price. The university could sell all of its 
premium beef domestically if it were not trying to service a 
Japanese client. Because of the Japanese tariffs, which 
depresses the price the Japanese importer can offer to the 
U.S. exporter. Dr. Wright thought that the U.S. market was 
more profitable than the Japanese market." Specialty 
restaurants in the U.S. have a significant demand for this 
type of beef, and at present that market is larger than 
domestic supply. In dealing with a domestic market the 
producer also avoids a myriad of complexities associated 
with servicing a foreign market, including communication, 
transportation, and exchange rates. The saturation point 
for that domestic market, however, is unknown.
In addition to Japan, newly industrializing countries 
(NICs) may be emerging markets for premium beef. According 
to Dr. Barron, as the income level of a population or 
population segment rises, so does its demand for expensive 
foods. Therefore, if a premium product is developed for 
Japan, additional market outlets may be cultivated in NICs.
As the price of beef declines. Dr. Wahl maintains that 
mid-level consumption will increase dramatically. The 
question is whether the price will decline. For price to
"At present, according to Dr. Wright, while the Japanese 
tariff on imported U.S. beef is 60 percent, the U.S. tariff on 
imported Japanese beef (Wagyu) is 3 percent.
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decline significantly, the distribution system in Japan must 
be modernized. To what extent this will happen, and when it 
will happen if it does happen, is unknown. Nonetheless, Dr. 
Wahl reported that beef restaurants are doing very well in 
Japan, due in part to an increase in demand for beef among 
younger Japanese. As the population ages, consumer demand 
will shift more towards beef as the consumption of rice and 
fish decline. The gap in price is expected to narrow 
between beef and fish as fish gets more expensive relative 
to beef. This change in price structure reflects a 
dwindling supply of fish and an expected decrease in beef 
prices as import duties decline.
Dr. Wahl also believes that the Japanese could double 
their per capita consumption of beef and: (1) it would
still not be a major factor in their diet; (2) beef 
consumption would still be at a healthy level; and (3) U.S. 
exports of beef would increase dramatically.
In Dr. Wahl's assessment, consistency and high quality, 
and a good working relationship with a Japanese contact who 
will push the exporter's product through the distribution 
system, are key. In this regard, early adopters, or those 
who "get in on the ground floor," will have the advantage in 
the Japanese market in terms of developing contacts and 
"getting ahead on the learning curve." Dr. Wahl sees 
opportunity in pre-packaging seasoned, marinated beef in the 
U.S. to serving-sizes desired by the Japanese consumer.
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Japanese labor costs will continue to increase, and it will 
therefore be cheaper to cut and package beef in the U.S. 
prior to shipment.
Dr. Wright indicated that beef exports to Japan are 
limited to chilled, frozen, and processed beef. In 1991, 
six live cattle were shipped to Japan, total, from all 
sources.
Dr. Reeves reported that air freight to Japan for 
carcass beef was $.93 per pound, compared to $.19 to $.23 
per pound by ship. Ocean freight from Seattle or Oakland to 
Japan takes eleven days —  which gives western states an 
advantage over midwestern states.
Ultrasound
With the use of ultrasonics, cattle can be tested while 
on feed to determine how well they are marbling. If the 
particular animal is found to be marbling well, then that 
animal is left to continue the feed trial. If not, then the 
animal is sold before reaching a carcass type which will be 
discounted in the U.S. market and which will not be accepted 
in the Japanese market.
The importance of this technology to a cattle feeder 
who is feeding for a select, premium market cannot be over 
emphasized. For instance, Mr. Marchi could cull those 
animals which stood little if any chance of reaching a 
carcass grade of B3 or better while they were still valuable
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to the U.S. market, and Nichiro could be assured of 
receiving only those carcasses which met their 
specifications. Carcasses would perhaps be judged according 
to three standards: those that would meet Japanese
specifications, those that would qualify for specialty 
markets in the U.S., and those that would do neither. Each 
animal could then be sorted, fed, and marketed accordingly. 
Mr. Marchi sees an important place for ultrasound even if 
the genetics of premium, highly-marbled beef are determined 
because of variation within genetically similar animals.
To date, ultrasonics has not been developed to the 
extent necessary to make these determinations with a 
reliable degree of accuracy. Though WSU researchers have 
done little research with ultrasound, they are in contact 
with a Canadian researcher who has, and who claims good 
success, and who will conduct ultrasound tests on WSU cattle 
in June, 1992. A fair conclusion would be that ultrasonics 
may be a tool of vital importance to this specialized 
feeding industry, and that more research needs to be done 
before it can be judged dependable and cost effective.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 21 
ZENCHIKU LAND AND LIVE STOCK, INC,
[Because Zenchiku's managers understand the Japanese 
market and style of doing business,] all these things 
that are unique to Japan are hurdles to everyone else 
but me.
John W. Morse, Jr., President of Zenchiku 
Land and Live Stock, Inc. (Dennison 1990).
The Selkirk Ranch is the single largest U.S. exporter 
of carcass beef to Japan.
Matthew Cohn, Pacific Rim Trade Officer, 
Montana Department of Commerce (telephone 
interview 1992).
In October of 1988, Zenchiku Company Ltd., Japan's 
largest meat importer (Cullison 1991, IDA) with 1988 
revenues of $1.5 billion (Eisenstodt 1988, 37), purchased 
the Selkirk Ranch in Montana. Located ten miles southeast 
of Dillon, Zenchiku paid about $13 million for the 77,000 
acre ranch (Atchison 1989). The 1988 calf crop was included 
in the purchase (the ranch reportedly runs about six- 
thousand cattle). Also formerly known as the Lazy 8, 
Zenchiku Land and Live Stock, Inc., was chartered as a 
Montana corporation and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Zenchiku Company Ltd. According to Mr. John Morse,
President of Zenchiku Land and Live Stock Co., the mission 
for the ranch is to produce beef suitable to Japanese taste,
165
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including packaging and presentation of p r o d u c t . Z L & L  is 
free to pursue that mission in any manner it sees fit.
Zenchiku has six divisions through which its imported 
beef must pass prior to entering the distribution system. 
Each of these six divisions imposes a price markup before 
the product passes to the next division. Once the product 
has passed through these six divisions, Zenchiku then deals 
with fifty-four distributors, each of which is free to buy 
beef from other suppliers. To remain competitive, then, 
Zenchiku must offer beef to these distributors at 
competitive prices (interview with Matthew Cohn, 1992).
As a point of reference concerning price markups, Mr. 
Aoyama said that wholesale price in recent Tokyo markets for 
a B3 boxed carcass was 900 yen per kilogram (about $3.15 per 
pound). Once this carcass was fabricated, it would sell to 
a Japanese supermarket for a wholesale price of 1,800 to 
2,000 yen per kilogram (about $6.30 to $7.00 per pound).
Once the carcass was cut-up to serving size, the per 
kilogram retail price became 3,000 to 3,500 yen (about 
$10.50 to $12.25 per pound) (interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, 
1992). Markups in this scenario approach 300 percent.
ZL&L's 1989 sales were about $1.5 million. Nearly two- 
thirds of its cattle were shipped to Japan to supply a mid­
range market. ZL&L is not attempting to produce a super-
“̂Mr. Morse granted an interview to Messrs. Marchi and 
Hibbard on February 21, 1992.
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high grade of Japanese beef. Rather, it sees its product 
equivalent to Certified Angus Beef and better, i.e., high 
Choice and above, with 30 percent of ZL&L's product 
surpassing U.S. Prime. Mr. Morse sees Zenchiku's niche as 
between U.S. grain-fed beef and Japanese Wagyu. As such it 
is shipping carcasses which have as much as 40 percent 
intramuscular fat, compared to 5 to 10 percent for most U.S. 
beef, and 80 percent for Japanese Kobe (Balzar 1991, F6).
Included in Zenchiku Company's 1991 revenue of $2 
billion are sales of beef, pork, poultry, and assorted 
processed meats. According to Mr. Morse, Zenchiku "grinds 
more hamburger in Japan than anyone." McDonalds of Japan is 
one of Zenchiku's customers.
Zenchiku Co. Ltd. is not limited to purchasing U.S. 
beef solely from Zenchiku Land and Livestock Co., and in 
fact, ZL&L must keep its prices competitive if it is to 
market its beef in Japan. ZL&L will also contract with 
other producers, who will use ZL&L's genetics, to increase 
its feedlot inventories to the levels necessary to provide 
Zenchiku Co. Ltd. with a consistent supply of "Selkirk 
Beef."
After being raised on the Montana ranch, the cattle are 
shipped to feedlots in other states as are most calves 
raised in Montana. With its feedlot and ranch cattle, ZL&L 
has a current inventory of about eight-thousand head.
Though ZL&L has had cattle in as many as four feedlots with
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"nearly mirror image results," it currently has cattle in 
feedlots in Kansas and Idaho. Mr. Morse selects feedlots 
according to the type of feed a given feedlot offers. For 
instance, the feedlot in Idaho may feed corn, barley, wheat, 
and/or other feed grains dependent upon whichever represents 
the best value. The Kansas feedlot feeds a milo-based 
ration which includes corn.
After being fed to Zenchiku's specifications, the 
cattle are processed at a relatively large U.S. plant 
(seventeen-hundred per day capacity) before being shipped to 
Japan. ZL&L has had cattle slaughtered every week for the 
past two-and-one-half years. The carcasses are loaded in 
refrigerated containers at the packing plants and are 
shipped to Japan via ocean freight from San Pedro or 
Oakland, California. Transit time to Japan from the 
slaughter house is fifteen days. According to Mr. Morse, 
ZL&L's boxed beef (some is boxed and some is shipped as 
carcass quarters) has a shelf-life of ninety days.
ZL&L's minimum target is to ship one container per week 
(about 30 carcasses) with a goal of 150 carcasses every two 
weeks, or 300 per month. In addition to the chilled 
carcasses, Mr. Morse reports that ZL&L will also ship, as 
many as 45 carcasses of boxed beef each week.
Chilled beef produced by ZL&L ranges between B2 and B4. 
The Beef Marbling Score (BMS) is Zenchiku's primary 
indicator of quality, however, and Mr. Morse reports that
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ZL&L's cattle have been marbling well.^® To achieve this 
carcass quality, ZL&L weans calves at 525 to 550 pounds, 
backgrounds them with rolled oats and hay at an ADG of two 
pounds per day until they reach 600 to 650 pounds. The 
cattle are then fed a higher concentrate grain ration from 
300 to 400-plus days. Live finished weight is in the area 
of 1600 pounds. The goal is to produce a carcass that 
weighs 950 to 1050 pounds, with 850 pounds the minimum 
acceptable carcass weight.
ZL&L's carcass weights have been as high as 1345 pounds
and have been fed for as long as five-hundred days with an
ADG of 2.48 pounds and a slaughter age of thirty months. 
Growth implants are not used (nor are they in the Marchi 
cattle) because they promote growth of red meat and inhibit 
the formation of intramuscular fat, and consequently have a 
substantial negative affect on carcass grade.
Final live weights will, in Mr. Morse's opinion, settle
back to 1300 to 1400 pounds. He believes the key to
producing quality beef in the feedlot is to feed cattle to 
the point where they quit gaining, and then feed for another 
sixty days in order to develop the proper color in the fat 
and meat. Mr. Morse also believes that the mineral content
^®BMS scores ranged from 3 to 6 for the bulk of ZL&L's 
recent two shipments preceding the date of interview. BMS 
scores of 3 and 4 qualify for yield grade 3 (as in B3) for 
this one criteria of quality grade (there are 4 criteria). 
BMS scores of 5 and 6 qualify for yield grade 4 (as in B4). 
Refer to Chapter 11, "Beef Grading in Japan," for 
clarification.
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of feedlot water affects meat color.
Mr. Morse claims no loss in efficiency up to a feeding
period of 400 days. He also claims that he is able to feed 
cattle to 1150 pounds for less than $.50 per pound of gain, 
and to 1350 pounds for less than $.70 per pound of gain.
Mr. Morse says that he can place high quality chilled beef 
in Japan at a break-even cost of less than $1.50 per pound 
(C&F basis, i.e., cost includes product and freight to 
Japan). His price to the Zenchiku wholesaler has been less 
than $2.00 per pound for as long as ZL&L has shipped beef to 
Japan.
According to Mr. Morse, beef produced at the Montana 
ranch may sell in Japan under ZL&L's trademark as Certified
Selkirk Beef. Mr. Morse has been pleased with the ability
of Angus to produce the quality he wants, in part because 
Angus does not give up its feed efficiency in doing so. He 
does not anticipate introducing Wagyu into the ZL&L herd and 
would prefer to continue use of the best available Angus 
genetics for "classic" Angus herd development.
Like Mr. Marchi and WSU, ZL&L has had some experience 
with a moisture problem in its meat. Mr. Morse believes 
that moisture is a function of age, average daily gain, and 
days on feed more so than drinking water. He thought no 
benefit would be realized by withholding water from cattle 
for an extended period of time prior to slaughter. His 
cattle are dry-lotted overnight prior to slaughter, and the
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cattle which are trucked from Kansas to a Los Angeles area 
packing plant are provided with free-choice water with 
electrolytes for the 1400 mile trip.
ZL&L owns an ultrasound machine but Mr. Morse has been 
disappointed with its success. He did report that 
ultrasonics may be useful in determining which cattle to 
sell as regular domestic U.S. cattle, but it cannot detect 
which animals are developing the best marbling.
Mr. Morse expects overall beef consumption in Japan to 
increase to twenty-five or twenty-six pounds by the year 
2000, and that 60 to 70 percent of that increase will be in 
high-quality U.S. beef. He reported that, according to the 
U.S. Meat Export Federation, beef in Japan enjoys an 
elasticity factor of 2-to-l, that is, for every one-dollar 
drop in price, demand will increase by two dollars. He 
reported that the Japanese dairy feeding industry is in 
decline but that the Wagyu industry is stable, and that the 
market in Japan for B2 and B3 carcasses has been instable 
over the last twelve months. Mr. Morse expects this 
instability to continue until the market settles to its 
equivalent U.S. values (plus costs).
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SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
With its custom feeding arrangement with Nichiro 
Corporation, Marchi Angus Ranches is in the unique position 
of being able to sell its agricultural products (cattle, 
roughage and feed grains) at cost plus a 20 percent markup. 
The uniqueness of this is apparent when the particular 
marketing framework of agricultural products is considered. 
Historically, producers of agricultural products are price 
takers, not price setters. Cattle and feed prices are set 
by a market over which no single producer has influence, let 
alone control. In a relative sense, then, by pursuing this 
custom feeding arrangement Mr. Marchi is allowing himself 
the opportunity to set prices for his products.
The variables with the most potential for volatility 
are: loss on costs of gain, i.e., cost per pound and
numbers of pounds gained in excess of $.83 per pound; death 
loss, which may vary from 2 to 5 percent of the numbers of 
cattle on feed; interest payments, which vary according to 
market rate and amount of debt; amortization costs, which 
are also a function of market rates and amount of land 
financed; and income tax, which may be influenced by ranch
172
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operations as a whole.
Other expense items may vary due to a myriad of factors 
which occupy any business climate as well as those peculiar 
to ranching and feedlot operations, including prices 
attainable through economies-of-scale, weather conditions, 
quality of feed, and market prices for agricultural 
commodities. Income may vary due to market conditions at 
the beginning of a given feed trial, when the feeder steers 
are sold to Nichiro. The degree to which Nichiro 
Corporation is willing to accept markups on cattle and feed 
may also affect income.
For the current feed trial (ten head, to be completed 
in October 1992), net income after depreciation, interest 
and taxes of about $900 is expected, for a per-head profit 
of roughly $90. Due to the small size of this feed trial, 
Nichiro will not be billed for any expenses until its 
completion. This will cause modest negative cash flows in 
the second and third quarters ($318 and $315 respectively) 
and is not cause for concern. Once larger quantities of 
cattle are involved (from ten head per month to a potential 
high of three-hundred head per month) Nichiro will be billed 
monthly for yardage, feed, veterinary, transportation, and 
livestock processing costs, which will mitigate potential 
cash flow problems.
Best and worst case income and expense scenarios were 
examined for different quantities of cattle (ten, fifty.
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one-hundred, and three-hundred head per month). The highest 
per-animal return to cash flow is expected with the present 
trial, explained by the fact that all feed is raised, but is 
sold at market cost plus 20 percent. The effective markup 
on raised feed then becomes 260 percent for hay (raised for 
$20 per ton, sold at $60 plus 20 percent), and 300 percent 
for grain (raised at $45 per ton and sold at $150 plus 20 
percent). However, the lowest per-head net income is also 
for the current period. This discrepancy is explained by 
the lower costs assigned to feed production on a cash flow 
basis (actual production cost) than on an income and expense 
basis (market cost). This discrepancy does not carry 
through to the fifty-head scenarios due to the high 
proportion of purchased feed under those models.
Under the worst case scenario for fifty head per month, 
net cash balance remains positive, in excess of $80,000 for 
the year, with net income (before land capitalization costs) 
of nearly $70,000. Per-head profit, after taxes, interest, 
depreciation and capitalized land payments, is expected to 
exceed $100. Under the best case scenario, per head profit 
(net income after taxes, interest, depreciation and 
capitalized land payments) should approach $244.
Under the best case scenario for fifty head per month, 
a return on assets (ROÀ) of about 22 percent is expected, 
with roughly a 29 percent return on investment (ROI). Under 
the worst case scenario these ratios change to 10.5 percent
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and 14.3 percent respectively.
The current ratio and debt ratio indicate good debt 
service ability, likely placing the operation in a favorable 
light from a lender's perspective. Even under the worst 
case scenario, adequate cash flow should be generated to 
service debt.
Per-head profit figures and financial ratios for the 
50-head-per-month best and worst cases assume the operating 
expenses of the current feed trail are adjusted to reflect 
costs associated with feeding six-hundred head per year 
(fifty head per month). That is, it is assumed that Angus 
only are fed, that all feed is sold at market price plus 20 
percent, and that 60 to 70 percent of the cattle will grade 
B3, thereby allowing the cattle (under the best case 
scenario) to be sold at a 20 percent markup. It also 
assumes that land payments are made only on that land which 
is occupied by the feedlot space required to feed six- 
hundred head at any given time.
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CONCLUSION
Many producers are now beginning to think of ways to 
produce beef that meets specifications, rather than 
producing generic beef and then trying to sell it.
Reported in "Livestock News" (Farris 1991, 
8).
Feeding beef for the premium Japanese market should be 
a profitable venture for Marchi Angus Ranches. Because the 
Marchi Project involves developing a premium product per the 
request of a large company, those cattle are sold at a 
premium price, as high as 20 percent over market. Because 
the cattle are sold when they enter the feedlot, their sale 
weight is something less than half their final weight. As a 
custom feeder, however, Mr. Marchi is compensated through 
yardage fees and mark-ups on feed in addition to the 
premiums paid for the feeder cattle. Yardage not only 
covers the overhead costs associated with feeding cattle, it 
also provides a revenue stream which helps defray labor 
costs.
With the Japanese market, Mr. Marchi also has more 
marketing options for his feeder cattle, which provides more 
potential for profit. He also has the flexibility of
176
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deciding when a feed trial will begin and when the cattle 
will be slaughtered. With the Japanese option he has the 
security of a ready market for his feed crops, which is 
particularly important in those years of feed surplus when 
many farmers are unable to market their crops at acceptable 
prices. As a custom feeder, he is able to sell that feed at 
a predetermined price with no freight costs in any given 
year.
Another advantage is the spreading of risk within the 
feedlot. Mr. Marchi retains ownership of some cattle in his 
feedlot, and with the Japanese cattle, custom feeds others. 
If the market falls, as it does periodically in the cattle 
business, Mr. Marchi has the cushion of a revenue stream 
from the owner of the custom-fed cattle.
Strictly from the standpoint of feedlot operation, 
then, developing a long-term relationship with a Japanese 
client on the magnitude that Mr. Marchi and Nichiro 
Corporation are attempting makes good business sense. The 
profit in such a relationship, and in developing a product 
which is the focus of that relationship, will be from the 
flexibility, diversification, and revenue streams provided 
to a custom feedlot operation as described above. Of equal 
if not greater importance are the premiums paid for the 
feeder cattle (assuming the cattle make grade) and the 
markups on feed. For Marchi Angus Ranches, the profit will 
likely not be in the difference between wholesale and retail
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value. Given the new-found concern of the Japanese consumer 
for cheaper prices (Ono 1992, Bl), a "windfall" may never 
occur for Marchi Angus Ranches or for Nichiro Corporation.
In terms of product development, much was learned in 
discussions with the WSU research team and with Mr. Morse of 
Zenchiku Land and Live Stock Co. Length of feed trial, feed 
ration composition, feed trial in- and out-weights and ages, 
and expected average daily gains, though not necessarily in 
agreement, have provided concrete suggestions which can be 
implemented.
An important step which Mr. Marchi can take to hasten 
product development is to introduce genetics predisposed to 
high-quality marbling into his registered Angus cow herd on 
a trial basis. Wagyu offer those genetics, as do the 
classic Angus of the 1950s. By artificially inseminating 
some of his registered cows with Wagyu semen, Mr. Marchi is 
now in the process of doing so. Mr. Aoyama said that 
genetics account for 75 percent of a steer's ability to 
marble, with the remaining 25 percent determined by feed 
(interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, 1992). Attention to genetic 
predisposition to marbling, then, appears to be crucial.
It is clear that the market in Japan for premium.beef 
is growing beyond Japan's capability to service that market, 
and that the U.S. is well positioned to take advantage of 
that market development. Some economists expect U.S. beef 
exports to increase by about 4 percent in 1992, fueled
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primarily by the drop in the Japanese import duty from 70 
percent to 60 percent (Doane's 1992a).
It can also be argued that Montana is better positioned 
than many States to capitalize on this emerging market. 
Montana's abundance of wheat and barley; its clean, mountain 
environment; its cold winter weather; its proximity to 
Seattle seaports; and its stature as the number one producer 
of Black Angus cattle in the U.S.; all give it competitive 
advantage in developing beef tailored to Japanese taste.
Many authorities believe that tariffs on imported beef 
in Japan will decline beyond the 1993 level of 50 percent, 
and some believe it will decline steadily to as low as 25 
percent. The waning of rural political strength in Japan, 
combined with: (1) a growing consumer voice for cheaper
prices and increased access to foreign goods; and (2) 
external pressures from foreign governments to allow greater 
market access for their products; will keep an 
insurmountable political voice within Japan in abeyance.
Like Mr. Morse at Zenchiku Land and Live Stock Co., Mr. 
Marchi is in the enviable position of having a well 
established contact with a major Japanese food company. Not 
only does this bring a "window to the final consumer," it 
also provides direct access to one of the most complicated 
distribution systems in the world. The benefit of this 
should be amplified with the development of "Steake 
Restaurant," where Mr. Marchi will get very direct feedback
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on consumer acceptance of the Marchi-Nichiro product. As 
with Mr. Morse, so many of the barriers which impede foreign 
access to the Japanese market simply don't exist for Mr. 
Marchi. The "functional integration" (Smith 1990) implicit 
in producers, packers, processors and retailers pushing 
toward a common goal will be instrumental in the timely 
development of an acceptable product.
Much progress has been made. Much more needs to be 
made before the Marchi Project has any real and lasting 
economic significance for Marchi Angus Ranches, for Montana, 
and for Nichiro Corporation. To continue progress toward 
the goal of providing three-hundred premium (B3 and better) 
carcasses per month as a profitable business for Marchi 
Angus Ranches, a number of things should occur. These 
include the following:
(1) Genetic improvement. The use of Wagyu and 
possibly "classic" Angus genetics should (and is) be 
pursued with some degree of urgency.
(2) Expand facilities. Additional feedlot space, and 
additional feed mill capacity will be required to 
service the numbers of cattle necessary to provide the 
expected quantity. Refrigeration space at White's 
Wholesale Meats will also need expansion. To raise the 
capital necessary for these investments in capital, a 
joint venture with Marchi Angus Ranches, White's 
Wholesale Meats, and Nichiro Corporation may need to be 
pursued.
(3) Load containers at the packing plant for ocean 
freight. To be competitive, freight costs must be 
reduced once a significant quantity of carcasses begins 
to be shipped on a regular basis. Shelf-life would 
also be improved by doing so.
(4) Vacuum-pack pre-seasoned, serving-sized portions 
of beef for microwave use. With the increasing numbers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8 1
of working women in Japan, this ready-to-use, premium 
product would cater to a growing market.
(5) Failing numbers three or four above, Nichiro 
Pacific, Ltd. should pursue fabricating the carcasses 
in its Seattle facility. This would include cutting, 
packaging, storing, and shipping the finished product 
to outlets in Japan.
(6) Develop a trademark. Like Certified Selkirk Beef, 
Marchi beef should be readily identifiable to the 
Japanese consumer. Particular attention should be 
given to how the product is presented. In developing a 
trademark, it must be mutually agreed that only beef of 
well-defined quality be acceptable for branding.
(7) Develop a collaborative, working relationship with 
the research team at Washington State University. Mr. 
Marchi is well on the way toward doing so. Each will 
benefit from the information exchange implicit in such 
a relationship, which should assist in product 
development in a cost-effective manner.
(8) Research concerning the use of ultrasonics in 
determining carcass marbling should continue. Should 
funding permit, Mr. Marchi may collaborate with Montana 
State University in doing so. Research completed or 
underway at other institutions should be investigated. 
Should this technology be developed, not only would a 
feedlot operator have more options available in 
marketing cattle, he would also have more efficient 
costs-of-gain.
(9) Consideration should be given to feeding heifers 
as well as steers. Though heifers tend to grade better 
than do steers under the Japanese grading system (Mr. 
Aoyama said that virgin females graded highest in terms 
of quality), lower feed efficiencies of heifers may 
make it uneconomical to feed them to premium weights.
(10) Renegotiate the $.83 cap on cost-of-gain. As 
Wagyu genetics are introduced into the cow herd, 
efficiencies of gain will likely decline. Costs will 
therefore increase. Mr. Marchi should not be expected 
to accept this risk unilaterally.
(11) Locate secondary or auxiliary markets. These may 
either be domestic or foreign.
The venture is not without risk. However, enough has 
been learned to warrant further feed trials, hopefully
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involving more cattle so the results may have real 
statistical significance. Mr. Yamamura's concern about 
developing an acceptable product to be in place as the 
import duty declines should be heeded. There is concern 
that, in spite of Mr. Marchi's and Nichiro^s best efforts, 
other enterprises undertaken by other concerns in other 
parts of the U.S. and in Australia may gain the advantage of 
the early adopter.
A number of concurrent feed trials, involving more 
cattle in each trial (20 to 30), and different bloodlines, 
ages, feed rations, daily gains, and length of feed period 
would provide more information in a shorter period of time. 
Much of this research is being conducted at WSU, but may be 
augmented by coordinated feed trials with the Marchi 
operation. A joint venture between Nichiro and Marchi Angus 
Ranches, established to provide the necessary capital and to 
spread the financial risk involved in such an undertaking 
and hopefully the financial reward, may be required.
An Investor's Perspective
Under the best case scenario, ROA is expected to be 22 
percent. Though this compares favorably with the current 
returns of the stock and bond markets, it may not be 
competitive with other businesses seeking venture capital. 
There is also a significant degree of risk. Given the 
reputation of Japanese businessmen as tough negotiators, the
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expected 20 percent markups on market price of feed and 
feeder cattle may not materialize. Carcass grades may not 
be satisfactory in terms of quality or consistency, and 
Nichiro may decide to abandon the project or change its 
goal. For instance, should carcasses which consistently 
grade B3 or better not be attainable, Nichiro may change its 
focus to the intermediate market. If this were the case, it 
may not be necessary to pay premiums to secure high quality 
cattle.
It is significant that the income and expense 
projections are based on historical costs associated with 
feeding Angus steers for Nichiro. These projections assume 
that Angus cattle, or cattle of similar performance, will 
continue to be fed and that an acceptable number will grade 
B3. Once Wagyu genetics are introduced and the cow herd is 
altered significantly in order to accommodate the Nichiro 
enterprise, a number of crucial measures will change. The 
livestock breeding herd, and the land necessary to carry 
that herd, will be added to assets (property, plant and 
equipment). Liabilities and owners' equity will increase in 
like measure, though to which degree for each category is 
uncertain. As a result, ROA will decrease in response to 
this increase in total assets and a decrease in net income.
That is, total income will likely show no significant 
change with the addition of Wagyu, at least initially. 
Expenses, however, are expected to increase due to the
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higher costs-of-gain for the less feed-efficient Wagyu. In 
spite of the increased cost associated with Wagyu, without 
these genetics it may well be that total income will decline 
due to an inability to have significant numbers of cattle 
grade well (relative to Japanese grading standards and 
Nichiro's goal), thereby precluding a 20 percent premium.
Not only may Wagyu be necessary for Marchi Angus Ranches to 
maintain this premium, but with satisfactory development of 
Wagyu genetics premiums exceeding 20 percent may be 
attainable.
Once the cow herd, or a significant portion of that cow 
herd, is dedicated to the Nichiro operation by changing its 
genetic structure for that purpose, capitalized land costs 
will increase substantially. This will reduce net cash 
flows as those land payments are made, and it will reduce 
net profit (net income after taxes, interest, depreciation 
and amortized land payments). A worst case scenario of 
fifty head per month will likely show a net profit between 
break-even and $20,000. The best case may register a net 
profit of about $100,000.
A venture capitalist who is motivated primarily by 
high rates of return would likely not be attracted by the 
Marchi enterprise. For an investor who is motivated in part 
by creating a value-added product in Montana, however, the 
Marchi-Nichiro enterprise may be quite appealing.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Summary of Financial Data, Nichiro Steer Operation
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CASH FLOWS (S)
INCOME & EXPENSE ($)
Best Case Worst Case
First 







































Net Income/Income: 3.75% 9.87% 4.90%
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(1) For the 50 head per month scenarios, cash disbursements for 
the worst case exceeded cash disbursements for the best case, 
which resulted in lower Net Incomes Before Interest and Taxes (NIBIT). This in turn allowed for substantial reductions in income tax, as follows:
Change in Cash Disbursements 50 hd/mo
increase in cash disbursements,
worst case over best case 11,600
tax reduction 54,700
net reduction in cash disburse­
ments, for worst case 43,100
Total and per-head cash disbursements are therefore lower 
for the worst case scenario than they are for the best case 
scenario.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Financial Ratios —  Nichiro Steer Operation 
50 head per month (Best Case)
LIQUIDITY:
Working Capital (1) $670,000
Current Ratio (2) 3.48
LONG-TERM DEBT SERVICE ABILITY:
Debt Ratio (3) 0.60
Debt/Equity (4) 1.48
PROFITABILITY :
Return on Assets (5) 21.87%
Return on Investment (6) 28.94%
(1) Working capital = current assets - current liabilities.
(2) Current Ratio = current assets / current liabilities.
(3) Debt ratio = total liabilities / total assets.
(4) Debt/equity = total liabilities / owners' equity.
(5) Return on assets = (net income before interest and income
tax / total assets.
(6) Return on investment =net income before interest and income tax + (interest expense 
X (i-tax rate)] / long-term liabilities + equity.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Financial Ratios —  Nichiro Steer Operation 50 head per month (Worst Case)
LIQUIDITY;
Working Capital (1) $670,000
Current Ratio (2) 3.40
LONG-TERM DEBT SERVICE ABILITY:
Debt Ratio (3) 0.60
Debt/Equity (4) 1.48
PROFITABILITY:
Return on Assets (5) 10.54%
Return on Investment (6) 14.341
(1) Working capital = current assets - current liabilities.
(2) Current Ratio = current assets / current liabilities.
(3) Debt ratio = total liabilities / total assets.
(4) Debt/equity = total liabilities / owners' equity.
(5) Return on assets = (net income before interest and income
tax / total assets.
(6) Return on investment =
net income before interest and income tax + (interest expense 
X (1 - tax rate)] / long-term liabilities + equity.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES










Property, Plant and EquipmentFeedlot, scale, fences and Imprvmnts 
Equipment and vehicles
Total Depreciable Assets 
Less accumulated depreciation























Owne rs' Equ i ty:
Capital stock
Additional contributed capital 
Retained earnings
Total Stockholders' Equity
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Pro Forma Statement of Income and Expenses, Nichiro Steer Operation November 1, 1991 through October 31, 1992
INCOME:
Sale of steers: 10 strs § 1122.5# § $.80 $8,980
Sale of feed:
57 ton grain mixture @ $180 $10,260
20 ton hay @ $72 1,440
mineral 50 11,750
Yardage: $.50 x 10 strs x 360 days 1,800
Veterinary care: 10 strs § $15 150
Transportation ;
Marchi to White's @ $3 per head 30White's to Seattle i $.06 per pound 530 560
Livestock processing fees:
slaughter § $25 per head 250
packaging and handling § $20 per head 200
meat inspection: 10 hours § $18 180 630
TOTAL INCOME $23,870
OPERATING EXPENSES:Cost of steers: 10 strs § 1122.5 # § $.80 $8,980
Cost of feed:
57 ton grain mixture @ $150 $8,550
20 ton hay § $60 1,200 9,750
Ranch labor:animal handling, feeding, facility mntnc. 40





needles, syringes, misc. supplies 15 120
Feedlot maintenance (materials, tools) 200
Feedlot utilities 150
Brand inspection 10
Telephone, fax, postage 20
Legal and accounting 50
Travel 50
Membrshps., pubis., mktg. 50
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Transportation :
March! feedlot to White's @ $3 per head 30
White's to Seattle @ S.06 per pound 530 560
Livestock processing costs :
slaughter @ $24 per head 240
packaging and handling @ $20 per head 200
meat inspection: 10 hours § $18 180 620
Commission of Trading House ($1 per live cwt) 110
Insurance 80
Loss on cost of gain (excess above $.83/#) 650
Livestock death loss 100Property tax 100
Depreciation 350
TOTAL EXPENSES $22,010
NET INCOME BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES 1,860
Interest expense 370
Allowance for income tax 596
NET INCOME $894
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis —  Best Case (1)







1995 300 hd/mo 1996
Sale of steers $129,600 $648,000 $1,296,000 $3,888,000Sale of feed 140,400 702,000 1,404,000 4,212,000Yardage 21,600 108,000 216,000 648,000Veterinary care 1,800 9,000 18,000 54,000Transportation : Harchi to White's 360 1,740 3,300 9,000White's to Seattle 7,200 36,000 72,000 216,000Lvstk. processing fees 
slaughter 3,000 14,400 26,400 72,000pkg and hndlg 2,400 11,400 20,400 54,000meat inspection 350 525 700 875
TOTAL INCOME 5306,710 $1,531,065 $3,056,800 $9,153,875
OPERATING EXPENSES:
Cost of steers sold $108,000 $540,000 $1,080,000 $3,240,000Cost of feed: 
grain 102,600 513,000 1,026,000 3,078,000hay 14,400 72,000 144,000 432,000Labor :
general ranch work 500 7,500 15,000 30,000payroll taxes 100 1,500 3,000 6,000Ranch supplies 600 2,400 3,600 7,200Veterinary care: 
medicines 600 3,000 6,000 18,000vaccinations 960 4,800 9,600 28,800supplies 240 1,200 2,400 7,200Feedlot mntnc. and sup 400 1,000 2,000 4,000Feedlot utilities 500 600 800 1,000Brand inspection 140 690 1,380 4,140Phone, fax, postage 1,200 4,500 6,000 10,800Legal and accounting 600 1,800 2,100 2,700Travel 720 2,700 3,900 5,400Membrs, pubis, mktg 300 400 500 600Transportation : 
Harchi to White's 360 1,650 3,000 8,100White's to Seattle 7,200 36,000 66,000 180,000Lvstk. processing costs 
slaughter 2,880 13,200 24,000 64,800pkg and hndlng 2,400 10,800 19,200 50,400
meat inspection 350 525 700 875Commission 1,380 6,900 13,800 41,400
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Insurance
Loss on cost of gain 

















TOTAL EXPENSES $255,910 $1,267,115 $2,512,480 $7,450,015
NIBIT (2) 50,800 263,950 544,320 1,703,860
Interest expense 4,800 12,000 60,000 120,000
Allowance for income tax 18,400 100,780 193,728 633,544
NET INCOME $27,600 $151,170 $290,592 $950,316
(1) ASSUMPTIONS
Income: steers and feed sold at cost plus 20 percent; yardage
e $.50 per head per day (360 days); veterinary care at cost; 
modest markups on transportation and livestock processing.
Expenses: costs for hay § $60 per ton and grain $ $150 per ton
remain constant; economies of scale (lower per-unit costs) 
for ranch supplies, transportation, slaughter, packing and handling, and insurance.
Assumed a reduction in pounds per head exceeding the cap on 
cost of gain ($.03 per pound, from 500 pounds for 10 head 
per month to 75 pounds for 300 head per month). Livestock death loss § 2 percent throughout; property tax § $10 per head; income tax § 40 percent. Other increases are assumed to be 
consistent with increases in livestock volume.
(2) NIBIT = Net Income Before Interest and Taxes
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HARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis —  Worst Case (I)







1995 300 hd/mo 1996
Sale of steers $108,000 $540,000 $1,080,000 $3,240,000Sale of feed 140,400 702,000 1,404,000 4,212,000Yardage 21,600 97,200 172,800 453,600Veterinary care 1,800 9,000 18,000 54,000Transportation : 
Harchi to White's 360 1,740 3,300 9,000White's to Seattle 7,200 36,000 66,000 180,000Lvstk. processing fees 
slaughter 3 ,000 13,800 25,200 68,400pkg and hndlg 2,400 10,800 19,200 50,400meat inspection 350 525 700 875
5TAL INCOME $285,110 $1,411,065 $2,789,200 $8,268,275
OPERATING EXPENSES:Cost of strs sold $108,000 $540,000 $1 ,080,000 $3 ,240,000Cost of feed:
grain 102,600 513,000 1,026,000 3,078,000hay 14,400 72,000 144,000 432,000Labor :
general ranch work 500 7,500 15,000 30,000payroll taxes 100 1,500 3,000 6,000Ranch supplies 1,000 5,000 8,000 11,000Veterinary care:
medicines 600 3,000 6,000 18,000vaccinations 960 4,800 9,600 28,800
supplies 240 1,200 2,400 7,200Feedlot mntnc. and sup 400 1,000 2,000 4,000
Feedlot utilities 600 800 1,000 1,300Brand inspection 140 690 1,380 4,140
Phone, fax, postage 1,200 4,500 6,000 10,800Legal and accounting 600 2,000 2,500 4,000Travel 720 3,500 5,000 8,000
Membrs, pubis, mktg 300 500 750 950Transportation :
Harchi to White's 360 1,740 3,300 9,000
White's to Seattle 7,200 36,000 66,000 180,000Lvstk. processing costs:
slaughter 3,000 13,800 25,200 68,400pkg and hndlng 2,400 10,800 19,200 50,400
meat inspection 350 525 700 875
Commission 1,380 6,900 13,800 41,400
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Insurance
Loss on cost of gain 












54,000 162,000 43,200 
108,000
TOTAL EXPENSES $257,850 $1,283,855 $2,557,530 $7,615,865
NIBIT (2) 27,260 127,210 231,670 652,410
Interest expense 4,800 12,000 60,000 120,000
Allowance for income tax 8,984 46,084 68,668 212,964
NET INCOME $13,476 $69,126 $103,002 $319,446
(1) ASSUMPTIONS
Income; steers sold at break-even ; feed sold at cost plus 20 
percent; yardage § $.50 per head per day {360 days) for 10 head 
per month, decreasing incrementally (minimum of $.35 per head 
per month) as quantity increases; veterinary care, transpor­
tation and livestock processing at cost.
Expenses: costs for hay @ $60 per ton and grain § $150 per ton
remain constant; though to a lesser extent than the "best case" scenario, economies of scale (lower per-unit costs) 
were assumed for ranch supplies, transportation, slaughter, 
packing and handling, and insurance.
No reduction in pounds per head exceeding the cap on cost of 
gain was assumed (500 pounds per head § $.03). Livestock death 
loss from 3 percent for 10 head per month to 5 percent for 300 
head per month. Property tax § $12 per head; income tax § 40 
percent. Increases in other categories assume less favorable 
pricing or increase in volume purchased. Allowance for income 
tax declined due to lower NIBIT.
(2) NIBIT = Net Income Before Interest and Taxes
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Statement of Cash Flows, Nichiro Steer Operation November 1, 1991 through October 31, 1992 (1)
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Quarters (2)
Total1st 2nd 3rd 4th 12 mos.
CASH RECEIPTS (per head):
Sale of steers $898 SO SO $0 $898Sale of feed 0 0 0 980 980
Yardage 0 0 0 180 180
Veterinary care 0 0 0 15 15
Transportation 0 0 0 56 56Livestock processing fees 0 0 0 63 63
Total Cash Receipts $898 $0 SO $1,294 $2,192
CASH DISBURSEMENTS (per head):
Cost of steers sold (3) $200 $200 $200 $225 $825
Cost of feed purchased:
hay 0 0 0 0 0
grain 0 0 0 0 0Cost of feed raised:
fertilizer 0 18 0 0 18
seed 0 10 0 0 10
irrigation 0 0 18 11 29
fuel, oil, grease 4 10 4 1 19equipment maintenance 1 10 11 7 29
labor 9 9 9 6 33misc. supplies 0 0 3 3 6
grain processing 0 0 0 143 143
Ranch labor 0 1 2 2 5Ranch supplies 0 0 1 0 1
Veterinary care:
medicines 1 1 1 1 4
vaccinations 6 0 0 0 6
supplies 1 1 0 0 2
Feedlot mntnc. and sup. 6 6 5 3 20
Feedlot utilities 5 4 3 3 15
Brand inspection 0 0 0 1 1
Leases 3 2 3 2 10
Telephone, fax, postage 1 1 0 0 2
Legal and accounting 0 0 5 0 5
Travel 1 2 1 1 5
Membrshps, pubis, mktg 2 1 2 0 5
Transportation :
March! to White's 0 0 0 3 3
White's to Seattle 0 0 0 53 53
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Lvstk. processing costs:slaughter 0 0 0 24 24pkg and hndlng 0 0 0 20 20meat inspection 0 0 0 18 18Commission 11 0 0 0 11Insurance 2 2 2 2 8Interest 10 9 9 9 37Amortization of land pmts 15 16 16 16 63Property tax 5 0 5 0 10Income tax 15 15 15 15 60
Total Cash Disburs. $298 $318 $315 $569 $1,500
ST CASH FLOW (per head) $600 ($318) ($315) $725 $692
ŜH BALANCE (per head) $600 $282 ($33) $692 $692
(1) 10 head on feed
(2) Quarter 1: November 1 through January 31
Quarter 2 : February 1 through April 30
Quarter 3: May 1 through July 31
Quarter 4: August 1 through October 31
(3) Production cost is based on the break-even, total (or economic) 
cost of raising steer calves for export to Japan as carcass beef. 
Production costs were calculated as follows: $.90 per pound up
to 500 pounds ($450), plus $.60 per pound from 500 to 1125 pounds 
($375), for a total production cost of $825 for an 1125 pound 
steer.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis —  Best Case (1)








Sale of steers $148.5 $148.5 $148.5 $148.5 $594.0Sale of feed 156.4 156.4 156.4 156.3 625.5Yardage 27.0 27.0 27.0 27.0 108.0
Veterinary care 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 9.0
Transportation 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.7 37.7Lvstk. processing fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.3 26.3
Total Cash Receipts $334.2 $334.2 $334.1 $398.0 $1,400.5
CASH DISBURSEMENTS (1000s)i 
Cost of steers sold:
steers raised (3) $10.3 $10.3 $10.3 $10.3 $41.2steers purchased (4) 113.4 113.5 113.4 113.5 453.8Cost of feed purchased:
hay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0grain 122.6 122.6 122.6 122.6 490.5
Cost of feed raised (5):
fertilizer 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 3.4
seed 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 1.9
irrigation 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.0 5.5
fuel, oil, grease 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.3 3.6equipment maintenance 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 5.5labor 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.1 6.1
misc. supplies 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.1grain processing 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 3.8
Ranch labor 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 2.9Ranch supplies 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.3Veterinary care:
medicines 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 3.0
vaccinations 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 4.8
supplies 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2Feedlot mntnc. and sup. 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0
Feedlot utilities 2.5 2.5 0.5 0.5 6.0Brand inspection 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7
Leases 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 10.0Telephone, fax, postage 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 4.5
Legal and accounting 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.8Travel 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 2.7
Membrshps, pubis, mktg 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4Transportation:
Harchi to White's 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.7
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White's to Seattle Livestock processing i 
slaughter 









NET CASH FLOW (1000s) 
CASH BALANCE (1000s)
9;: 9 9 9 36.0
3 . 3 3.3 3 . 3 3 . 3 13.22.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 10.80.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.51.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 6.90.6 0.7 0 . 6 0.7 2.63.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 12.01.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 5.03.0 0.0 3 . 0 0.0 6.025.2 25.2 25. 2 25.2 100.8
$307.6 $307.7 $320.4 $316.4 $1,252.2
$26.6 $26.5 $13.7 $81.6 $148.3
$26.6 $53.1 $66.7 $148.3 $148.3
(1) ASSUMPTIONS
Receipts: steers and feed sold at cost plus 20 percent; yardage
§ $.50 per head per day; other cash receipts are reimbursements 
at cost.
Disbursements; all cash disbursements are based on costs that 
are known or on costs that can be reasonably expected under 
normal operating conditions.
(2) Quarter 1: November 1 through January 31
Quarter 2: February 1 through April 30
Quarter 3: Hay 1 through July 31
Quarter 4: August 1 through October 31
(3) No more than 50 raised steers, based on a resident herd of 100
mother-cows. Production costs were calculated as follows: $.90per pound up to 500 pounds ($450), plus $.60 per pound from 500 
to 1125 pounds ($375), for a total production cost of $825 for an 
1125 pound steer.
(4) Purchased steers are bought at weaning at 500 pounds § $.90 per
pound. Cost of gain from 500 pounds to 1125 pounds § $.60 per 
pound.
(5) Feed raised for feedlot consumption is produced at average costs
of $20 per ton for hay and $45 per ton for grain. 1200 tons of
hay and 150 tons of grain are raised by Harchi Angus Ranches, for 
total feed production of 1350 tons.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis —  Worst Case (1)




2nd 3rd 4 th Total 12 mos.
CASH RECEIPTS (lOOOs);
Sale of steers $123.7 $123.8 $123.7 $123.8 $495.0Sale of feed 156.4 156.4 156.4 156.3 625.5Yardage 24.3 24.3 24.3 24.3 97.2
Veterinary care 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 9.0
Transportation 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.7 37.7
Lvstk. processing fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.1 25.1
Total Cash Receipts $306.7 $306.8 $306.6 $369.4 $1,289.5
CASH DISBURSEMENTS (1000s)i 
Cost of steers sold:steers raised (3) $10.3 $10.3 $10,3 $10.3 $41.2steers purchased (4) 113.4 113.5 113.4 113.5 453.8Cost of feed purchased:
hay 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0grain 122.6 122.6 122.6 122.6 490.5Cost of feed raised:
fertilizer 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 3.4seed 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.0 1.9
irrigation 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.0 5.5
fuel, oil, grease 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.3 3.6eguipment maintenance 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 5.5labor 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.1 6.1misc. supplies 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.1
grain processing 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 3.8Ranch labor 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 2.9Ranch supplies 0.9 1 1 1 3.9Veterinary care:
medicines 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 3.0vaccinations 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 4.8supplies 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2Feedlot mntnc. and sup. 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0
Feedlot utilities 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 8.0Brand inspection 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7
Leases 0.0 0.0 6.0 6.0 12.0Telephone, fax, postage 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 4.5
Legal and accounting 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 4.0Travel 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 3.5Membrshps, pubis, mktg 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5Transportation :
Marchi to White's 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.7
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White's to Seattle 9 9 9 9 36.0Livestock processing costs:
slaughter 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.4 13.8pkg and hndlng 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 10.8meat inspection 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5Commission 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 6.9Insurance 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 2.7Interest 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 12.0Amort, of land pmts 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 5.0Property tax 3.6 0.0 3.6 0.0 7.2Income tax 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 46.1
Total Cash Disburs. $297.0 $296.1 $310.6 $305.2 $1,209.1
NET CASH FLOW (1000s) $9.7 $10.7 ($4.0) $64.2 $80.4
CASH BALANCE (lOOOs) $9.7 $20.3 $16.3 $80.4 $80.4
(1) ASSUMPTIONS
Receipts: steers sold at cost; feed sold at cost plus 20 percent;
yardage § $.45 per head per day; other cash receipts are 
reimbursements at cost.
Disbursements: Increases in ranch supplies, feedlot utilities,
leases, legal and accounting, travel, marketing, slaughter, 
and insurance. A reduction in taxes is due to lower NIBIT.
(2) Quarter 1: November 1 through January 31
Quarter 2: February 1 through April 30
Quarter 3: May 1 through July 31
Quarter 4: August 1 through October 31
(3) No more than 50 raised steers, based on a resident herd of 100
mother-cows. Production costs were calculated as follows: $.90
per pound up to 500 pounds ($450), plus $.60 per pound from 500 
to 1125 pounds ($375), for a total production cost of $825 for a 
1125 pound steer.
(4) Purchased steers are bought at weaning at 500 pounds @ $.90 per
pound. Cost of gain from 500 pounds to 1125 pounds § $.60 per 
pound.
(5) Feed raised for feedlot consumption is produced at average costsof $20 per ton for hay and $45 per ton for grain. 1200 tons of
hay and 150 tons of grain are raised by Harchi Angus Ranches, for 
total feed production of 1350 tons.
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NICHIRO CORPORATION
Pro Forma Profit and Loss —  Carcass Sale in Japan (wholesale)Scenario I 
November 1992
COST:
Nichiro's cost, FOB SeaTac:
10 carcasses § 1800 lbs @ 60% yield § #2.03/lb $21,924
Airfreight to Tokyo:
10,800 lbs § S.80/lb 8,640
Ad valoreum tax (import duty):
10 head @ 1125 lbs 8 $.80 8 70% tariff (1) 6,300
Total Cost, 10 Carcasses FOB Tokyo $36,864
REVENUE:
Sales price (wholesale):
4898 kg 8 60% B3 8 900 yen/kg (2) $20,3454898 kg 8 40% B2 8 700 yen/kg 10,549
Total Revenue, 10 Carcasses Wholesale Tokyo $30,895
NET PROFIT (LOSS) ($5,969)
NER PROFIT (LOSS) PER HEAD ($597)
(1) Ad valoreum tax based on price at which Nichiro purchased the 
steers (October 1991).
(2) Conversion factors used: 2.205 lbs/kg; 130 yen per dollar.
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NICHIRO CORPORATION
Pro Forma Profit and Loss —  Carcass Sale in Japan (Wholesale)Scenario II 
November 1992
COST:
Nichiro's cost, FOB SeaTac:
10 carcasses @ 1800 lbs § 60% yield @ #2.03/lb $21,924
Airfreight to Tokyo:
10,800 lbs e $.80/lb 8,640
Ad valoreum tax (Import duty):
10 head § 1125 lbs § $.80 § 70% tariff (1) 6,300
Total Cost, 10 Carcasses FOB Tokyo $36,864
REVENUE:
Sales price (wholesale) (1):
I carcass § A3 § 1600 yen/kg (2) $6,028
3 carcasses § A2 § 1300 yen/kg 14,694
3 carcasses ? 83 § 900 yen/kg 10,173
3 carcasses § B2 @ 700 yen/kg 7,912
Total Revenue, 10 Carcasses Wholesale Tokyo $38,807
NET PROFIT (LOSS) $1,943
NET PROFIT (LOSS) PER HEAD $194
(1) Ad valoreum tax based on price at which Nichiro purchased the 
steers (October 1991).
(2) Carcass weights § 489.8 kg (1080 lbs).
(3) Conversion factors used: 2.205 lbs/kg; 130 yen per dollar.
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